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EDITORIAL

ARTICLES

World Migration in the Age of Globalization: Policy Implications and Challenges

PETER LI

Immigrants and the Economy: Debates about Sustaining Economic Growth in Post-Industrial Societies

WILLIAM A V CLARK

“The Sum of my Margins may be Greater than your Centre”: Journey and Prospects of a Marginal Man in the Global Economy

JAMES H LIU

Changing Asian Immigration and Settlement in the Pacific Rim

WEI LI

Pacific Islands Population and Development: Facts, Fiction and Follies

GERALD HABERKORN

The Structure of Māori – Asian Relations: An Ambivalent Future?

TAHU H KUKUTAI

One in Six? The Rapid Growth of the Māori Population in Australia

PAUL HAMER
Attachment to Place in New Zealand

CATHERINE J SCHRODER 177

Labour Force Shortages in Rural New Zealand: Temporary Migration and the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Work Policy

KIRSTEN LOVELOCK, TERESA LEOPOLD 213

RESEARCH NOTES

Once Returned, Twice Forgotten? Asian Students Returning Home after Studying in New Zealand

ANDREW BUTCHER, TERRY MCGRATH, PAUL STOCK 235

The Distribution of Personal Incomes, 1951 – 2006: Māori and non-Māori Compared

JOHN GOULD 251
Editorial

This is an unusual issue of the *New Zealand Population Review*. Firstly, it is a much thicker publication than normal and this is because it contains papers submitted over two years, 2007 and 2008 and thus spans the volumes for those years, 33 and 34. Secondly there has been a long delay in getting the papers published largely because of some major changes in personnel involved in producing the journal.

This double issue contains a series of papers dealing with aspects of population change and international migration that were presented by speakers from North America (Professor W.A.V. Clark, Professor Peter Li, Associate Professor Wei Li), the Pacific (Dr Gerald Haberkorn) and New Zealand (Tahu Kukutai, Andrew Butcher and his colleagues) at conferences during 2007, including the Population Association of New Zealand's Biennial Conference in July 2007. It also includes the research paper by Catherine Schroder which won the Jacoby Prize in 2007.

There are also three papers which were submitted for publication during 2007 and 2008 outside of conference contexts by Kirsten Lovelock and Teresa Leopold, Paul Hamer and John Gould.

We decided to print the papers in a single volume for two main reasons. Firstly, there is quite a bit of linkage between several of the papers that were presented at conferences in 2007 – especially papers dealing with international migration in global and Asia-Pacific contexts. Secondly, the single volume enabled us to get around some problems with production during this transitional phase between editors and production teams.

We apologise to the authors for the delays that have occurred between the time they prepared their manuscripts and the time they were printed. We appreciate that arguments made in 2007 and early 2008, especially about international migration and the state of economies, relate to a pre-recession era. In our view these papers remain valuable contributions to the literature even if their reference is to situations which existed before the current economic crisis commenced.

The editors would like to express considerable appreciation to Katie McLean, Administrator in the Population Studies Centre at the University of Waikato, for formatting and preparing the papers for printing, and to Jenine Cooper for editorial assistance.

Richard Bedford
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World Migration in the Age of Globalization: Policy Implications and Challenges

PETER S. LI

Abstract

Economic globalization has changed the nature and volume of world migration. The world migrant population reached 190 million in 2005, but migration tends to be from less developed to more developed regions. Changes in world migration are related to fundamental features of economic globalization, but also influenced by demographic transitions in immigrant-receiving societies. Declining fertility and population aging compel many advanced industrial countries to rely on immigration for growth in labour force and population, but the demand is largely for highly-skilled immigrants. Globalization produces contradictory tendencies, making it easier for highly-educated professionals to migrate while displacing unskilled workers in traditional economies. Immigrant-receiving countries are confronted with issues related to international migration, including the need to develop a long-term immigration policy to attract immigrants with substantial human capital and to strengthen security to bar the entry of unskilled migrants and asylum seekers. Competition amongst immigrant-receiving societies for highly-skilled workers is increasing. Future brain drain is likely to be multidirectional and the world community may be compelled to agree upon a universal framework under which, world migration could be regulated.

Globalization has increased the interconnectedness of nation states, speeding up the flow of goods, services, ideas and people across national boundaries. There was international migration long before the age of globalization, but the speed, scope, complexity and volume of world migration under the global era are unprecedented. In 1980,
the world migrant population, that is, the population made up of those who resided in a country other than their country of birth, was less than 100 million people, or 2.2 percent of the world population (United Nations 2004, 2005). By 2005, the migrant population had increased to 190 million people or 2.9 percent of the world population (United Nations 2006). Thus, on average between 1980 and 2005, the world immigrant population increased by 3.6 million people each year. However, the distribution of the migrant population is uneven, with over 60 percent of the 190 million migrants or immigrants located in the more developed regions of the world; Europe and North America account for 57 percent of the world migrant population (United Nations 2006). How does globalization change world migration? What are the features of globalization that shape the nature of world migration? What are the policy implications for immigrant receiving countries?

**Features of Globalization**

There is no doubt that as a result of globalization, regions and nations become more interdependent and integrated. But the forces of globalization are perhaps most evident in economic relations. Economic globalization involves four essential elements. First, the growth of digitalized technology and communication has revolutionized the nature, efficiency and organization of every aspect of production and distribution. Digitalized technology has hastened the speed of automation. Globalization enables corporate firms to localize economic activities in different countries and regions by taking advantage of local labour supply and market conditions.

Concomitantly, digitalized technologies and transnational corporate structures and networks make it possible for firms to integrate localized economic activities in metropolis headquarters. In short, free trade and globalization enable corporate firms to operate in an enlarged transnational market, one that is characterized by the increasing deregulation of local restrictions and the integration of national economies into a universal framework of free trade. Thus, economic globalization thrives on advanced digitalized technology that facilitates the global expansion of corporations by enabling them to optimize their operations and accumulation in the global market and to economize the cost of such operations. In other words, the same process that promotes the dispersion of economic activities across
national boundaries also hastens the integration of territorially dispersed economic activities in the hands of corporate concentrations in global cities (Sassen 2001).

Second, the rapid growth of the market economy and world trade has prompted regional and national economies to dismantle barriers of trade by integrating transnational trading zones in order to carve out a larger share of the world market. The formation of European Union (EU), North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is aimed in part at promoting freer trade among countries within the integrated region. As well, the World Trade Organization, founded in 1995 by the 128 signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is dedicated to the principle of free trade through the development of a universal framework of trade to which member states comply (World Trade Organization 2001). Thus, economic globalization not only expands the market economy but does so under a universal framework of free trade that aims at incorporating peripheral regions to a singular global economic system unhindered by national boundaries.

Third, the integration of the world economy facilitates the flow of capital, raw materials, goods, services and people across national boundaries. Capitalist expansion and economic globalization encourage the freedom of movement of people. It is a freedom that is closely associated with free trade, within which investments, exports, imports, information and capital are encouraged to move and operate in relatively unrestricted ways within a common trading zone, or a block of trade partners. One of the outcomes of globalization is to soften national boundaries by internationalizing domestic markets and integrating them in production, distribution and consumption. Thus, the expansion of the market economy and the integration of world trade inevitably lead to a larger volume of human migration.

Increased migration is evident not only from less to more developed regions of the world, but also among countries within integrated economic zones. For example, since the formation of the European Union in 1993, it has maintained the principle of free movement of people within the integrated European community. The original principle to open Europe’s labour markets to migrant workers and their families was later extended to cover all categories of citizens of the European Union. To facilitate the free movement of citizens within the European Union, member states also
adopted the policy of mutual recognition of professional qualifications so that those with such qualifications may work in any country within the union and have their credentials properly recognized. The North American Free Trade Agreement, signed by the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico in 1994, also has a visa provision to allow a wide range of professionals in one country to work in another. For example, the U.S. created the TN visa to allow Canadians trained in 64 broad professional categories to work in the U.S. on a yearly basis but the visa may be renewed indefinitely. Hence, economic globalization removes many barriers of mobility by integrating regional economic zones and by allowing those with highly-trained human capital to move relatively freely across national boundaries.

Finally, since economic globalization is prompted by advances in information technology, there is a competition among information-based economies to develop such technology in order to sustain their future growth. The term “new economy” is used to refer to the inevitable future of the world economy in which countries that invest in information and communications technology stand the best chance for economic growth and wealth accumulation (OECD 2001). As a result, economic globalization brings an increasing demand for highly-trained human capital among advanced developed countries, prompting competition for high-skill workers in the world labour pool.

**World Migration**

The age of globalization has witnessed some major changes in world migration. Many of these changes are related to the emerging global economic structure and the impact such a structure has on advanced capitalist countries and peripheral regions. However, there are other changes in advanced capitalist societies, notably the demographic transitions related to declining fertility and aging that produce pressures for these countries to look outside their borders for future growth in population and in the labour force. Four major areas of change in world migration are evident under globalization.
Shifts in Source and Destination Regions

Europe, a traditional emigration source, has become a net receiver of international migration. Throughout the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century, Europe was a main source of out-migration, particularly to North America. However, in the decades after the Second World War, emigration from Europe has slowed down because of the economic reconstruction of Europe after the war and the corresponding rise in demand for skilled workers. By the 1960s, it was evident that there was a shortage of skilled labour in the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. amended its immigration law in 1965 and Canada in 1967 to remove national and racial origin in the selection of immigrants and to place a greater emphasis on educational credentials and labour market needs. These changes increased the opportunity of immigration to North America for those outside of Europe, notably from Asia and also Africa and Latin America. By the 1980s, it became clear that immigration from Europe has fallen behind the migration flow from the so-called “non-traditional” parts of the world.

Data on the global migrant population in the first decade of the 21st century show that Latin America, Asia and Africa have a net migration loss, whereas Oceania, mainly Australia and New Zealand, North America and Europe have a substantial net gain (Figure 1).

When the migrant population of each region is compared in terms of its proportional population weight, it becomes clear that the migrant or immigrant population accounts for a much larger share of the population in North America, Oceania and Europe than Asia and Africa. The data show that migration in the global era tends to be from less developed regions to more developed regions of the world, and the immigrant population carries a larger population weight in the more developed than less developed regions of the world.
Declining Fertility and Aging

Declining fertility and population aging have compelled many highly developed countries to rely on international migration as a source of labour supply and population growth. The fertility rate and the level of economic development usually change in opposite directions. Hence, the more developed regions of the world tend to have a lower fertility rate (Table 1).

Among OECD countries, the fertility rate has been declining since the 1960s to a point where many countries do not have the natural capacity to replace their populations. A total fertility rate of 2.1 is considered by demographers to be the required level for a population to replace its members through natural replacement. The only OECD countries in 2005 that had a total fertility rate that was marginally below the natural replacement level are the U.S. (2.04), New Zealand (1.96) and Ireland (1.94). In contrast, Japan, Italy, Spain and Germany have a total fertility rate of about 1.3, and Canada, 1.5 (Table 1).
Table 1: Total fertility rate and foreign or foreign-born labour force in selected OECD countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD Countries</th>
<th>Total Fertility Rate (children per woman) 2000-2005</th>
<th>Foreign or Foreign-born Labour Force as % of Total Labour Force 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The decline in fertility means that a succeeding cohort of labour market entrants will be smaller than the preceding one and, over time, the senior population will rise. Population aging is a demographic problem that is
affecting many OECD countries, and some have responded by increasing the intake of new immigrants.

The case of Canada illustrates well how demographic factors have made the issue of immigration pressing. The total fertility rate of Canada shows a dramatic shift over the 75-year period from 1921 to 1996. Except for the decade between the late 1940s and the late 1950s when the post-war prosperity brought about a short period of baby boom, the overall trend has been declining. More recent data indicate that the fertility rate dropped further to 1.5 in 2003. In other words, the continuous decline in the fertility rate in Canada means that Canada has lost its capacity to replace its population by natural increases.

Besides declining fertility, the most notable change is the aging tendency of Canada’s population and the corresponding decline in the proportion of the population under 15 years of age. Since 1961, the youth population has been declining steadily; by 1971, it was down to 30 percent, by 1991, 21 percent, and by 2001, 19 percent (Li 1996; Statistics Canada, 2006). At the same time, there was a corresponding increase in the proportion of elderly people. In 2001, Canadians of 65 years and over accounted for 13 percent of the country’s population. The median age of the Canadian population was 38.5 years in 2005; it was 31 in 1985 (Statistics Canada 2006).

There are further implications. Over time, the two trends of declining fertility and aging expand the elderly population and shrink the proportion of people in the working ages, since succeeding cohorts are proportionately smaller. When this happens, there would be a smaller proportion of people in the working ages to support a tax system to finance the publicly funded health and income security programs; at the same time, there would be a substantial cost increase in maintaining these programs which have to service a rising number of users due to the growing elderly population.

Statistics Canada has used different assumptions to project the future of Canada’s population, and the results show that Canada will have more deaths than births as early as 2016 under the scenario of low growth, and as late as 2036 under the scenario of high growth (George et al. 2001: 64). In short, sometime between 2016 and 2036, Canada would have to rely exclusively on immigration in order to prevent its population from shrinking because of its inability to replace itself naturally. Even with
immigration, the aging trend will continue. Under the medium growth scenario, the median age of Canada’s population is expected to reach 42.5 in 2021 and 46.2 in 2051. At the same time, the working population will be around 61.5 percent in 2035 and 60.9 percent in 2051 (George et al. 2001: 76). The demographic challenges in Canada explain why Canada maintains a relatively high level of immigration. As of 2001, the immigrant population accounted for 18.4 percent of the country’s total population and about 20 percent of its total labour force (Statistics Canada 2003a; b).

**Globalisation and the Demand for Labour**

Globalization has had a contradictory impact on the demand of labour, creating new opportunities of social mobility for those in possession of scientific expertise and technical knowledge needed for the new economy, while dislocating others in peripheral countries connected to the traditional economy. These tendencies generate different kinds of labour demand in different locations. In developed regions of the world, the demand is mainly for highly skilled labour tied to the growth of the new economy, whereas in peripheral regions penetrated by the market economy, the demand is usually for low-cost industrial labour needed to fuel the economic expansion driven by the rapid growth in industrial and manufacturing production.

There are further contradictory tendencies within developed regions of the world, notably in what Sassen (2001) calls “global cities”. The demand and growth of specialized service firms in global cities have enriched the professionals and technocrats responsible for their success, but the informalization of economic activities, in production and distribution, have resulted in poor remuneration for those associated with them (Sassen 2001). Thus under globalization, the demand for skilled labour by immigrant-receiving countries has risen while the demand for unskilled labour has shifted to offshore regions where such labour supply is plentiful and economic.

However, a distinction should be made between structural demand and actual demand. According to dual economy theory, demand for unskilled labour is a permanent feature of capital (Piore 1979). This is because under capitalism, capital is fixed and labour is a variable. The cost of procuring skilled labour compels employers to protect it in terms of providing training and benefits. But the unskilled labour is a dispensable
component. The shifting of production to periphery countries means that the demand for unskilled labour is partly shifted to offshore locations where its abundance, supply and low-cost makes it attractive, and the lack of labour protection makes laying off unskilled workers easy. Hence the structural demand for unskilled labour may not have changed, but its manifestation as an actual demand has shifted elsewhere as a result of outsourcing of manufacturing jobs. But some sectors, such personal services, still require regular supply of unskilled labour. But the structural shift in production makes low-skill immigrants less needed for manual labour in advanced capitalist countries and global cities.

Historically, the rising demand for skilled workers is met by the state investing in higher education as a means to ensure that the supply of skilled labour is assured. Under the information age, the rising demand for high-skill labour is compounded by demographic transitions that threaten the size of the entry cohorts to the labour force. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the increased labour force participation of women and their rise in enrolment in the higher education system have maintained a sustained growth of labour supply for many advanced industrial countries. But the increase of women’s labour market participation has begun to saturate. As well, the declining fertility means the entry cohort of fresh graduates may be shrinking in the future. This means that domestic youths graduating from university would be in high demand as their number declines over time, creating potential serious shortages of skilled workers.

This tendency creates an additional pressure for advanced industrialized countries to have to rely on immigrants as a means of addressing the problem of shrinking labour supply and rising demand for skilled labour. In Canada, as much as 70 percent of the growth in the labour force between 1991 and 2001 can be attributed to new immigrants; by 2011, it is estimated that all labour force growth would come from immigration (Statistics Canada 2003b).


Contradictory Tendencies in Labour Demand and Migration

Fourth, economic globalization creates contradictory tendencies in international migration. As noted earlier, capitalist expansion and economic globalization promote greater freedom of movement associated with free trade, within which investments, exports, imports, information and capital are encouraged to operate relatively unrestricted within a common trading zone, or a block of trade partners. Immigrants today are attracted to the highly developed regions of the world because of the material affluence and economic prosperity of these regions, and because of the resulting occupational opportunities and financial rewards for individuals. Regional disparities explain why economically developed regions such as Europe, North America and Oceania, mainly Australia, have net gains in international migration, whereas Asia, Latin America and to a lesser degree Africa are migrant or immigrant sending regions and are experiencing net loss in international migration. Advanced capitalist countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia are benefiting from international migration, especially by attracting the highly-trained human capital from less developed regions of the world.

Different kinds of immigrants are drawn to highly developed countries for similar reasons. For those in possession of advanced skills and human capital that are in rising demand because of the expansion of digitalized technology and professional specialties, technologically advanced capitalist economies offer the best remuneration and job opportunities. But the robustness of highly developed economies also attracts others to venture to move, including those who are marginalized and displaced in their own countries as a result of economic globalization, capitalist expansion, and other social and political forces. For them, advanced capitalist countries provide a chance to improve their livelihood, even though their lack of educational expertise and technical skills is likely to land them only in marginal sectors and in low-paying jobs. In short, in comparison to limited options and growing uncertainty in their home countries, any slim chance of migrating to affluent countries becomes attractive, even if it means working in menial and marginal jobs. Thus, the two forms of migration - skilled and unskilled - operate under different levels of supply and demand.

It is difficult to estimate the different types of people who have crossed national boundaries. However, the comparison between the global
migrant population and refugee population is revealing. As of 2006, the United Nations estimated that there were 13.5 million refugees globally, about 80 percent of them located in less developed regions of the world. In contrast, 61 percent of the migrant population was located in the more developed regions of the world (United Nations 2006). The magnitude of inflow of these two types of populations also illustrates the contradictory approaches adopted by advanced industrial countries towards the wanted and the unwanted migrant populations (see Table 2). Many OECD countries have developed an immigration policy as a means to regulate a steady annual flow of skilled immigrants. However, asylum seekers are seen as “unwanted immigrants” or “bogus refugees” who cross national borders for economic reasons. Despite the relatively small inflow of asylum seekers compared to the inflow of immigrants, most OECD countries adopt draconian measures of border control to keep potential asylum seekers at bay.

A distinction is sometimes made between political or conventional refugees and economic refugees; the latter group is composed of those who are economically displaced and not necessarily politically persecuted. Whether driven by political factors or economic forces, the displacement of large numbers of people globally also encourages desperate attempts to seek entry to highly developed countries which offer better opportunities of survival. Many advanced capitalist countries today are faced with the rising problem of undocumented immigrants or unauthorized migrants, that is, those who are without a legal status because they either extend their legal stay without authorization or enter the country illegally.

In 2000, the United States was estimated to have seven million undocumented immigrants, about 69 percent of them originated from Mexico (OECD 2005:289). In 1999, 37,800 illegal immigrants were removed from the U.K.; by 2002, the number of illegal immigrants removed rose to 65,500 (OECD 2005:284). In Australia, the number of people who remained in the country after the period of their legal stay expired was 59,800 in 2003, and in New Zealand, between 16,515 and 20,042 migrants were estimated to have overstayed in 2003 (OECD 2005:154, 244). The undocumented immigrants are in a vulnerable position subject to exploitation and abuse, and they often provide a source of cheap labour for developed countries (United Nations Development Programme 1999:33).
Table 2: Inflows of foreign population and asylum seekers into selected OECD countries, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD Countries</th>
<th>Inflows of Foreign Population (000's)</th>
<th>Inflows of Asylum Seekers (000's)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia*</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria**</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium**</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada*</td>
<td>229.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark**</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland**</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>136.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany**</td>
<td>658.3</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece*</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary**</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland*</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*</td>
<td>388.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan**</td>
<td>343.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg**</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands**</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand**</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway**</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland*</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal*</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain**</td>
<td>443.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden**</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland**</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom*</td>
<td>418.2</td>
<td>103.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States*</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>1063.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1282.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Inflows of foreign population data based on residence permits or on other sources.
** Inflows of foreign population data based on population registers.
Data from population registers are not fully comparable because the criteria governing who gets registered differ from country to country. Counts for the Netherlands, Norway and especially Germany include substantial numbers of asylum seekers.

The contradictory effects of economic globalization on international migration are well summarized by the United Nations (United Nations Development Programme 1999:32) as follows:
Global employment opportunities may be opening for some, but they are closing for most others. The global market for high-skilled labour is now more integrated, with high mobility and standardized wages. But the market for unskilled labor is highly restricted by national barriers, even though it accounts for a larger share of the international migration.

These migration flows produce different tendencies for immigrant receiving countries. On the one hand, there is an intense competition among these countries for immigrants with professional expertise and highly specialized human capital that is in growing demand in the information age and digitalized economy. On the other hand, advanced industrial countries have common concerns and adopt similar strategies in trying to block the entry of unwanted immigrants and illegal migrants who are seen as having little value to offer and who constitute a social and financial burden to the receiving society. These tendencies influence the way the receiving society approaches the immigration question and how it assesses the merits of immigration.

**Racial and Cultural Diversity**

World migration has added racial and cultural diversity to historically homogeneous populations. Canada and Australia have adopted a policy of multiculturalism in response to the rising racial and cultural diversities brought about by new waves of immigration. Since the 1970s in Canada, the increased presence of visible minorities in Canadian society has become more noticeable. In 1986, members of visible minorities made up only 6.3 percent of Canada’s population; by 1991, they climbed to 9.4 percent; and by 2001, 13.3 percent (Statistics Canada 1998; 2003a). No doubt, the single most important factor contributing to the growth of visible minority populations in Canada has been immigration since the 1970s.

The United States, which historically had to deal with the white and black race question, now has to recognize the growing Hispanic population as a result of immigration. As of 2006, the 43 million Hispanic population has outnumbered the Black population (about 36 million), accounting for 14.3 percent of the U.S. population. But Hispanics now account for about 1.3 million of the annual growth of 2.8 million people in the U.S. (Joyce 2006). In short, as international migration continues from less developed to more developed regions of the world, the growing nascent migrant
population is likely to change the racial and cultural mix of immigrant-receiving societies. Depending on the speed and magnitude of change, the resident population reacts in different degrees of nativism and intensity towards the increased heterogeneity brought about by immigration.

**Policy Implications and Challenges**

The proliferation of the market economy under economic globalization has produced different types of labour demands in different parts of the world. In advanced industrial countries, there is a rising demand for professionals and highly-skilled workers as a result of the thriving information-based new economy and the global expansion of corporate firms. The future prosperity of nation states now depends on their ability to invest in the knowledge economy and to procure and to retain highly-trained human capital. Thus, the changing economic conditions under globalization have created increased demands for highly-skilled and professional workers, as well as opportunities of international mobility for such workers.

The demand for highly-trained labour is exacerbated by demographic transitions in many advanced industrial countries as the fertility level continues to decline below the natural replacement level, producing an aging population and a potentially shrinking labour force. The combined economic and demographic forces generate different tendencies of international migration, which in turn, produce contradictions and policy challenges for immigrant-receiving countries.

Most developed countries now see the need to rely on immigration as a source to replenish their populations and labour forces and as a means to sustain future economic growth. However, even though enlarging the intake of immigrants may be a sound policy choice for the future sustainability of the population and the labour force, such an expansion may trigger a backlash towards newcomers from the resident population. The immigration question has become a sensitive issue in many European countries, and the resident population often views immigrants as outsiders from a different cultural and racial background infringing upon the rights and entitlements of native-born citizens. Thus the challenge for policy makers is to maintain a balance between the long-term interests of the nation by ensuring a steady flow of immigrants and the immediate concerns...
of citizens who tend to blame incoming immigrants for many economic problems and social woes.

One solution some countries have adopted is to set up an immigration program that maintains a level of immigration that does not deviate much from past levels, but at the same time, creates substantial flexibility in the admission system to enable foreigners not of immigrant status to reside and work legally in the country. In the U.S., the number of legal immigrants granted permanent residence status in 2002 was 1.06 million, but the U.S. also has 60 categories of non-immigrant admission. In 2002, 1.3 million non-immigrants were given a visa to reside in the U.S., the largest category was the speciality professionals (H1-B) which numbered 118,400 people, following by 57,000 intra-company transfers (OECD 2005:287-9).

In Canada, 262,824 legal immigrants were accepted in 2005 and 247,143 temporary residents were also admitted. About one third of temporary residents were also given work authorizations (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2006:63). The use of temporary admissions and work permissions is a means by which some countries use to increase the stock of foreign workers without appearing to raise the immigration level. Over time, the cumulative stock of foreign workers granted a temporary status creates a potential labour pool from which the level of immigration can be further regulated by speeding up or slowing down the process of clearing immigration backlogs that arise from in-land applications of temporary residents.

The shifting of immigrant-sending regions from Europe to Asia, Africa and other less developed areas means that immigration will inevitably lead to greater racial and cultural diversity in immigrant-receiving countries located mainly within OECD. Thus, the increased migration from less to more developed regions of the world exacerbates the need for receiving countries to address issues of cultural pluralism, social integration and racial discrimination. The rise in immigrant population from different cultural, religious and racial backgrounds also creates a new constituency that can exert political demands on the host society to accommodate diverse cultural practices, religious worship, and educational aspirations in terms of the languages of instruction and school curriculum. Thus, the challenge of immigration goes beyond the framing of a policy of admitting newcomers to include policies of integration and social inclusion.
Immigrant-receiving countries also vary in their reactions towards cultural pluralism and racial diversity. Canada and Australia adopt an official policy of multiculturalism, even though such a policy often amounts to a token recognition of cultural diversity. But countries like Germany and France tend to be more protective of the conventional culture and way of life and less prepared to accommodate for differences brought by immigrants. Thus, the policy challenge for immigrant-receiving countries is to find a policy option that would allow the country to bridge its cultural heritage with a future that is bound to be more diverse and multicultural.

Most immigrant-receiving countries now define the value of immigration in terms of human capital. Given that immigrant-receiving countries have a similar interest in procuring high-skill human capital to strengthen the emerging new economy, the international competition for skilled immigrants is likely to increase. Immigration-receiving countries have developed various measures to soften the shortages of skilled workers, including making it easier for professionals to migrate for short-term and long-term employment purposes and adopting a universal standard of credential recognition within an integrated economic zone. However, as the national border is relaxed to facilitate the international mobility of highly-trained professionals, immigrant-receiving countries also tighten border controls to bar the entry of unskilled or unwanted immigrants. Hence, economic globalization brings a contradictory response regarding border control, sometimes requiring it to be flexible and accommodating to high-skilled labour and other times necessitating it to be draconian in driving out the unskilled migrants seeking entry to improve their life chances.

As the flow of skilled immigrants increases, they in turn sponsor family members and relatives from the country of origin to immigrate. Family sponsorship provides a means of chain migration for many immigrant groups. However, immigrant-receiving countries often do not attach much economic value to family migration, but accept family migration as a humane measure under liberal democracy that permits family reunification. As the cumulative stock of immigrants increases, there is a corresponding demand for direct and extended family members to migrate. Thus the policy challenge for immigrant-receiving countries is to uphold the liberal value of allowing immigrant workers to reunite with overseas family members by accepting family-class immigrants on the one hand and to
allocate sufficient immigration slots for skilled immigrants needed for the labour market on the other.

In Canada, as well as Australia and New Zealand, there has been a shift to accept a larger proportion of skilled immigrants and a smaller proportion of family-class immigrants since the 1990s. In 1980, about one-third of the annual immigrants were family-class and another one-third were economic class, but by 2000, economic-class immigrants had risen to about 60 percent and family-class immigrants declined to 27 percent (Li 2003a). Throughout the 1990s, the immigration discourse in Canada placed a substantial economic value on skilled immigrants selected under the point system, and used terms such as “self-selected” or “unselected” immigrants to describe family-class immigrants (Li 2001; 2003b).

The U.S. immigration system is largely designed for family reunification, but with the exception of spouses and minor children, other family classes usually have to wait many years before an immigration visa is granted. In contrast, the immigration of professionals is often facilitated by first using various non-immigrant categories of admission and then expedited in immigration procedures. Maintaining a balance between family-class immigration and economic-class immigration is difficult because as the intake of skilled workers increases, the enlarged stock of immigrant skilled workers will also increase the potential pool of family-class immigrants. Eventually, the immigration system will be haunted by an ever increasing backlog of immigration applications.

The continuous reliance on developing regions to supply skilled immigrants to developed regions of the world also runs the risk of losing the skilled immigrants back to the sending regions once the regional disparity is reduced. Since the end of the 20th century, there has been keen competition among immigrant receiving countries like Australia, Canada and the U.S. for skilled immigrants, with the result that changes in the immigration policy of each country affects the competition of skilled immigrants in the worldwide market (Cobb-Clark & Connolly 1997). At the same time, there has been an increase in the migration of highly skilled workers within Asia, albeit mainly temporary, as skilled workers follow capital investment from more developed regions of Asia to less developed regions (Iredale 2000).

The case of emigration from Hong Kong to Canada in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by a subsequent return of many Hong Kong immigrants to Hong Kong in the late 1990s illustrates well the dilemma
facing immigrant-receiving countries. Canada benefited from the injection of human and financial capital brought by middle-class immigrants from Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the economic success of many Hong Kong immigrants that enabled them to fulfil the immigration requirements of Canada in the 1990s also gave them the option to move back to Hong Kong once the opportunities of Hong Kong improved (Li 2005). Thus, while Canada's policy of admitting immigrants well endowed in human and financial capital meets the country's labour needs, such a policy also brings highly mobile immigrants who have the capacity to move away once the opportunities elsewhere become more attractive.

Since the late 1990s, immigration from China to Canada has topped the list of sending countries. The arrival from China to Canada was between 33,000 to 42,000 a year between 2000 and 2005, most of them were admitted as economic-class immigrants (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2006). But as the economic growth of China continues and the remuneration levels for professionals keep rising, some immigrants from China to Canada with substantial human capital can be expected to be drawn back to China. Thus, a policy challenge for immigrant-receiving countries like Canada is not only to attract high-skilled immigrants, but to retain them after they have arrived and settled.

A Concluding Comment

It is difficult to predict the future of international migration in the global era. The competition for skilled migrants in the world market is likely to increase, as developing countries raise their economic output and reduce the disparity with developed countries, and as demographic pressures increase in the developed world regions. Under such a scenario, countries which can maintain a competitive level of remuneration as well as an enlightened policy of multiculturalism and immigrant integration will be in a better position to attract and to retain skilled immigrants. Immigrant receiving countries like the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the U.K. will continue to facilitate the admission of well-educated professionals and skilled workers and at the same time tighten their border controls to restrict numbers of unskilled immigrants and asylum seekers from entering.

There is no doubt that international migration under economic globalization represents a form of brain drain from less developed to more
developed regions of the world. But as the shortage of skilled immigrants increases, the brain drain may be multidirectional as immigrants well endowed in human capital likely will be able to circulate in various regions of the world market subject to competitive market prices for their labour.

Currently, there is no agreement in the international community to support a universal policy of international migration, in the same way that free trade has been supported and regulated under the World Trade Organization. As the contradictions of international migration sharpen under further economic globalization, migrant-receiving and sending countries will have to come to terms with a universal framework of international migration under which the supply and demand of various types of labour may be regulated.

Notes

1 Professor Peter Li prepared this paper for a keynote address at the Building Research Capability in the Social Sciences (BRCSS) New Settler Researchers Network National Conference, February 2007, University of Auckland, New Zealand. Professor Li is Professor of Sociology at the University of Saskatchewan. Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. His e-mail address is: Peter.Li@usask.ca.

2 The European Union (EU) was founded in 1993 as a union of European countries to advance political, economic and social cooperation. The member states adopted a common currency, the Euro. At the end of 2006, the EU had 27 members (http://userpage.chemie.fu-berlin.de/adressen/eu.html). The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed by the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico in 1994 to promote freer trade among these countries. The agreement was an expansion of an earlier agreement called Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement signed between Canada and the U.S. in 1989. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by the five original countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam, 1995, Lao and Myanmar, 1997 and Cambodia, 1999. The aims of ASEAN are (1) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and (2) to promote regional peace and stability. The ASEAN covers a region of 500 million people and a combined gross domestic product of almost U.S.$700 billion, and a total trade of about U.S.$850 billion (http://www.aseansec.org).

3 The total fertility rate is the number of children a woman would have if she were to go through her entire reproductive years in accordance with the reproductive pattern set by all women of that year.
Informalisation refers the growth of the informal economy that encompasses “the production and sale of goods and services that are licit but produced and/or sold outside the regulatory apparatus covering zoning, taxes, health and safety, minimum wage laws, and other types of standards” (Sassen 2001:294). The informal economy differs from the underground economy that entails illegal activities.

References


———. (1998) Table 93F0025XDB96001 (n01_1303.ivt): *Total Population by Aboriginal Identity (7) and Registered Indian Status (3), Showing Indian Band/First Nation Membership (3) for Canada, Provinces, Territories, and Census Metropolitan Areas*. 1996 Census of Canada.


Immigrants and the Economy:
Debates about Sustaining Economic Growth in Post-Industrial Societies

WILLIAM A.V. CLARK*

Abstract
Developed world economies are concerned with how to create and sustain economic growth in contexts where the population is aging and there are increasing needs for young workers. Can an immigrant workforce fulfill the needs for both skilled and unskilled labour and can an immigrant workforce save pensions and social security? Will flows of immigrants provide the new labour force, or will large-scale flows, of especially low skilled immigrants, overwhelm the economy altogether? The debates about immigrant contribution to economic growth and the associated social and infrastructural costs are contentious and only slowly being resolved. At the moment the received wisdom is that in countries with skilled based immigrant policies, immigrants do provide contributions to economic growth, and even in countries which do not have a specific skill-based approach, there appears to be some added economic growth from the immigrant workforce. At the same time there is evidence in the United States and Europe of growing unregulated immigration, the emergence of an unregulated labour market, and growing social costs of unrestrained immigration. The evidence is not in but there are at least two stories to contend with in the ongoing discussion of immigrant impacts and the gains from immigration.

There is an emerging concern in developed world economies, where population is aging and the need for young workers is growing, with how to create and sustain economic growth. Will flows of young immigrants, willing to work, provide the new labour force or will

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large-scale flows of especially low skilled immigrants overwhelm the economy altogether? The debates about the immigrant contribution to economic growth and the economic costs are contentious although the overall evidence tends to favor the view that immigrants do provide significant contributions to economic growth, and even in countries which do not have a specific skill-based approach, there is still support for an immigrant economic contribution. It is difficult to make definitive judgments about immigrant contributions, and the discussion in this paper will provide some of the pros and cons about the immigrant intersection with economic growth. We will find also that it may be non-economic issues which, in the long run, will be the most difficult to resolve. The paper reviews some familiar ground by examining the demographic context of growth and the immigrant impact debate especially in a U.S. and Southern California context. It also provides an enriched perspective on immigrant impacts by examining changes in the structure of the labour force and the impacts of large scale undocumented immigration in California.

Economic growth has been and still is the central focus of developed economies. During the past three, perhaps even five decades with growing youthful populations there was not a great deal of concern with where the labour force would come from - it was largely home grown. Now, however, with the aging of the baby boom population and increasing longevity it has become increasingly apparent that there may be difficulty in finding the writers, teachers, skilled service workers and IT professionals that the economy needs. Where will businesses find the labour to provide the services in a growing knowledge economy? More generally, can immigration provide the solution to the dependency problem? All of this must be set within the costs and benefits to post-industrial societies as a whole.

**The Demographic Context**

Before examining the debates about immigrant contributions it is worthwhile stepping back and reviewing the demographic changes that created our current world, a world in which the population continues to grow despite slowing fertility. The world population is now about 6.6 billion people. Between 1900 and 2000 the world population grew from 1.6 billion to 6.1 billion, a rate of growth unprecedented in human history. The
world population tripled between the end of the depression and the end of the last century. It is this seven-decade experience of economic growth that informs most discussions of how we got where we are and our sense that economic growth in the 20th century is inextricably tied up in sustained population growth. While developed economies have reaped the advantages of this economic growth, never before have there been so many who want a share of the world’s wealth. How will the poorest nations fare in the next 50 years? It is the disparities across nations, along with political instabilities, which create much of the world’s population migration and the changing demographic outcomes in OECD nations.

There is no question that the world population will continue to grow, that it will be much older, and that there will be many more international migrants (Figure 1). Some of this will affect New Zealand, a lot more of it will affect the United States and Europe. Those who wrestle with the problems associated with widespread poverty, environmental degradation, political conflicts, and continuing population growth have offered one of three alternatives for solving the “population problem” - a bigger pie, fewer forks, and/or better manners (Cohen 2006).

Figure 1: Growth of the world population and stock of international migrants
We can try and increase the size of the pie, that is increase our productive capacity, a topic that is central in any discussion of economic disparity and a critical element of providing jobs and economic opportunities for growing immigrant populations. We can reduce the number of people, which is essentially to say we can slow population growth, and perhaps at the same time moderate or change over-consumption by developed societies. The third scenario argues for reducing corruption and violence as a way of solving differences in inequalities between rich and poor nations and making markets more efficient worldwide (Cohen 2006).

All three approaches may be central to dealing with continuing population growth which will bring the world's population to more than 9 billion within 50 years. Given the continuing growth of the world's population and the inequities between developed and developing economies and the need for labour it is natural to turn to the possibility of using immigrant workforces to replace the aging workforces of developed economies. This also increases opportunities for wage employment for those in developing nations. The key question is: how likely is this and how rational is it as a solution to continuing to grow our economies and solve world economic inequality? What is the evidence from the recent past in terms of the contribution of immigrant populations in North America and especially California? What can we learn from the experience there, which may be relevant for growing the New Zealand economy?

The context in the U.S. and California is perhaps writ larger than in New Zealand but many of the same issues bubble beneath the surface. It is unlikely that New Zealand is a special case, though isolation has played a role in the past and accessibility remains constrained by comparison with many other markets. Certainly, the U.S. is more concerned with total population growth than is New Zealand (the U.S. population is now more than 300 million and is projected to increase to a little less than 400 million before mid century). The U.S. is also affected by a growing undocumented population.

The fact that the U.S. population was a little over 200 million in 1970 and has added more than a 100 million in a little over three decades reiterates the potential impacts of population growth alone for infrastructure and services. The foreign born population is now more than 35 million (55 million foreign born and their native born children) including about 11-12 million undocumented immigrants who are the focus of a
continuing discussion of how to incorporate them in U.S. society more generally. In addition, the general conversation about total numbers tends to mask the very significant changes that are occurring in individual metropolitan areas. In the U.S., as in New Zealand, immigrant outcomes are not distributed evenly across the country, and cities like Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco are homes to very large numbers of new settlers.

It is the absolute growth of the U.S. population that initiated the debates about the ability of the economy and society to provide jobs for both the native and foreign born. The initial celebrations of increasing diversity are now tinged with some anxieties of just how U.S. society as a whole will incorporate and assimilate the continuing flow of newcomers (Clark forthcoming). It is this population and labour force debate which has engaged economists, demographers and geographers, not to mention the media. On the one hand there is an increasing concern with providing workers at both ends of the labour force distribution - service workers to mind the babies in an economy with two workers, and skilled workers to grow the information economy. This suggests the need for a flow of both skilled and unskilled labour to fill jobs and sustain economic growth.

The Debate about Immigrant Contributions: A Brief Review

There are strongly held positions about how immigrants affect the economy and especially about whether or not they lower the wages of native born workers. This debate, with Borjas (2003; 2004) and Camarota (2006) on one side and Card (1990) on the other (with many other important writers contributing) is contentious, but it does seem that a consensus view is that the effects on native born wages are small, perhaps a reduction of 40 cents in 10 dollars. These are estimates from Borjas who argues strongly for significant effects of immigrants on native born wages.

A more recent study on the role of immigrants in the U.S. labour market concluded that while the overall impact of immigrants on wages is difficult to quantify, it appears that a flexible labour market will adjust over time to the presence of more foreign born workers, and the market will expand as a result of the new worker influx (Congressional Budget Office 2005). It does appear that if there are wage effects in the American context
it is an effect on the wages of the recent immigrant arrivals rather than the native born workers. In the New Zealand context Jacques Poot and Bill Cochrane (2006) completed a thorough review of the extensive literature in 2004 and concluded that there are short run positive impacts on wages and employment and long run positive effects on migration adaptation and catch-up. They noted that New Zealand does have one unusual feature of immigrant intersections with the economy - the extensive and fluctuating international movement of New Zealanders themselves.

An alternative view is found in Camarota (2006) who uses Census data to suggest that there are negative impacts of the large-scale flux of recent immigration, and that the impacts extend to native born workers generally, as well as to immigrant workers who arrived in previous decades. His research uses participation rates rather than wage effects to show that young adults, 20 to 24, are most affected by the increase in immigration and that the negative impacts are greatest for native born black and Hispanic males compared to their white counterparts (Camarota 2006; Sun, Harrington & Khatiwada 2006). Camarota (2006) documents a 1.3 million decline in native born workers with less than a high school education and a 1.8 million decline in those with a high school education only. By contrast, foreign born workers with less than a high school education, increased their number in the workforce by nearly 800,000. It is this “substitution” effect that he uses to argue that there is an impact of immigration on labour force participation.

In the past and continuing in the current debates, the division has been between those who base their analysis on specific local studies (Card’s study of the Cuban Mariel boat lift on Miami, 1990) and those who have turned to national studies of immigrant labour force impacts. Aydemir and Borjas (2006) argue that it is only at the national scale that we can measure the economic impact on immigration because native born workers may respond to increases in immigration by moving their labour or capital to regions that are less affected by immigrant supply shocks. Those studies, which examine change in global gateways, rather than focusing on national change, argue that the very small reductions in native wages are an indication of the minor effects of immigration on wages. In contrast those who focus on national studies argue that a national perspective is needed because changes in particular localities can miss the impacts of the native born who migrate away in response to pressure on local wages.
Aydemir and Borjas (2006) extend their arguments with a comparative study of international migration to Canada and the United States, countries with very different immigration policies and quite different immigrant compositions, to show that international migration narrows wage inequality in Canada, because immigrants were disproportionately highly skilled while the opposite is true for the United States where migrants are disproportionately represented in the low skill spectrum of occupations. The lesson from this study is to go for highly skilled immigrants. In the U.S., there was an almost 20 percent decline in the real wage for those who did not complete high school, but an eight percent increase in the real wage of college graduates and a 20 percent increase in the wages of workers with postgraduate education. Thus, immigration played an important role in reducing the real wage of low income workers but had little to do with effects on the upper end of the distribution. It is easy to see how there can be conflicting results in different analyses of immigrant impacts.

Much of the debate about the effects of immigration ends up being a debate about the assumptions that go into estimating the effects of immigrants on wages or indeed on the definitions of impacts. When we talk about immigrant impacts are we speaking of impacts on wages, or impacts on employment and participation? While Borjas and most economists focus on immigrant effects on wages, Camarota and other demographers more often focus on participation and employment rates. It is clear that you can have different effects whether you focus on one measure or another. The effect on wages is, as we have seen, about whether wages are reduced for one or another group. The effect on employment participation is about whether new immigrants are replacing the native born and whether there is increased competition from migrants and associated job loss of the native born.

Recent discussions of wage effects have recently turned to whether immigrants are perfect or imperfect substitutes for U.S. born workers with the same education and experience. Orrenius and Solomon (2006) have revisited the question of immigrant effects on native born wages using a general equilibrium approach. They made two important changes to previous work - they removed the standard assumption that foreign and U.S. born workers are perfect substitutes within the same levels of education and experience, and they introduced a specific analysis of the response of
physical capital to immigration, specifically, that physical capital does respond to immigration. With these adjustments they showed that the long-run average wage of all U.S. born workers experienced a significant increase as a consequence of immigration in the period 1990 to 2004.

If we accept their assumption of imperfect substitutability (an example might be when a Mexican worker with a high school education and a set level of experience does not have a driver's license but a native born worker does) between U.S. and foreign born workers we have the explanation for the increase in the wages of U.S. born at the expense of a decrease in wages of foreign born workers. Orrenius and Solomon (2006) concluded that the least educated U.S. born workers suffered a wage loss, but that it was much smaller than previously calculated by Borjas. Their work reiterates where we started – generally immigration has small effects on wages, and where there is an effect it is greatest on the earnings of previous immigrants. However, the latter probably have the largest non-economic benefits from the migration of spouses, relatives or friends, and this contributed to making them willing to sustain the low wages and the small gains in wages (Orrenius & Solomon 2006).

Evidence for the Immigrant Contribution

If we examine simple employment growth there is no question that much of the growth in the United States labour force was immigrant driven. Between 1990 and 2005 the employed population increased by about 22 million and nearly half of that growth was from the foreign born population. The foreign born workforce grew from 10.5 million in 1990 to 16 million in 2000 and 20.6 million in 2005 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000; 2005). It is now 15 percent of the U.S. workforce. In California foreign born workers make up 34.4 percent of the workforce. The sheer size of the immigrant workforce is a testimony to the expansion of the U.S. economy and its ability to absorb (provide value added) these new workers. If we use these participation numbers alone we have to conclude that immigration has had relatively positive effects on economic growth if only because it provided the labour force for an expanding economy.

The foreign born work across the spectrum of occupations and industries in the United States - the notion of Mexicans as solely agricultural labour has been transformed in the past decade and a half
though there are still many Mexican agricultural workers. Now, nearly a quarter of the foreign born are in managerial and professional occupations and although they are over represented in construction, production (labour) and transportation sectors it is the generality of the occupations which is most notable (Clark 2003). They make up about 11 percent of the construction industry and 14 percent of the manufacturing sector. Within the service and health sectors they have a remarkable presence. Almost 40 percent of the doctors in California are foreign born and you have a one in five chances of being seen by a foreign born nurse. The foreign born share of science and engineering employment is even more dramatic than the overall data on increases in employment. More than a third of all PhDs in the United States are foreign born and 53 percent of PhDs under 45 years of age are foreign born (Freeman 2006). Moreover, the proportion is increasing.

While there is growth in the skilled sector there is a parallel growth in the low skill sector, a growth which is stimulated by the very large number of undocumented workers in the U.S. economy, workers who take up the low end, low wage jobs, the three-D jobs (dirty, dangerous and demanding) of our modern global economy. In Los Angeles there are substantial numbers of undocumented workers in construction, restaurant employment and apparel manufacturing jobs (Clark 1998). They are also important contributors to landscaping, baby care and other service activities. They are in just those jobs that in a globalized economy are neither unionized, nor well-paying, and no longer provide a step in on the ladder of occupational mobility but it is clear that they are finding jobs.

Recent work on labour force participation from the Midlands in England suggests that indeed immigrants are in general participating in such low wage occupations and industries. There were large gaps between migrant and U.K. born workers with the latter earning more, but no evidence was found that migrants dampened wage growth. Indeed, overall immigrants contributed about 9.6 percent to the regional gross value added of the East Midlands economy. A larger portion of this contribution is, as we might expect, from earlier arrivals, but the overall point is that migrants do make a sizeable contribution to growth of the Midlands economy even if they are in the low-end sector.

In any discussion of immigrant contributions it quickly becomes apparent that we are dealing with nested paradoxes, paradoxes which
included substantial numbers of employed immigrants, at the same time as there are stagnant wages and modest income growth for many immigrants and the less educated native born alike, with overall robust economic gains for the nation as a whole. The answers to immigrant outcomes and immigrant contributions are as varied as the methods used to examine immigrant productivity but it does seem that immigrant outcomes may be tied to labour market policies.

Immigrant Progress and Labour Market Policies

Some limited research suggests that indeed, immigrant gains are not independent of the host country’s labour market institutions and practices. Obviously some of the poor labour market outcomes of immigrants are attributable to the immigrants themselves, to their education levels, language abilities – in short their human capital - as well as to their family composition, and legal status. But at the same time, it does appear that countries with less restrictive labour regulations seem to provide more opportunities than countries with more restrictive regulations (Orrenius & Solomon 2006). In countries where employers have greater freedom in hiring and firing, and supply and demand play a greater role in terms of employment, wages and benefits seem to generate situations in which economic growth is greater than where centralized wage setting and strict rules about layoffs inhibit the flexibility of businesses. Although there is not yet a great deal of research on the affect of regulations on immigrant outcomes, an OECD study found that union wage setting tends to price the young and elderly out of employment and push them out of the labour force (Jeans 2006).

There is no question that nations intervene in their labour markets. The question of course is the extent of the intervention and the nature of the outcomes. The International Institute for Management Development (IMD) (2004) provides a rating system for the level and the nature of government intervention. In a relatively simple scale from zero to 10 in which high scores represent less regulation, France and Germany are the most regulated economies, while the United States and Canada are amongst the least regulated of a selection of OECD countries (scores tending towards seven). New Zealand is a little on the over regulated side with a score of 3.6.
Orrenius and Solomon (2006) use these scores and the difference between immigrant and native unemployment rates to evaluate the potential for immigrant gains in differently regulated economies. Overall, the relationship is negative, that is more regulated economies have bigger differences between native and immigrant unemployment rates (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Relationship of employment and IMD score

Another way of interpreting this finding is to argue that more regulated economies are less open and provide fewer opportunities for immigrant populations. It is true that the relationship is far from perfect, and clearly there are other variables which influence the possibility of immigrant gains, but still it is an intriguing result about where and how immigrants might make greater gains.

A corollary of this analysis is a specific focus on the young native and foreign born. Are they disproportionately affected by excessive market regulation? Again, the data must be treated with caution but there is a rough parallel between the outcomes for youth and the average analysis discussed above. The limited data that Orrenius and Solomon (2006) provide, suggests that as regulation increases the difference between immigrant and native born youth increases or alternatively, less regulation means a lower differences between native and foreign born youth (Table 1).
Table 1: Labour market regulation and youth unemployment

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IMD Score</th>
<th>Native born unemployment</th>
<th>Foreign born unemployment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
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In France, the unemployment rate for foreign born youths was 34.2 percent in 2002 - nearly 17 percent higher than native born youth unemployment rates. The differentials are much lower for other countries. However, Spain is significantly more regulated than Canada but has a lower differential. Again there are other factors that go into the formation of the differential outcomes but the link to institutional structures is interesting and worth further analysis. In the U.S. the unemployment ratios were actually lower for foreign born youth than for native born youth, perhaps part of the explanation for high levels of foreign born youthful employment.

Even though the analysis is based on limited cases and is more indicative of a trend than a formal proof of any relationship it does fit into the general argument that labour market policies do have an impact on immigrant labour market outcomes. Immigrants in countries with highly regulated labour markets, have higher unemployment rates than those in labour markets with less regulation. Clearly this is also influenced by the levels of education for the immigrant population, more educated immigrants will be less affected than less educated immigrants, but overall Orrenius and Solomon (2006) concluded that markets where labour is highly regulated,
with union set wages, will price newcomers out of jobs. There is no question that immigrant success is a complex dynamic but we cannot ignore the interactions between immigrants and the labour market and how labour market rigidities affect the progress of immigrants.

A nation’s competitiveness may also play a role in structuring economic outcomes. The competitiveness of people, whether part of a nation, a firm, or as individuals is fundamental in creating wealth (Garelli 2006). The general arguments about competitiveness may intersect with the oft reiterated selectivity of migration; that it is often immigrants with the eagerness to succeed and the willingness to work long hours, at first for low pay, who have “made-it” in their new societies and in turn have been a boost to many economies. But whether in immigrants, or the native born, the competitive instinct is a critical dimension of individual and national success. The world is in constant evolution and it is currently, more open, more online and more transparent than in previous decades.

Once competitiveness was low cost manufacturing but emerging economies are not just competing with cheap manpower but with cheap brainpower as well. India is increasingly recognized for her scientists and Central European nations for the supply of engineers and skilled technicians. Garelli (2006) estimates that there are 33 million university educated young professionals in developing nations compared to only 14 million in developed nations – where they are a lot more expensive. Where is New Zealand in the competitiveness index? Not at the bottom but not at the top either (IMD 2004). In the ranking of 60 nations New Zealand is squarely in the middle.

Clearly, labour market access is a critical component of immigrant success and immigrant economic incorporation. Without relatively easy access to jobs immigrants are blocked from beginning the first steps on the economic ladder and the first steps to making it in their new societies (Clark 2003). Although there are concerns that businesses may be taking advantage of the new immigrants by paying low wages, at the same time these lower wages are the potential first steps on the economic ladder. The unresolved question is whether the economic ladder will be available for the growing stream of new and often undocumented immigrants – an important issue discussed further later in the paper.
Open competitive societies are a central ingredient in the opportunity set for immigrants but not all immigrants arrive legally and can access the formal labour market. There is increasing evidence that the formal economy in the United States may be fragmenting and employers are increasingly turning to contract workers to cut back on benefits and other non-salary compensation. In addition, we know that immigrants with limited education, poor language fluency, and subject to discrimination are likely to end up in jobs outside the formal economy and those who arrive without documentation are the most likely to end up outside the formal economic system.

Current estimates place the total undocumented population in the United States at about 11 to 12 million people and growing at about 500,000-700,000 persons per year. Certainly that number is consistent with an increase in the undocumented population of about 10 million in the last fifteen years. Beginning in 1989, not long after the last amnesty in 1986, there has been a steady growth in the undocumented population. It is estimated that nearly 7.2 million of the unauthorized migrants were employed in the U.S. in March 2005, almost five percent of the civilian labour force. Of course, they were a much greater percentage of particular occupational categories such as household services, retail services and construction as we noted earlier. That most of the immigrant population also works in unskilled occupations is consistent with our knowledge of immigrants who arrive with low levels of completed schooling and few skills.

We can suggest that the growth of the informal economy may be related to the way in which the nation's labour markets are organized. The rise in immigrant employment, especially in marginal and temporary work, has been paralleled by significant changes in the way in which employment is organized in U.S. labour markets. There is an increase in contracted employment and the use of independent consultants and thus these "newly hired" workers are often not on the payrolls of the firms that hired them. Clearly they are not paid employee benefits such as health insurance and pensions or covered for unemployment insurance let alone social security benefits. Working in unregulated jobs of course can also give rise to abuses by employers who fail to respect the basic rights of work – they are
vulnerable and so are the employees. In addition, employers operating in the informal market short change the social safety net, and perhaps create an unfair disadvantage for businesses that comply with the law.

The data suggest that the informal economy has grown in the past decade or decade and a half. The changing patterns of employment show up in the differences between the employment documented by the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistic’s Current Employment Statistics survey (CES) and the Current Population Household survey (CPS). The CES is the basic data source used by the Bureau of labour statistics to calculate job-generating performance of the economy. The difference between that and the data from the CPS is a measure of the self-employed, independent contractors, unpaid family work, and "off the books" employment.

In general, through a long period, the CPS and the CES have tracked fairly consistently. Since the mid-90s, and especially since 2000 there have been considerable differences in the reports from the two sources. The recent assessment shows a slow rate of growth of payroll employment, and given the strong performance of the nation’s economy this suggests that a lot of the labour productivity is associated with growth in the off-payroll employment sector. The implications are that large numbers of the new undocumented immigrant workers are not appearing on the formal payrolls of their employers. They are either independent contractors or completely “off the books”. The implications for the economy in terms of tax receipts, and for the nation's labour laws and labour standards are significant. As the numbers of informal workers increase there is growing pressure on the relationship between workers and employers with potential negative outcomes for both the labour community and the larger society. Ultimately society depends on tax receipts from both employers and employees for sustaining itself.

A specific analysis of the informal labour market in California enriches and documents the general statements about the U.S. as a whole (Flaming, Haydamack & Joassart 2005). A plot of reported employment from the Current Population Survey (CPS data) and reports of payroll tax data – that is jobs reported to the state economic services suggests that there is a growing disconnect between official and unofficial statistics (Figure 3). The graph shows a growing gap between the number of residents reporting employment in the survey data, and the number of residents who are enumerated from the payroll tax data. That gap has been
widening since 1990 and is almost half a million workers currently in Los Angeles County.

**Figure 3:** Employment estimated from Current Population Survey and Employer Surveys

It is possible that some of the gap is due to reporting issues — for example Los Angeles has high rates of self-employment and these jobs may not be reported in the payroll reporting data but Flaming, Haydamack and Joassart (2005) conclude that the gap between the number of residents who report they are employed and the number of jobs that employers report providing, is not explained by self-employment or by workers who hold multiple jobs. The unreported jobs in official employment statistics are simply because employers hire undocumented workers and fail to report employment. Whether it is to maintain their competitive advantage or simply to increase profits, the outcomes are reduced tax receipts and marginalized workers. It is here that we see a troubling intersection
between undocumented immigration and the organization of the labour market, an intersection which does not support a well structured opportunity set for new immigrants.

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In the absence of documented status, workers accept jobs in the informal sector as a survival strategy. Undocumented workers have lower employment rates and are also likely to have part-time employment which in turn emphasizes their likelihood of being in marginal employment and hints at the likelihood of ending up in the informal sector. There is a clear progression of levels and hours of work based on duration and citizenship status. Workers with higher earnings and more hours were more likely to have arrived earlier than those who came later who, in turn, have lower earnings and greater likelihoods of being unemployed.

One way of illustrating this outcome is to note that immigrants who came to the U.S. since 1991 make up 17 percent of workers earning under $10,000 a year, compared to their 11 percent of the overall labour force (Flaming et al. 2005:10). Unsurprisingly, the undocumented immigrant population ends up in just those jobs which are at the low end of the service sector, in restaurants, or in dangerous and low paid “piece work” in garment manufacturing and fabrication but also in occupations which are hard to regulate like construction (Figure 4). Clearly there are acute economic pressures on recent immigrants who have lower employment rates, lower weekly salaries, uncertain employment and marginal labour force participation.
Undocumented immigration, "overstaying" in New Zealand parlance, has not been a major issue in New Zealand, nor does it appear to be an issue in the labour market. However, in the last few years, undocumented immigrants arriving in Australia have emerged as a possible problem. In the late 1990s, there was evidence that as many as 50,000 people in Australia overstayed student tourist or temporary residence visas (Hugo 1999). Australia may well become the target of people smugglers, who have been active in bringing undocumented immigrants to other regions of the world. We know from other research that undocumented immigration is coupled with legal immigration, so we might well expect increases in the flows of undocumented migrants in association with the legal movements all these populations.

Hugo (1999) suggests that undocumented migration is about to play a much larger role than in the past and by extension we can expect that in New Zealand as well. It is unlikely that the island status of Australia and New Zealand will serve to protect these nations anymore than border fences have protected the United States from increasing undocumented flows. In New Zealand and Australia undocumented migration will likely proceed via increasing numbers of over-stayers, those who come legally in the first instance, but it is also likely that people smuggling will increase. In the end the outcome is likely to be larger numbers of new, illegal immigrants and an increase in the informal economy.

Figure 4: Undocumented employment by industry
Social Change and Social Inclusion – Immigrants and Changing Societies

Until now we have been in the main discussing what Gary Freeman (forthcoming) calls the “money” problem – the impact of immigration on wages, participation and productivity. There are two questions which go beyond the formal money problem. The first is: will the flow of immigrants provide a cushion for the coming dependency problem in OECD countries, will the flows make up for the coming labour shortage in post industrial Europe, North America and Australia and New Zealand? The second is: how will immigrants be incorporated into their new societies? These are substantial and substantive questions, which have complex literatures in their own right, and this review will only cover some selected observations on dependency and social inclusion.

The dependency issue focuses attention on the growing aging populations in European countries like Italy and Spain, currently less of a problem in New Zealand (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Change in the working age population 1950–2050

Clearly, in Italy the several decade long surplus of young workers has now changed to a deficit. It has not yet become a deficit in New Zealand (using slightly different age groups) but there is only modest growth, if any at all, in the productive population. In the long run age dependency will be an issue in all developed societies. Much of the dependency issue revolves around how the surplus will be created to support an aging population. Increasing the retirement age, stimulating fertility and other strategies will become important in working out solutions to the aging populations of developed societies. However, it is unlikely that immigrants will be a realistic substitute for declining fertility and a decreasing workforce.

While Dayton-Johnson et al. (2007) are optimistic about using a North African labour force to supplement a declining workforce in Europe, Camarota (2007) and Demeny (2006) are both quite pessimistic about substituting immigrants as a new workforce in the United States or Europe. The authors suggest that even if there are short-term gains, substituting...
immigrants will simply postpone the need for the more relevant policies which will be necessary to address the consequences of demographic change. Most demographers agree that immigration can only be a temporary solution to dependency ratios. Immigrants too get old and need the same services as the native born. Demeny (2006) suggests that the “failings of the European social model, with its existing high unemployment, low labour force participation rates, early retirement age, and inflexible labour markets” will require remedies that “must be administered through domestic institutional reforms that command consensus of the native population. Immigration in all likelihood would provide an excuse to delay tackling that agenda, thus making the timely adoption of the needed reforms less likely (Demeny 2006:40). All the evidence suggests that to solve the dependency problem by immigration – true for New Zealand as for other developed economies - would require levels of immigration that would have to be unsustainable in the long run. Social security and pensions will not be solved with immigration.

Despite the upbeat stories of how immigrants have moved into decaying neighborhoods in the inner cities of American metropolitan areas and restored their vitality, there is also evidence that native born populations move away as immigrants move in. There is indeed evidence that ethnically heterogeneous societies display lower levels of trust and spend less on redistribution programs than more homogeneous societies. We ignore at our peril the large literature on ethnic own race preferences and the myopia of preferences for people like ourselves. While we can ensure that we do not discriminate against one another, and remove the pernicious affects of negative behavior in employment and housing, it is more difficult to engineer residential integration. The long history of households voting with their feet is unlikely to be interrupted by social engineering.

The still emerging literature on the topic of generalized trust is far from unanimous and while some find that generalized trust is negatively related to the ethnic and racial diversity of communities (Hooghe 2005) this may be a function of homogeneous societies. In diverse societies recognition of group differences and identities and group relations rooted in equality-based concepts of reciprocity may be a more meaningful strategy for creating restructured societies. How our societies will play out the mixing that is occurring is far from clear. The literature on multiculturalism is only
one example of our attempts to deal with the mixing problem and there are
real questions about the success of multiculturalism (Clark 2008).

Migrant numbers are unlikely to decline in the future. If anything they will increase over time and the issue about immigration and economic
growth my raise an important ancillary question - how to manage, and deal
with immigration in a rational policy response rather than with either open
borders or walls and militarized responses? The question which we must
address is how to develop policies that will satisfy both migrants and
employers, while satisfying the needs of both labour sending and labour
receiving countries (Martin 2005; 2006). A recent position paper on the role
of mobility in the European Union raises important questions about just
how we can manage immigration (Dayton-Johnson et al. 2007). Clearly an
aging European population and neighbouring countries with growing
youthful populations in need of employment suggests an orderly, safe, well-
regulated migration system (Dayton-Johnson et al. 2007:16).

Indeed, there is a need to rethink the process of migration and the
reciprocal relationships between Europe and the new sending countries and
Dayton-Johnson et al. (2007) do a good job of evaluating and examining the
process and the problems of the new migration into Europe. At the same
time, they tend to think in labour market terms and not of the larger issues
of societal structures, homogeneity and heterogeneity in terms of ideas and
cultures. In the long run the social issues may be more important than
whether or not immigrants can provide the labour in aging European
societies. There are deep-seated cultural perceptions that rightly or
wrongly affect the debates about immigration and immigrants. The
perception in industrial countries is often that legal migrants are associated
with the welfare and unemployment, and unauthorized migrants are
associated with the underground economy lawbreaking and often criminal
activity. These perceptions, in turn, exacerbate the potential for xenophobia
and discrimination.

What sort of society will immigration bring? Unlike Europe New
Zealand is not struggling with issues of the Burkha and the veil. The clash
of religions is a sensitive subject and brings the social into the economic
realm (a Wal Mart employee in the United States has sued not to have to
handle pork at the checkout counter, and Muslim employees in Britain have
objected to handling liquor in a similar situation). How will employers deal
with immigrant groups who have special religious needs? How it will be
played out is far from clear but it is important to evaluate the complexity of immigration as a whole and not piecemeal – after all with immigrants you get both the labour and the cultural values.

**Concluding Observations on Managing Immigration**

Immigration is likely to continue at relatively high levels. It shows no sign of decreasing as the global economy shifts and changes, and the gap between developed and less developed nations continues to widen. The pull of opportunities in developed economies will continue to attract immigrants from countries where they are often not well trained and are poorly educated. Still, income differences alone are not an explanation for international migration - it is driven by complex sets of networks, whether through contacts with others who migrated previously or through various forms of recruitment and family ties. We do know that once international migration gets to a certain level, it tends to take on a life of its own. Given that international migration is likely to continue at a world scale, including for countries like Australia and New Zealand, where more than 20 percent of the population is already foreign born, it is a truism that we need a well developed policy on immigration - a policy to provide the labour and manage the immigrant flows of those who arrive.

There is a challenge around the less skilled in the native born workforce and less skilled previous migrants. For New Zealand the issue is the intersection of immigration and Māori employment. Both are often competing for jobs in the low-skilled end of the labour market. The net economic impact of immigration is beneficial to an economy, but what happens at the bottom end of the pay scale and whether immigration generates an informal economy are important policy questions. At least one commission in the United States has suggested that the immigration system be redesigned to allow for temporary, provisional, and permanent streams in such a way that immigrants could be admitted as needed in the labour force, while permanent residence will be based on more stringent requirements including mandatory skill tests and some form of a secure national identity card. These policies are some way from being formulated, but may come sooner than we expect in our increasingly interconnected technology-driven world. Illegal immigration creates security problems, incurs some fiscal costs at least locally, and may create an isolated underclass. Social and
cultural tensions, in the long run, may be the most difficult issues to address when dealing with immigration.

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“The Sum of My Margins May be Greater Than Your Centre”: Journey and Prospects of a Marginal Man in the Global Economy

JAMES H. LIU

Abstract

Relatively few papers in the social sciences have provided subjective (i.e. auto-biographical) examinations of minority identity experiences through the lenses of the scientific literatures of social identity theory and acculturation theory from social and cross-cultural psychology. Just as few papers in psychology have examined subjective experiences of identity as informed by sociological theory and the literary tropes of minority writers like Fanon. The sociological theory of the “marginal man” is revisited in the context of the global economy, where connecting margins is often as rewarding as adhering to centres. The author describes his acculturation experiences as a Chinese-American-New Zealander through migration and transmigration, and provides evidence of cultural integration, separation, marginalization and assimilation in various phases and situations in his life. He rejects the notion he has either a single unified notion of self or a single acculturation strategy, but rather locates identity within the web of power relations consisting of cultural and institutional resources and constraints (for Asians in New Zealand and in global society). According to this author, the emotional difficulties of marginal positions are married to immense opportunities for building bridges and being part of the connective tissue for global consciousness.

I do not come with timeless truths. My consciousness it not illuminated by ultimate radiances. Nevertheless, in complete composure, I think it would be good if certain things were said.

Franz Fanon Black Skin, White Masks (1968/70:7).

There is a burgeoning literature on subjective experiences of identity by minorities writing in a post-colonial vein, informed by literary tropes and sociological theory (e.g. Fanon 1968/70; hooks 1990).

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Comparatively little has been written from the perspective of minority writers steeped in contemporary psychology, where the main tropes are derived from natural science and theories focus more on the individual than society. In effect, post-colonial theorizing on identity is largely divorced from the findings on minority identity that have emerged from more empiricist traditions. As a Chinese-American-New Zealander, and an academic psychologist, my purpose in writing this paper is to provide a personal account of my experiences in migration and transmigration through the lens of current theory and data from social and cross-cultural psychology. My account is informed in particular by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell 1987), acculturation theory (Berry, Phinney, Sam & Vedder 2006; Ward, Bochner & Furnham 2001), and my own work on history and identity (Liu & Hilton 2005; Liu, McCreanor, McIntosh & Teia 2005). By fusing these empiricist traditions with a narrative of my personal experiences, I hope to provide insight into how members of the Chinese Diaspora may align the marginal positions typically available to them in Western societies with transnational opportunities to take productive roles in the global economy.

Psychological Theories of Social Identity and Acculturation

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) has emerged as one of the most influential theories in social psychology over the last quarter of a century. In its fully elaborated form as self-categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987), the theory holds that each person has a repertoire of self-concepts available, ranging from personal (e.g. I am a kind person) to group (e.g. I am a woman) to humanity (i.e. we are all human beings). Thought and action change qualitatively depending on what aspect of identity is activated or made salient in a given situation. So for instance, if Condoleeza Rice represents the United States as its Secretary of State in the United Nations, her identities as “American”, and “Secretary of State” would be salient, and her identities as “woman” or “academic” would be dormant. The former identities would govern her thought and action more than the latter. By contrast, if she were invited to give a speech at an academic conference on feminism, the opposite would be true. Her behaviour could thus appear to be quite different across the two situations. Identity according to self-categorization theory functions as a navigation system, providing a diverse
repertoire of tools (many of them implicit) that allow a person to adjust to situation appropriate norms. Identity emerges out of an interaction between the individual's repertoire of self-concepts and the expectations held by other people in the situation. The theory does not specify how different identities are combined except to say that activation of group-level identities suppress individual-level identities and vice-versa (Turner et al. 1987).

Hence, it is the acculturation theory of John Berry and his colleagues (Berry et al. 2006) rather than social identity theory that has been most influential in conceptualizing how minority group members adapt to a new culture as a consequence of migration. According to Berry et al. (2006), the migrant or sojourner asks him or herself two questions (1) “Do I want to maintain my heritage culture”?, and (2) “Do I want to adopt aspects of the culture of the receiving society”? The answers form a 2x2 matrix that results in four possible acculturation strategies. If the answer to both questions is yes, then the acculturation strategy that emerges is described by Berry et al. as integrated. The “integrated” profile includes high subjective identification with both heritage culture and the culture of the receiving society, endorsement of integration (with respect to cultural traditions, marriage, social activities, friends from both groups, etc.), being proficient in both languages, and having strong ethnic peer contacts. This is the most common and most preferred profile among ethno-cultural youth and it is associated with the most positive outcomes (Berry et al. 2006). The second most popular profile is separation (maintaining heritage culture, language, and social networks, and maintaining distance from the receiving society and its members), followed closely by assimilation (giving up heritage culture and adopting the host culture); these are associated with intermediate adaptation outcomes, whereas the worst outcomes are had by those who are marginalized, or unable to maintain heritage culture and unable to be accepted by the mainstream.

The preceding paragraphs are not meant to summarize well-developed literatures that consist of more than a thousand publications. They are intended as thumbnail sketches for the purpose of discussion. I use these theories to guide an account of my life story, using a narrative psychology of history and identity (Liu & László 2007), where “the rules of plausibility and verisimilitude more than the rules of factuality and logic govern acceptability” (Liu & Atsumi 2008).
A Personal Journey of Migration and Transmigration

The so-called 2x2 “Berry Boxes” are a snapshot of a moment in time for migrant experiences rather than the narrative continuity that I now present. My personal impression is that I have inhabited all four quadrants of Berry’s acculturation space over the course of my forty some years of experience, and I move between the three more adaptive strategies on a daily basis.

I was born in Taiwan, where my parents emigrated from mainland China after World War II and the Chinese Civil War as refugees. For them, life was difficult during formative years. My mother remembers when she was a little girl in China, her father pointed “look” at a man who was then executed by a pistol shot to the head. Her family evacuated the city of Nanjing ahead of the Japanese army, barely escaping the massacre to follow. On my father’s side, when his grandfather’s sugar warehouses were bombed by the Japanese, a street in Shanghai ran red with molasses. All their businesses were lost after the war. My father took an examination to enter National Taiwan University as an undergraduate, being the only member of his nuclear family to leave the mainland after the Communist takeover. He was offered a position as a Professor of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University (SIU) after completing his Master’s Degree in Taiwan and PhD in the United States. We moved to Carbondale, Illinois, a small Midwestern town in the United States to join him when I was four.

Despite the fact that they lived in Carbondale for more than a dozen years, and that my mother holds an American passport, I would not describe my parents as Americans. They are Chinese through and through. While my father was a successful Professor at SIU, he specialized in Chinese philosophy, and all of our close family friends were Chinese. Our family made several trips back and forth between Southern Illinois and Hong Kong during my childhood, and finally when I was an undergraduate, they went to Hong Kong for good. They currently reside in Taiwan, where my father is a Professor Emeritus at Academia Sinica, and among the best known neo-Confucian philosophers in the world. Chinese identity for them is a state of being, a simple statement of who they are. It is an essentialized position not requiring qualification nor inducing reflection.

The situation for me was quite different. Acculturation theorists have long noted the “acculturation gap” between older new migrants and younger ones. As a “1.5” generation migrant (one who is born overseas but
arrives in a receiving society early as a child), I quickly learned English and began to acquire American behavioural memes, like a love of basketball, football, and TV shows like "Combat". At home, we spoke Chinese or "Chinglish", and our food preferences and social habits were Chinese. This private separation and public (economic) integration is a pattern often observed among first generation migrants (Navas, Rojas, Garcia & Pumares 2007).

I would not say that we were explicit targets for discrimination. My father's promotions in his department were performance-based and quick. My progress in school was similarly exemplary. While I remember being in a fair number of fights as a boy, they were not explicitly associated with being called "Ching Chong Chinaman", though this was an occasional feature of my social life (far behind being asked whether I knew kung fu, the typical conversation opener). But we certainly were not popular among the locals. The only family invitations to white households I recall were to that of co-workers in my father's department, never to neighbours. My mother, who was a homemaker, had no white (or black) women friends.

Rather than explicit racism, what we faced was a more implicit form of social exclusion. The public integration/private separation profile that we exhibited was not only chosen by us, it was also a preference shown by members of the majority group. New techniques for measuring implicit racial attitudes pioneered by Devos and Banaji (2005) show that all Americans, white, black, and Asian, see white faces as more closely implicitly associated with symbols of America like the flag and bald eagle. They exhibit faster reactions times in pairing white faces with symbols of America than Asian faces. These implicit biases are larger and more reliable than for explicit measures, and they are part of a syndrome that has been called "modern racism" (McConhay 1986). Whether or not I knew this at a conscious level, I was being conditioned on the one hand to want to be an American, but on the other hand was socially excluded from this privileged status. This pattern also holds for New Zealand, as recent evidence from my own lab shows that Chinese are implicitly considered less closely associated with New Zealand symbols than either Pākeha or Māori (Sibley & Liu 2007).

In many respects, I was marginalized as a boy growing up in Southern Illinois in the 1970s. I did not especially desire association with the Chinese children of my parents' friends. We children had the intuition
that we were so outnumbered in everyday life that to seek association with one another in school would be to invite discrimination. We never spoke Chinese with one another, though some of us were fluent. I was even more marginalized in the three years we lived in Hong Kong as a Mandarin but not Cantonese speaker with a Chinese face. The travel between locations played havoc with my social life.

In Carbondale, where I completed high school, I found a peripheral circle of white friends, who enjoyed marginal activities like fantasy role playing games, and reading *The Lord of the Rings*. I did not go to my school prom and I did not date as an adolescent in high school. In retrospect, if I were a girl back then I wouldn't have dated me either: my haircut, my activities, my clothes all marked me as a “geek”. I was a target for racial discrimination by one large boy, in the football team, who once pulled down and ripped my shorts while we were going to gym class; I will never forget the humiliation and laughter that followed. Despite this, I do not remember those years as unrelieved misery: adolescence involves angst for many teenagers, and I did have a circle of friends who shared many of my interests and among whom I had some social standing. But for me, the best part of adolescence was that it was soon over.

As an undergraduate studying Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Illinois (UI), I experienced a happier, more assimilated phase of existence. I fell in with a group of Jewish boys from Chicago in my residence hall. Before, I was not aware of Jews as separate from other majority group members, but soon found that our shared experiences of being minorities and our parents’ experiences of suffering during the war created a bond between us. I adopted many of their memes, that influence me to this day: cynicism of authority expressed as sarcasm, contempt for the popular and dominant groups (the fraternity/sorority system was our favourite target), detailed analysis of quality films, and a love of progressive rock music. For the first time in my life I was assimilated and accepted within a tight circle of white people. Oh Happy Days! I remember meeting with the son of the greatest Chinese philosopher in the world, who also happened to be studying at UI. He had arrived from Hong Kong for his undergraduate studies and was very lonely, but I had no interest in befriending him. I learned later with sorrow and regret that he experienced mental illness later, in part because of his social isolation at UI.
I was learning how not to be a geek (which in my mind, was associated with being Chinese). My grades suffered, but not so much that I wasn’t offered a lucrative job at an aerospace company in Southern California. One of my best friends was an ABC (American born Chinese) co-worker, who as a Californian made a clear distinction between himself and the FOBs (Fresh off the Boats). My degree in Computer Science gave me the ticket to an excellent income for a young man. I got an apartment in Redondo Beach. I got tanned and played beach volleyball. I got a Mazda 626 with a sunroof. I got laid.

I think that for young Asian men growing up in Western societies, one of the keys to acquiring confidence is sexual maturity. Western gender stereotypes emasculate Asian men (especially East Asians) while positioning Asian women as desirable (see Liu, Campbell & Condie 1995 for survey results; Fanon (1968/70) and hooks (1990) provide theoretical analysis for black folks). More colloquially, Jackie Chan and Jet Li could kick your ass, but you wouldn’t want to get in bed with them, whereas Ziyi Zhang and Michelle Yeoh could theoretically also kick your ass, but that would not be the primary attraction. For many young people, social standing is derived from the quality of their other sex associates, and in multi-ethnic California by contrast to mono-cultural Illinois, I discovered that I had some market value. Taking psychology classes for fun at UCLA (also known as the University of Caucasians Lost Among Asians), I met my wife-to-be Belinda, a first generation Filipino during an introductory lecture in social psychology. I became bored with computer systems, and was becoming interested in human systems.

Belinda and I got married, and I went to graduate school in psychology while she worked an office job. With my marriage and the demographic opportunities of Southern California, I began to think of myself as Asian rather than Chinese. My literacy and verbal fluency in Chinese decreased through lack of practice, as Asians communicate to one another through the shared medium of English. I never developed much attachment to Chinese speaking communities as a consequence of my marginalization in Illinois, whereas Belinda, as a first generation immigrant who arrived in California as a teenager, was deeply imbedded within Filipino social networks that I enjoyed. To this day, our family life is more permeated by social relations with Filipinos than Chinese.
I earned a PhD in social psychology (on cognitive processes in stereotype formation), did a post-doctoral fellowship at Florida Atlantic, and got my first job as an academic at Victoria University of Wellington in 1994. The first thing I did was visit the Department of Psychology and get my relocation cheque. The second thing I did was visit the Department of Māori Studies. My best friend, a Carbondale boy I'd gone to kindergarten, high school, university, and graduate school with, had majored in anthropology at UCLA and done his thesis on the evolution of political complexity in Māori chiefdoms (see Liu & Allen 1999 for psychological interpretation of his archaeological data from Hawke's Bay). So I knew enough about Aotearoa to realize that I should visit tangata whenua, and this act turned out to be the first step in a journey that has yet to end. A lecturer in the department invited us to a powhiri to remove the tapu (sacredness) from our feet. Later, I learned that according to Māori lore, a good caller can make the hairs on the back of your neck stand up when you are welcomed onto a marae: Te Ripowai Higgins certainly did that for me. The city melted away as another world, nestled under pohutukawa and guarded by ancestral memories emerged. Te Ripowai had just taken her class to Ruatuhuna as a practicum and they were sharing their experiences; most of the students were urban Māori and asked questions about Tuhoe Māori protocols that were highly informative to me. A few months later, Te Ripowai’s sister Aroha was in need of a ride home to Ruatoki, and we volunteered to take her. She led us on a magical mystery tour, guided by the invisible strands of whakapapa that connect Māori to the land and to their relations throughout Aotearoa. We got to know Aroha’s family, rode horses up the Whakatane River, and hunted eels by moonlight.

Aroha’s son Ati once told a rich Texas oilman, whom they’d met at a diner, who was flush with cash but had no children, that it was they not he who was rich. I learned the truth of those words as I experienced a side of New Zealand that few new migrants get to see. Before I had a chance to get socialized into the negative stereotypes of Māori that one sees on TV and reads in the press (Barclay & Liu 2003; Liu & Mills 2006), I met the people from whom those negative statistics are drawn face to face. I went to parties where a large percentage of people were missing teeth, had tattoos, and were in various states of inebriation, but felt welcome, safe and learned more than in most classrooms. It was in Te Urewera where I discovered that I was a cross-cultural psychologist, by life experience. Interviews
conducted in collaboration with Pou Temara with community members taught me much; but the best parts of these interviews were not captured on tape. The process of self-presentation and negotiation required to reach the point of informed consent where the Children of the Mist agreed to be interviewed and recorded by me was the real test. The perspectives held by Tuhoe are deeply grounded in the history of the land, and a knowledge of the past (see Liu & Temara 1998 for analysis of these interviews). I began to realize New Zealand’s bicultural heritage and learned how to articulate it formally using the methods of empirical social psychology (Liu, Wilson, McClure & Higgins 1999). I have helped my students and they have helped me to rewrite the literature on a bicultural psychology for Aotearoa/New Zealand (Barclay & Liu 2003; Harrington & Liu 2002; Kirkwood, Liu & Weatherall 2005; Liu 2005; Liu & Mills 2006; Rata, Liu & Hanke in press; Sibley & Liu 2004; Sibley & Liu 2007). We have developed a theory of history and identity (Liu & Hilton 2005), where we can empirically determine what and how people and events are drawn from history to form an iconic system of meaning that enables a culture to maintain its traditions while absorbing the implications of current events (Sibley, Liu, Duckitt & Khan 2008).

From Tuhoe I learned that my cultural heritage was not something to be dismissed, as I had during my assimilationist phase at UI. If Māori could fight against such odds and with such tenacity for their culture, should I not exert a little effort to retain my own? At exactly the right moment, I received notice of the inaugural meeting of the Asian Association of Social Psychology (AASP) in Hong Kong in 1995. I presented a paper co-authored with my father entitled “Modernism, post-modernism, and Neo-Confucian thinking: A critical history of paradigm shifts and values in academic psychology” (Liu & Liu 1997). Through writing this paper I got to know my father better. This paper earned me an invitation to become the first Insular Pacific regional representative for the association, and from there I have served as Treasurer, Secretary-General, and am currently Editor-in-Chief of the association’s journal, the Asian Journal of Social Psychology. AASP has been going from strength to strength, with a rapidly growing membership of currently 300 members, an SSCI journal with an citation impact rating of 0.6-1.0, and a biennial conference recently attended by more than 700 scholars (see www.asiansocialpsych.org). Within the association, I am sometimes known as an “honorary Taiwanese”, though this status, like
all my others, is provisional (see Huang, Liu & Chang 2004). My regular visits to Taiwan (where my parents now live) have greatly improved my fluency in Putonghua (Mandarin). Through the association my collaborations extend to Southeast Asia (e.g., Liu, Lawrence, Ward & Abraham 2002) and Japan (e.g., Ikeda, Liu, Aida, & Wilson, 2005; Liu & Atsumi 2008). I maintain a distinctly Asian sphere of activities that is largely separate from my cultural activities in NZ. I regularly visit Taiwan and hardly speak a word of English during these visits, but I also regularly travel to Japan where English is all I speak.

With this account, I draw my personal narrative to a close; for all the resources that I have been gifted and burdened with for the management of identity have been disclosed. Unusually for a psychologist, my approach to social identity focuses on the resources through which identity is mediated: institutional forms, shared knowledge structures, and social relations (Liu & Hilton 2005). It is to these that I now turn in providing a theoretical analysis of the journey and prospects of a marginal man in the global economy.

Marginal Positions and the Laws of Supply and Demand

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

W.B. Yeats

Robert Ezra Park (1950) writes:

It is characteristic of marginal types that they are able to look with a certain degree of critical detachment upon the diverse worlds of their parents. At the same time they are likely to feel themselves not quite at home in either (p.111).

Park describes characteristics of the marginal man as including:

spiritual instability, intensified self-consciousness, restlessness, and malaise… It is in the mind of the marginal man—where the changes and fusions of culture are going on—that we can best study the processes of civilization and of progress (p.356).

Leaving aside the biological essentialism and unfortunate notions of racial superiority that marred their analysis, Park and Stonequist
(Stonequist 1937) make some astute observations about the social identity of bicultural individuals that I shall pursue. But the professed Olympian detachment of their writing as “scientists” can be seen as time-bound assertions of white privilege when examined through the theory of race as power and language articulated by Fanon (1968/70). Fanon deconstructs their “personality theory of the marginal man” as an historical consequence of power, privilege, and language. Fanon says that “the Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately whiter—that is, he will come closer to being a real human being—in direct ratio to his mastery of French language” (p. 13). The superiority of the white man taken for granted by Park is re-inscribed as a neurotic aspiration for black men in Fanon’s account:

When it comes to the case of the Negro… He has no culture, no civilization, no ‘long historical past’. This may be the reason for the strivings of contemporary Negroes: to prove the existence of black civilization to the white world at all costs. Willy-nilly, the Negro has to wear the livery that the white man has sewed for him (p.25-26).

Fanon and Park can be read as locked into a dialogue that is situated within social and historical circumstances that provide reflections, but not a mirror for the story told here. Fanon writes further that “A man who has language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language” (p.14). And it is here that we part ways for reasons of power: Chinese language proficiency provides communications access to a population of more than 1.3 billion people, who possess a state with the fastest growing economy in the world. The days are long gone when overseas Chinese could proclaim without irony, as they did in a special issue of Daedalus published at the height of international acclaim for the economic miracles of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, that “the center has become the periphery”. In the Chinese-speaking world, the centre is the middle kingdom again (Kynge 2006). Fanon’s underlying theory of identity is a theory of power, and the distribution of power has shifted dramatically since the middle of the 20th century, when Western powers could more or less dictate to the rest of the world. America still attempts to dictate, but the world reacts in a way that can only be described as multi-polar. An international economic system has risen out of and sometimes supersedes the political state system (Lynne 2005), where China is the new manufacturer of choice for a wide range of global goods. The identity
strategies open to marginal men and women, particularly those of Chinese heritage, today far exceed the possibilities envisioned by Park or Fanon. They still revolve around bridging roles and their associated characteristics, but their value has increased because the colonial centres cannot hold.

Social Identity as a Tool Rather Than Essence

To illustrate, the only phase in my life when I regretted my Chinese-ness was during adolescence, and this rejection was more for social purposes than a wholesale devaluation of Chinese culture. Lu Xun’s famous story of Ah Q, the Chinaman who cries out “what has the world come to when the son is beating the father”, and has delusional confidence in his own value despite a series of beatings, resonates more with my sense of marginality than Fanon. In terms of representational resources to construct my identity, I grew up in a rich atmosphere of stories in Chinese of Yueh Fei, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Journey to the West, The Water Margin, and The Making of the Gods. I abandoned these narrative materials for self-construal during adolescence when I perceived that they had no value in the eyes of my peers, and untenable costs. But they were inscribed in my memory, and when it became again adaptive to know such things, as in interacting with professional associates from Asia, I found that I could draw from these as models of identity in a situated manner as tools (see Hong, Morris, Chiu & Benet-Martinez 2000 for experimental evidence). I do not unconsciously apply them in every situation as a person with an essentialized Chinese identity might.

In Taiwan, I speak more softly (in Chinese with fewer hand gestures), I address my elders with deference, I regard my students as my children as best I can, and I consider the ramifications of my actions in terms of how they will reverberate through the community of social psychologists in Taiwan rather than considering their impact on each individual in isolation. These are distinctly different modes of behaviour to what I do in New Zealand, where I gesture widely, speak more loudly, treat my students and other staff as colleagues, and consider actions with respect to their categorical effects on ethnic minorities. Through skilled use of social identity as a tool, I can be accepted as a marginal, but respected member of both societies. I am neither fully one with the in-group (remember at the implicit level, Asians are neither fully Americans in the
IDENTITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

U.S.A. nor fully kiwis in New Zealand), but nor am I an out-group member. While I do not seek (nor am I given) resources and power according to a central position in either society, my social relations are good. At the interstices between societies is my power, marked by a central position in the Asian Association of Social Psychology, which is a bridging institution itself. The irony is that this interstice is possessed of resources (at least in terms of journal impact ratings) beyond that of any of the centres of social science in either Taiwan or New Zealand.

The point is that power underpins the utility of reacting to situations in normative or stereotyped ways (see Radford, Ohnuma & Yamagishi 2007). When the China factor, as Ip and Pang (2005) call it is weak, Diaspora Chinese do well to keep their heads down and act as launderers or market gardeners (19th-early 20th centuries), or as professionals and technocrats (late 20th century), to fit with the positions available to them in Western economies. But there is no utility in internalizing such modes of behaviour when these same Western economies are now falling over themselves to get into China. I am writing these words in Hong Kong, where there are laser sensor wash basins even in the wet markets; thirty years ago there were live chickens on the trains and you were lucky to find a free (let alone clean) toilet anywhere. The payoff of the misery of being Chinese and not-Cantonese during my childhood is that I now speak functional Cantonese, and Hong Kong is another of the places where I can move freely; academic salaries and research funding is considerably more generous in Hong Kong than in New Zealand. When my father left Taiwan in the 1960s, it had a per-capita GNP equal to Jamaica’s, and New Zealand was one of the richest per-capita economies in the world. Thirty years later, the material standards of living in Taiwan and New Zealand are comparable. In particular segments, like investment in social science research, for example, Taiwan is far more generous than New Zealand. My largest grant, from 2005-2008, I was funded out of Taiwan to study “Realistic conflict and Chinese identity politics”, and involved colleagues in Taiwan, mainland China, and Japan (Liu & Atsumi 2008; Takahashi et al. 2008). I am immensely proud of the progress made by Chinese people over the course of my lifetime.

The larger corpus of work I have produced with my students on New Zealand identities, by contrast, has been funded by dribbles of money from my department, and is driven more by the interest and goodwill of my
students and self than economic incentives. One of the wonderful things about being a marginal man in New Zealand is that New Zealand itself occupies a delightfully marginal place in the global economy: comfortable enough, not despised by anyone, but not on anyone’s radar either in any domain except maybe tourism and agriculture. The markets for research on New Zealand identity are considerably smaller than the markets for research on Chinese identity. At the national level, funding for social science research in New Zealand is poor. My wife is fond of describing New Zealand as “outside the Matrix”, in terms of both resources and constraints. There has been for me a great freedom to do creative work because of the small size (including the low number of social scientists interested in NZ national identity) and lack of institutional straitjackets. I have made a career out of creating a substantial body of research without much in the way of grant money or interest from the big journals in psychology. In some ways, a freedom from grant money and from institutional requirements to publish in the highest impact journals has allowed me to pursue a particular line of innovation, born of marginal status. It has also allowed me to be more of a New Zealander on the dimension of bicultural knowledge of Māori and Pākehā than most native-born people.

It is true that New Zealand is sufficiently different from Asia that the ways of interacting in these societies sometimes fail to connect. Identity has become for me a practice of adapting in optimal ways to a variety of situations using cultural tools acquired over a lifespan. The more familiar Western personality model of Erickson, where the goal is to achieve a single integrated identity, is sub-optimal for me because of the range of disconnected social and economic structures that I inhabit. As I shall detail in my final section, such an identity strategy is not without emotional costs.

Marginal Positions and Affect

Thus far, I have offered an account of my personal journey as though instrumental rewards and costs were the primary drivers of my actions and identity. But the fundamental insight of social identity theory is that identity is a heuristic that can lead to irrational choices, based on social comparison and the affect associated with comparisons rather than calculations of instrumental value. The two formative political events of my early years as a social scientist were the Rodney King beating and the
Tiananmen uprising. These emotional events rocked me to the core and motivated me to follow courses of action that resonate with a need for social justice and practical concerns (Liu & Liu 1999). In some ways, there is no percentage in my working on New Zealand identities, because I am well-aware that in many quarters, my Asian skin precludes my ever becoming an authority on such matters. My role is as a teacher and cultivator of outstanding kiwi students of both Māori and Pākeha descent who are able and willing to take this work to another level. I did not grow up in New Zealand and do not have the same emotional affinity for the topic as they do. The ability to look at the symbols of nationhood for New Zealand with detachment is both a blessing and a curse. As Park noted, my emotional detachment enables me to examine such symbols with acute consciousness, but it also prevents me from taking comfort in their promises of immortality (see Liu & Hilton 2005). So it is true that I often feel restless and spiritually unstable. I cannot act out of the unquestioning convictions that people with a more unified sense of identity seem capable of, and as a consequence I sometimes fall into a malaise of self-doubt about the value of my undertakings or my ability to achieve them. Whether this is due to my temperament or to acculturative stress I cannot say. But I do thank my wife for putting up with my emotional ups and downs.

On the sociological level, what this translates into for me is a reluctance to assume leadership roles. I am alternatively a maverick, a consensus seeker, one who acts with caution, is eager to please, is emotionally remote, and is unlikely to push his more visionary ideas of interconnectedness (Liu & Liu 1995; 1997; 1999). The habits of social identification formed in my youth and childhood have not been greatly changed by the higher statuses that I currently occupy in the academic world; in some respects, I choose now to be marginal because that is the comfort zone for my identity. I crave the stimulation of the border zones of inter-connectedness, not the peaceful hegemony of established centres.

By articulating my journey and limitations, I hope to have set out a set of markers so that others walking along the same paths may recognize the forces carving the terrain beneath their feet. The Hegelian Torch of history passed from Britain to the United States with World War II, and I believe that it passed from the United States to humanity when the U.S. invaded Iraq. The loss of moral legitimacy for the U.S.A. has been catastrophic since then, as numerous social surveys have found (Pew
The world no longer finds American naïveté in international relations charming. In the 21st century, where Anglo-American hegemony is loosening its hold, marginal men and women are needed more than ever to build bridges, to look for new forms of managing consensus, for articulating inclusiveness without forcing consensus. The marginal role is a bridging role, and its prospects are considerably brighter than half a century ago. But in the future, the art of both building and maintaining bridges between people who do not desire assimilation, who reject the need for homogeneity while maintaining a desire to be interconnected, will have to be refined. It is my belief that global consciousness is plural consciousness, and in this coming century every centre would be wise to nurture and promote its marginals, its biculturals (see Chen, Benet-Martinez & Bond 2008), within them are life skills to help build connective tissues to assuage the friction between centres that is simultaneously advancing human society and a major source of future peril.

Notes

Parts of this paper were presented as an invited address at the Metropolis Plus International Conference: Perspectives from New Zealand, Te Papa, Wellington, October 15, 2007.

1 Blacks were the largest minority group in Southern Illinois but in no way was this a “bicultural” society. About half of the whites in Southern Illinois fought on the side of the Confederacy during the Civil War, and to this date the racial hierarchy is clear and certain.

2 Defined by Park as “Hybrid peoples, particularly if they are the product of the inter-breeding of stocks so physically divergent that the resulting hybrid can be readily distinguished from both parents…a man who is predestined to live in two cultures and two worlds” (p. 111).

3 I doubt I would have found these stories so appealing had I been born female, but gender and acculturation is a story for another time.

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Changing Asian Immigration and Settlement in the Pacific Rim

WEI LI*

Abstract

As a result of receiving countries’ immigrant admission and integration policies, source country development, and economic globalization trends, contemporary international migrants have become increasingly heterogeneous with regard to their origin and destination countries, socio-economic and demographic profiles, and the impacts on both sending and destination countries. This paper addresses these issues in the Pacific Rim countries through a comparative perspective. It starts with a brief overview of immigration policies and then discusses the spatial and socio-economic consequences of contemporary international highly-skilled and low-skilled migration, including changing social hierarchies and settlement forms. The final section explores some of the opportunities and challenges facing cross-national studies on immigration.

The Asia-Pacific region is the site of an increasing share of the world’s international migrants. Of the estimated 200 million people living outside their countries of birth in 2005, just over 100 million were resident in Asia, North America and Oceania (United Nations 2006). International migration accounted for 15.2 percent and 13.5 percent respectively of the resident populations of Oceania and North America in 2005, but only 1.4 percent of Asia’s population. Notwithstanding this small immigrant share in their own populations, China, India and the Philippines remain the top three migrant sending countries with, respectively, 35, 20

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and 7 million people born in these countries living overseas in 2005. The high proportions of immigrants in North America and Oceania reflect the fact that the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are longstanding immigrant receiving countries.

This paper reviews briefly some characteristics of immigration policy in the four major immigrant receiving countries on the Pacific Rim. Using Asian immigrants and temporary migrants as examples, the impacts of changing geopolitics and economic globalization on immigrant settlements and socio-economic hierarchies in the receiving countries are compared. The paper concludes with some reflections on opportunities and challenges facing cross-national studies on immigration.

Historical Immigration Policies: Exclusion and Restriction

The importance of international migration for the development of the four Pacific Rim economies and societies raises questions about how receiving countries’ immigration admission policies and their enforcement mechanisms regulate such inflows over time and the consequences of these regulatory measures. Lee (2003:7) has observed that “immigration law emerges as a dynamic site where ideas about race, immigration, citizenship and nation were recast. Chinese exclusion, in particular, reflected, produced, and reproduced struggles over the makeup and character of the nation itself.” National immigration policies in the receiving countries have continuously screened out immigrants on the basis of race/ethnicity, nationality, class and gender characteristics. How Asians have been treated in the past as well as under contemporary immigration policy is inseparable from the relationships between their ancestral homelands and the destination countries, regardless of their citizenship status, nativity, identity and behaviour.

Historically, immigration admission policies toward Asians in the four Pacific Rim receiving countries were those of exclusion (Canada and the United States (U.S.)) or restriction (Australia and New Zealand; Table 1). They were based on racialized and Eurocentric ideologies for nation building and intensified during periods of intense labour competition and economic recessions. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 remains the first and only federal legislation in the U.S. that excluded a group of immigrants purely based on their race and class (Canada passed their version of Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1923).

The significance of this law was long overlooked. Daniels (2004: 3) notes that the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, “which has long been seen as a minor if somewhat disreputable incident, can now be seen as a nodal point in the history of American immigration policy. It marked when the golden doorway of admission to the United States began to narrow…” Ten years later, the 1892 Geary Act not only extended the Chinese Exclusion Act for another ten years but also required Chinese immigrants to carry “certificates of residence and certificates of identity” with them at all times. Failing to do so could result in detention and deportation. No other groups were required to carry such certificates until 1928, when “immigrant identification cards” were first issued to any new immigrants arriving for permanent residency. These were eventually replaced by the “alien registration receipt cards” (that is, “green cards”) after 1940 (Lee 2003: 42).

Immigration enforcement also intersected with international obligations and asymmetric geopolitical power relationships. If both sending and receiving countries were more or less on an equal footing in the international arena, negotiation and bilateral agreements were likely to be the means for managing international migration. Otherwise, the more powerful side often unilaterally enforced their laws. This was evident in Sino-U.S. relations leading to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, versus the Japanese-U.S. negotiation resulting in the 1907 “Gentlemen’s Agreement” (Takaki 1998). Although still perceived as unequal since the Japanese government had to ‘voluntarily’ curb emigrants, these migrants nevertheless were permitted to bring wives into the U.S., compared to the prohibition of Chinese women immigrants that resulted from the 1875 Page Act. Additionally, immigration enforcement was differentially practiced along the northern and southern borders of the U.S. (Lee 2003).
Table 1: Policies toward Asian immigration in four Pacific Rim countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946 for Filipino and India</td>
<td>(1978-1986)</td>
<td>1990s emphasizing skilled migration, in favour of those with English, skills &amp; not settling in Sydney/Melbourne</td>
<td>Citizenship after 3 years of permanent residence, later extended to 5 years (after 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 ‘Asia-Pacific triangle’ (~100/country &gt;2000 total)</td>
<td>1978 Entrepreneurs stream; 1986 Investor stream (≥CAD$400,000 net worth $800,000)</td>
<td>Past 5 years: 220,000 skilled from China, India &amp; Pakistan</td>
<td>Policy emphasizes preference for skilled migrants but also several special schemes for selected Pacific countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-discriminatory: (1965-1986)</td>
<td>2002: Canadian experience class added</td>
<td>2005: up to 140,000 immig/year</td>
<td>Receipt of US Masters degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 Immigrants &amp; Nationality Act (family reunion (80%) &amp; professional (20%); Citizenship after 5yrs)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1991-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990 Immigration Act (140,000 employment-based, 10,000 employment creation ≥$1 ml.; diversity)</td>
<td>Past 5 years: 220,000 skilled from China, India &amp; Pakistan</td>
<td>1990s emphasizing skilled migration, in favour of those with English, skills &amp; not settling in Sydney/Melbourne</td>
<td>1991 introduction of a points system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 ACWIA: H-1B visa 65,000  190,000 (until 2002)</td>
<td>2002: Canadian experience class added</td>
<td>2005: up to 140,000 immig/year</td>
<td>Citizenship after 3 years of permanent residence, later extended to 5 years (after 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005: additional 20,000 with US Masters degrees</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1991-)</td>
<td>Policy emphasizes preference for skilled migrants but also several special schemes for selected Pacific countries</td>
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Source: Adapted from Li, W. (2006b)
At the U.S.-Canadian border, American efforts centered on border diplomacy based on a historically amicable diplomatic relationship and a shared antipathy for Chinese immigration. The U.S. pressured Canada to assist in enforcing the Chinese exclusion laws, including:

1. moving the enforcement of U.S. immigration law beyond the border and into the Canadian ports of entry where Chinese first entered, and
2. encouraging Canada to adopt Chinese immigration laws that were more compatible with American objectives, which resulted eventually in Canada’s 1923 Chinese Exclusion Act.

At the U.S.-Mexican border, however, there was less reliance on cooperation with the Mexican government and more emphasis on border policing through a system of surveillance, patrols, apprehension, and deportation, including:

1. commencing patrols at the border and increasing patrol personnel,
2. conducting immigration raids, and
3. arresting and deporting Chinese already in the U.S.

The result of such border control and immigration law enforcement eventually closed both the northern and southern U.S. borders to Chinese immigration altogether. In this way the foundations were laid for racialized conceptions of the ‘illegal immigration problem’ and for American border enforcement and nation-building at the beginning of 20th century (Lee 2003). Such immigration policies and enforcement solidified white supremacy ideology and practices, creating a national policy based on a racial hierarchy that advantaged whites over minorities.

World War II ushered in major immigration admission policy changes for the four Pacific Rim immigrant receiving countries. Some major Asian migrant sending countries became war allies, such as China, India and the Philippines; whereas others became enemies, such as Japan (and Korea which was under Japan’s ‘protection’ at the time). The need to win the war and silence Japanese war propaganda, in addition to the calls of some communities to correct historical wrongs and obtain racial justice, promoted all four countries to act during and after the war.
The U.S. and Canada repealed their Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1943 and 1947 respectively, provided limited quotas for new migrants, and permitted Chinese immigrants to become naturalized citizens. The U.S. passed similar laws extending such quotas and rights to Asian Indians and Filipina in 1946. In New Zealand the 1944 Finance Act abolished the poll tax and tonnage restrictions levied against Chinese immigrants since the 1880s. However, Japanese in the U.S. and Canada experienced a reversal of fortune. As their ancestral homeland became an enemy power, large numbers of Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians, regardless of their nativity, were placed into internment camps. These dislocations were the result of their race, ethnic ancestry, and place of residence, since only those who lived in the west coast were considered immediate threats and were interned.

Changing Policies, Migrant Categories and Sources

Restrictive immigration policies were not fully dismantled until the mid-20th century. The U.S. Congress passed the historic 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act as result of the civil rights movement at home and nationalist movements overseas. From 1965, U.S. immigration policy was now no longer race-based but offered equal immigration opportunities to all countries in the Eastern Hemisphere. Eighty percent of annual immigrant quotas were allocated to family-reunification categories with the remaining 20 percent allocated to employment-based preferences. Interestingly, the percentage of professional categories was reduced from the 1952 Immigration Act, because the post-WWII economic recovery in Europe made it less attractive for European professionals to immigrate to the U.S. (Cheng & Liu 1994). In the meantime, the ‘Asian Pacific Triangle’, created by the same immigration act, provided a total annual quota of 2,000 for the entire Asia Pacific region.

Canada, Australia and New Zealand also altered their respective immigration admission policies and adopted points systems for selecting immigrants on the basis of their human capital, such as education attainment and English speaking abilities. Canada’s major change came two years after that in the U.S. in 1967; Australia followed in 1972 and New Zealand caught up much later in 1986 (Table 1). Both Australia and Canada adopted an official federal policy of ‘multiculturalism’ (Li, W. 2006a; Li, P.
These immigrant admission and associated integration policies have since changed the demographic compositions, socio-economic profiles, and political landscapes of all four immigrant receiving countries.

Given the unprecedented speed and scope of economic globalization and free-trade since the early 1970s immigrant admission policies in most Western countries today explicitly recruit both capitalist investors and highly-skilled professionals. Immigration policies in the four countries have become more selective seeking migrants who will take advantage of the globalizing economy and intensifying competition. Canada attempted to lure business immigrants by establishing the ‘entrepreneur stream’ (1978) and the ‘investor stream’ (1986). Similarly, New Zealand implemented an ‘Entrepreneur Immigration Policy’ in the late 1970s, then a ‘Business Immigration Policy’ in 1986, to attract business immigrants and their investments. Australia launched the ‘business migrant program’ in 1981 and the business and skilled category has been a priority since the mid-1990s. The U.S. was a relative late-comer in the global race for business migrants but has constantly increased employment-based visas. For instance, the 1990 Immigrant Act allocated 140,000 immigrant visas to the ‘employment-based’ category. This included 10,000 EB-5 visas for ‘employment creation,’ a category requiring, with certain exceptions, at least a $1 million investment and the subsequent creation of a minimum of 10 new jobs.

The importance of globalization in changing immigration policies is also reflected in the non-immigrant categories created in recent decades. In the U.S., for example, L-1 and H-1B visas were introduced to encourage immigration of managerial personnel and resolve shortages of high-tech professionals. The American Competitiveness and Work Force Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA) increased the annual cap to 115,000 from 65,000 in previous years on H-1B visas, and non-profit organizations and academic institutions were exempted from this cap. The annual quotas of H-1B visas were further increased to 195,000 for three years ending 2002. An important provision of the H-1B visa stipulation is that during the two three-year terms of their stay, H-1B visa holders are eligible to bring their immediate family and to apply for permanent residence. Reportedly, more than 70 percent of H-1B visa holders have made this transition to residence in recent years.
Moreover, the trend towards immigration policies seeking investors and highly-skilled migrants is no longer a privilege enjoyed only by the four traditional receiving countries. Asian countries experiencing rapid economic growth and increasing wealth have joined the global search for capital and talent in order to solidify and promote their standing in the world economy (Hugo 2006). China enacted its own version of ‘green cards’ to allow residency for foreigners for up to five years to attract investment in economic, science/technology or cultural projects. The required investment varied by place in China and in the case of Beijing, the amount was U.S.$3million. By 2004, however, there were 1,566 investors on this visa in Shanghai alone. China has also implemented a points system for highly-skilled temporary migrants. By 2007 there were more than 450,000 people in China with one- to five-year renewable residence permits, almost double the 230,000 who had such permits in 2003 (Cha 2007).

Hong Kong started a ‘Capital Investment Entrant Scheme’ in 2003, attracting wealthy new migrants and capital (1,910 applicants reported assets at the level of $3.24m/person). In June 2006, a new points-based admission system, the ‘Quality Migrant Admission Scheme’, was launched allowing up to 1,000 highly skilled migrants per year. The program favors migrants in the 30-34 age range who have work experience, and a 19 member panel decides who gets in (Migration Policy Institute 2006; Workpermit.com 2007). In Singapore, there are three types of temporary work visas known as P-, Q- and S-passes. Pass-holders can bring dependants and become permanent residents. Temporary work permit holders, largely fulfilling low-skilled job and domestic service sectors on the other hand, do not enjoy these privileges (Yeoh 2007). Similarly in 2007 Taiwan was studying the feasibility of admitting up to one million highly-skilled white collar immigrants (Monsters and Critics 2007).

Table 2 contains data on the immigrant admission numbers, categories, and top five source countries during the 2004-2005 period for the four immigrant receiving countries. Significantly, the point-based immigration admission systems valuing human capital resulted in Australia, Canada and New Zealand admitting similar percentages of skilled immigrants during the year, varying from 58 percent to 61 percent, whereas family reunification types ranged from less than a quarter to less than one-third.
The U.S. data warrants some explanation. Only seven percent of new arrivals admitted directly for permanent residence were in the skilled migrant category; the great majority (81 percent) were admitted under family reunification categories. If one includes all people who were also admitted to legal permanent residence status in 2005, including those who adjusted their legal status onshore from non-immigrant visas to ones entitling them to reside permanently, the proportion admitted under policies favouring skills increases to 22 percent. This is still much less than the shares admitted in this category in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Also shown in Table 2 are the top five source countries for skilled migrants around 2005 in the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Asian countries account for four of the major sources of skilled migrants in Canada, and three of the top five in Australia and the U.S. Moreover, China and India are among the top five in all of them, and together they accounted for about a quarter of all skilled migrants in Australia and the U.S., and 29

Table 2: Immigrant categories and top source countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Country</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Fiscal Year 2005; Quota System)</td>
<td>(2004; points system)</td>
<td>(2004-2005; points system)</td>
<td>(Financial yr 04-05; points system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New arrivals (384,071)</td>
<td>Overall Intake</td>
<td>Overall Intake</td>
<td>Overall Intake</td>
<td>Overall Intake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(220,000-245,000)</td>
<td>(132,870)</td>
<td>(120,843)</td>
<td>(48,815)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills*: 7%</td>
<td>Skills*: 58%</td>
<td>Skills*: 59%</td>
<td>Skills*: 61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family: 81%</td>
<td>Family: 25%</td>
<td>Family: 31%</td>
<td>Family: 28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees/humanitarian: 13%</td>
<td>Refugees/humanitarian: 14%</td>
<td>Refugees/humanitarian: 10%</td>
<td>Refugees/humanitarian: 3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: 12%</td>
<td>Others: 3%</td>
<td>Others: 0%</td>
<td>Others: 6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Five Source</td>
<td>Top Five Source</td>
<td>Top Five Source</td>
<td>Top Five Source</td>
<td>Top Five Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries for skilled</td>
<td>Countries for skilled migrants</td>
<td>Countries for skilled migrants</td>
<td>Countries for skilled migrants</td>
<td>Countries for skilled migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India 18%</td>
<td>China 18%</td>
<td>UK 25%</td>
<td>UK 45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 7%</td>
<td>India 11%</td>
<td>India 13%</td>
<td>South Africa 12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 7%</td>
<td>Philippines 7%</td>
<td>China 11%</td>
<td>China 6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines 7%</td>
<td>Pakistan 4%</td>
<td>South Africa 5%</td>
<td>India 5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 6%</td>
<td>Romania 4%</td>
<td>Malaysia 5%</td>
<td>USA 4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top five total 45%</td>
<td>Top five total 44%</td>
<td>Top five total 50%</td>
<td>Top five total 76%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including immediate dependants
percent in Canada. The Philippines, Pakistan and Malaysia are the other Asian countries among the top five sources of temporary migrants.

There are also differences with regard to temporary migrants among the four immigrant receiving countries (Table 3). Canada has the lowest share of its skilled migrants admitted under temporary policies, although temporary migrants still constitute a majority (54 percent) of those admitted with skills. The U.S., Australia and New Zealand admit the overwhelming majority (over 80 percent) of their skilled migrants in the temporary categories (Table 3). Both the U.S. and Australia admit very large numbers of temporary migrants and this gives them the ability to fulfill labor needs in their changing economies without having to provide these migrants with permanent legal residency. By contrast, almost half of the skilled migrants in Canada are admitted as permanent immigrants with full privileges and rights of becoming Canadians.

### Table 3: Temporary skilled migrants and top source countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Temporary Skilled Migrants</th>
<th>Temp workers:</th>
<th>Int'l students:</th>
<th>Total Skilled:</th>
<th>Temp skilled in total skilled migrants:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong> (new arrival-FY05)</td>
<td>2,074,572</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong> (2004)</td>
<td>156,300</td>
<td>Foreign workers: 64%</td>
<td>Int'l students: 36%</td>
<td>Total Skilled: 2,104,054</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australia</strong> (2004-2005)</td>
<td>618,564</td>
<td>Business entrants: 55%</td>
<td>Working holidays 17%</td>
<td>Temp skilled in total skilled migrants: 89%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Zealand</strong> (financial yr 04-05)</td>
<td>126,905</td>
<td>Work permits 22%</td>
<td>Int'l students 61%</td>
<td>Temp skilled in total skilled migrants: 81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sources:
- Canada, Australia and New Zealand - Birrell et al. 2006 table 4.1.
International student admissions are also worth mentioning, not only because international education is seen to be an increasingly important economic sector in many developed countries, but also because the students constitute a large pool of potential skilled permanent migrants once their training is finished (Batalova 2007; DeParle 2007). New Zealand has the highest percentage of international students amongst its temporary migrants, as well as the highest concentration of students from its top five source countries (Table 3).

Asian countries count for four out of the top five source countries for international students in the U.S. and New Zealand, and all top five for Australia (Canadian data were unavailable at the time of writing). China and India again are on the top five lists for the three countries. China and India have rapidly growing economies and burgeoning, highly educated middle-classes. They are the largest sources of ‘talent’ migrants, and in the U.S. immigrants from China and India alone accounted for more than 25 percent of all international students, 40 percent of all employment-based immigrants and 60 percent of all H-1b visa holders in the early 2000s (Saxenian 2005).

**Consequences of Contemporary Immigration Policies**

Unprecedented changes have taken place in the composition of international migrant flows as admission and domestic integration policies in the four immigration countries have moved away from discrimination against non-white migrants following the introduction of the U.S. quota and the points selection systems in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In this section some of the consequences of contemporary immigration policies on social hierarchies and settlement patterns are reviewed.

**Immigrant Race and Class Hierarchies**

Within the global immigrant hierarchy, the top tier contains mainly transnational elites who are ‘global citizens’. They are corporate executives and investors (Beaverstock 2005) part of what Sklair (2002) calls a ‘transnational capitalist class’, or what Sassen (2007) calls ‘global classes’. They enjoy the privileges of choosing where to live and work, and frequently influence both domestic politics and global businesses. With
certain exceptions of ethnic Asians in the Pacific Rim, this group often consists of non-Hispanic European descendants. Global cities constitute their primary power base and likely location of residence and business.

The second tier includes middle-class skilled migrants, or ‘mental workers’ as they sometimes are called. These may be either permanent immigrants or temporary skilled migrants, such as H-1B visa holders in the U.S., many of whom are Asian migrants, often from China or India (Mather 2007; Regts 2007). Many people in this tier live and work in the knowledge-based economy areas of their destination countries, where their skills have greatest immediate impact.

The third tier in the hierarchy refers to other legal immigrants and temporary migrants, many of whom enter for the purpose of family reunification. This group comes from a wide range of origin countries, but increasing numbers and percentages are now from Asia, especially the traditional diasporic countries of China, India and the Philippines. Their long history of immigration has formed a large population base that facilitates chain migration through the sponsorship of family members and relatives. This tier’s spatial distribution has changed from heavy concentration in job sites and central city enclaves towards greater dispersal across suburban areas of large and medium sized cities.

At the bottom of the hierarchy are the undocumented/unauthorized migrants, who lack legal status and are often from racialized minorities, including Asians. A major distinction between the four Pacific Rim destination countries under discussion in this paper is the scope and extent of undocumented immigration, with the U.S. having much larger numbers and proportions than the other countries. Undocumented migration has been consistently connected to issues of homeland security in the U.S. since the September 11 crisis, and features prominently in public and political debates about immigration.

Changing Immigrant Settlement and Communities

Dramatic changes in immigration policies and profiles also manifest themselves spatially as a result of changing immigrant settlement patterns and community formations over time. Traditional analyses of immigrant settlement patterns and community forms focus on assimilation processes. In particular, the spatial assimilation model depicts suburbanization as a
distinct phase in an overall process whereby immigrants and other minorities improve their residential situations as they achieve socioeconomic success. In so doing, they frequently forsake urban ethnic enclaves for more ethnically-mixed suburbs, thereby ensuring further assimilation (Alba et al. 1999). Suburbanization is thus considered equivalent to the achievement of spatial assimilation.

Research in recent years has challenged such notions (Castles 2002; Peach 2002; Riggs 2002). Peach (2001:1) critiques the perspective that views the ghetto, enclave and suburb as a ‘three generation model’ of ethnic assimilation. He argues that U.S. sociological analyses of ethnic communities fail to distinguish between ghetto and the ethnic enclave, while identifying the assimilatory model as the only choice for explanation. On the basis of an analysis of the 1980 and 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) datasets from the U.S. census among 11 racial/ethnic groups, Alba et al. (1999) found that, while some evidence continued to support the classic spatial assimilation model, the significance of suburbanization as a distinct stage has declined in a larger process of residential assimilation, and there is a weakening relationship between suburbanization and linguistic assimilation.

Further analysis of 1990 census data among 15 racial/ethnic groups in New York and Los Angeles by Logan et al. (2002:299-300), distinguished the immigrant enclave from the ethnic community:

in the immigrant enclave model, ethnic neighbourhoods are formed because they serve relatively impoverished new arrivals as a potential base for eventual spatial assimilation with the whole majority. … [T]he ethnic community, as we define it here … is grounded in motives associated more with taste and preference than with economic necessity, or even with the ambition to create neighbourhoods that will symbolize and sustain ethnic identity.

They concluded that the differentiation between immigrant enclave and ethnic community is class-based, with the “immigrant enclave model … associated with labour immigrants, the ethnic community model … associated with groups of entrepreneurs and professional immigrants” (Logan et al. 2002:320).

It is increasingly evident in the first decade of the 21st century that suburbanization is no longer limited to middle- or upper-class immigrants. Recent statistics show that 40 percent of all immigrants now directly settle
in suburbs in the U.S. In fact, inner-suburban zones that provide relatively affordable housing have been seen as new immigrant gateways, especially for Latino labour migrants in various regions in the U.S. (Roberts 2007). Peach (2001:16-17) defines different types of ghettos and enclaves, providing examples of various ethnic groups in different countries. These are traditional assimilation-diffusion, the involuntary and non-assimilatory American ghetto, and three subtypes of voluntary plural communities: in situ persistent enclave, relocated enclave, and the ‘parachuted’ suburban model.

I have previously suggested an ‘ethnoburb’ (multiethnic suburb) model, which differentiates this new type of suburban immigrant/minority concentration from either ghetto or ethnic enclave models (Li, W. 1998a and 1998b; Li, W. 2006c). While conforming to both Logan et al.’s (2002) ‘ethnic community’ and Peach’s (2001) ‘parachuted suburban’ models in their voluntary nature and suburban location, an ethnoburb is more complex, pertaining not solely to affluent immigrants but to more complex communities of multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural, transnational and multiple socio-economic profiles.

Only in recent years have studies explored in greater detail the complexity of suburban immigrant concentrations across the Pacific Rim. Peter Li (1992) has analyzed the emergence of a new Chinese middle-class community and investment hub in Richmond, a suburban Vancouver city. Lo and Wang (1997) have explored immigrant suburban settlements in Toronto. I have described the transformation of suburban Los Angeles’s San Gabriel Valley to a Chinese ethnoburb (Li, W. 1999). Comparative analyses of immigrant communities in the four receiving countries have recently been published for nine metropolitan areas including the Chinese in Los Angeles (Li 2006c), Toronto (Lo 2006), Vancouver (Edindgton et al. 2006) and Auckland (Ho & Bedford 2006); Koreans in Los Angeles (Laux & Thieme 2006); Vietnamese in suburban Virginia (Wood 2006) and Cabramatta, Sydney (Dunn 2006); and Asian Americans in New York (Smith & Logan 2006) as well as the Silicon Valley (Li, W. & Park 2006).

The emergence of such suburban Asian immigrant concentrations varies from initial suburbanization of middle-class Asian residents (Los Angeles, New York, Silicon Valley, Richmond, BC and Toronto), to gateways for Southeast Asian refugees (suburban Virginia and Cabramatta). Moreover, the emergence of the truly ‘parachuted suburban’ model, depicted
by Peach (2001), demonstrates the major changes over the past decade with Asian immigrant concentrations emerging in suburban areas that did not have a pre-existing Asian residential core as result of suburbanization and globalization. This is particularly true in recently emerged knowledge-based economy areas. The availability of professional jobs and the amenities provided by middle-class suburbs such as those in Phoenix, Seattle, and the Maryland suburb of Rockville, have drawn increasing numbers of Asian highly-skilled migrants. In this regard, there may not exist distinct factors that attract highly-skilled migrants over other migrants, but the very existence and increasing presence of these highly-skilled migrants shifts the demographic composition, local business landscape and social-cultural practices, and alters the nature of immigrant communities.

Regardless of what they are called, these multiethnic suburbs with large Asian concentrations share several similar characteristics. They are a recent phenomenon emerging in the past two decades. They are no longer limited to a few city blocks or sections, as was the case with the traditional Chinatowns or Japantowns, but extend spatially to larger areas. They serve as immigrant residential as well as business concentrations with varying degrees of ‘institutional completeness’ as ethnic communities (Breton 1964). With certain exceptions among the more mature and persistent ethnic communities, however, one particular immigrant group does not comprise a majority in the total population of these suburbs; nonetheless they constitute a highly visible, if not dominant commercial presence.

Within these immigrant communities, goods and services primarily catering to first generation adult immigrants, as well as language schools for later generations, are abundant, and in some cases are increasingly appealing to other ethnic groups also. Such communities exhibit intense transnational connections to countries of origin, from communications and travel, and visiting family members and relatives, to home country societies and politics. Outside the specific ethnic immigrant group moreover, connections to and interactions with other groups and public institutions remain strong because no single group can dominate the political scene and power structure any more. Therefore, demographic shifts of recent decades have resulted in increased powersharing among different ethnic groups in these communities, whether it is a consensus among different interests or ethnic groups, or an increasing awareness of political realities.
Opportunities and Challenges for Cross-National Immigration Studies

Contemporary international migration patterns, as well as immigrant communities and identities, present unprecedented opportunities and challenges for research beyond the traditional destination country-centered analyses on immigrant assimilation to the mainstream society. Given the complexity of contemporary international migration, it is imperative that scholars in various disciplines - native-born as well as immigrant of various racial/ethnic backgrounds and from all perspectives - are encouraged to research various aspects of international migration. These aspects include, but are not limited to, the impacts of immigration on domestic policies, spatial distribution and settlement patterns, community forms, economic engagement/contribution, socio-cultural and religious institutions, health, ethnic identity, political representation, local reaction and inter-group relations in destination countries, the impacts of return migration in source countries, and the transnational connections of international migration.

Significantly, contemporary immigration research has become increasingly transnational in scope, comparative in essence, mixed in methods, and critical to understanding policy implications and/or impacts. In a recent article, Stephen Castles (2007:365) calls for a 'global sociology of migration':

The starting point for middle-range theorisation of contemporary migration could be the analysis of a particular migration system linking specific countries of origin, transit, and destination, within the context of the wider social relations of globalisation and social transformation.

He considers the following as:

some basic methodological principles for a critical migration sociology: interdisciplinarity; historical understanding, comparative studies, take a holistic approach; examine transnational dimensions of social transformation ... an interaction between global, national, regional and local factors (Castles 2007:367).

Key parameters for such a research agenda are:

1. The need for more comparative research. Contemporary international migration has moved beyond the isolated pairs of migrant sending and receiving countries, to globalized population movements that
are increasingly complex and dynamic. The studies of contemporary international migration also have shifted as a result, especially with the increasing analyses of transnationalism that exist between migrant sending and receiving countries and beyond (Dunn 2005; Glick Schiller 2005; Schuerkens 2005). However, direct comparisons among countries of origin or destination are relatively rare, despite increasing analyses conducted in recent years (e.g. Birrell et al. 2006).

Admittedly, there are numerous difficulties associated with conducting such cross-national studies, including the incompatibility of concepts and terminology (Aspinall 2007), the (un)availability and (in)compatibility of data sources, and issues of research methods and coordination in such endeavors. Therefore, there needs to be collaboration between researchers designing and conducting their research in order to resolve conceptual differences and data incompatibility issues. Such cross-national research requires concerted effort and leadership, and its development and execution often necessitates multiple funding sources. But these studies may also yield more productive outcomes which address the reasons for, dynamics of and solutions to cross-national phenomena associated with international migration, such as highly-skilled and undocumented/unauthorized migrant flows, and the various types of settlement patterns and communities.

2. Impacts of immigrant admission policies. It is important to assess the impacts of different immigration admission policies on migrants and their families, as well as sending and receiving countries. For instance, in the U.S. with its heavy reliance on temporary professional migrants, it can take up to 20 years for a college-bound foreign student to obtain a Ph.D. degree and go through the H-1b visa process before acquiring a green card and then citizenship. In this long process of status adjustment, s/he is completely shut out of the political system. In essence, both H-1B visa holders as well as undocumented immigrants are disfranchised in such an immigration system. Obviously such disfranchisements differ in degree and scope between legal temporary migrants and undocumented migrants. The former have a legal path to citizenship, whereas the latter will have to wait until an amnesty before they can regularise their status.

Heated public debates in Canada have questioned whether a points-based system for admitting immigrants, based on their human capital attainments without job market assessment, wastes human resources
through un- or under-employment and subsequently leads to increased return migration or migration on to third countries. The Australian and New Zealand systems of tying admission to job prospects seems to be more efficient in this regard. A critical need for comparative assessment about the pros and cons of different admission policies exists.

There is an increasing trend towards global circulation of talent to maximise opportunities to best use their human capital. Immigrant integration policies in destination countries play important roles in attracting and retaining such migrants. Moreover, there also exists a corresponding need to assess comparatively the impacts of the global recruitment of highly skilled migrants on the origin countries’ economy, society, and politics. Migrant sending countries are also implementing policies to recruit their expatriates back for permanent or temporary work, and to provide them with certain rights and privileges.

3. Consequences of immigrant integration policies and utility of the assimilation paradigm. Contemporary international migration yields to different immigrant integration policies in destination countries. Australia and Canada both have official multicultural policies, while New Zealand has a bicultural policy with debates moving toward multiculturalism. In practice, these states offer immigrants some English-language training and settlement services.

The United States, on the other hand, has no official immigrant integration policy but a dominant assimilation/melting-pot discourse even though pluralism and multiculturalism discussions have existed for decades (Brulliard 2007; Gans 2007; Hieronymi 2005). In reality, immigrant social, educational and health services are largely the responsibilities of individual states and local authorities resulting in disconnections between national immigration debates and state/local realities and solutions.

Such variations in immigration policies are reflected in national data collection strategies and practices as well as academic research. Recent research in Australia, Canada and New Zealand deals largely with immigrant integration issues (see, for example, Birrell et al. 2006). Many studies in the U.S. continue to assess the traditional assimilation measures and their variations. For example, a review article on U.S. sociological studies of immigration (Waters & Jimenez 2005) cites the ‘three-generation model’ of language assimilation as a sign of progress: first generation immigrants keep their native tongue, and the third generation speaks
nothing but English with the second generation somewhere in between. The critical question however is what constitutes language ‘progress’ in this globalizing world: is losing a language other than English a sign of progress or regress? Many Americans want to have their children learn a foreign language, evident by many public school districts in upper-middle class neighborhoods having started Mandarin and other foreign language immersion programs.

Teaching and learning certain foreign languages have become incorporated into post-9/11 U.S. national strategies. Nonetheless the ‘nation of immigrants’ and their academics still seem to suggest that immigrants and their children should forget their non-English language skills in order to fit into contemporary U.S. society. Does this represent a double standard for immigrants and their children versus other Americans? What role do racism and nativism play in these dual expectations of immigrants and native-born citizens? Such issues call for further theoretical explorations and empirical analyses of different integration policies and their implementation.

4. Transnationalism – a blessing or curse? In recent years, immigrant transnational connections between origin and destination countries and beyond have drawn increasing excitement and critique in the literature (see, for example, Dunn 2005; Smith 2007; Vertovec 2007). Transnationalism is recognized as a process with both bottom-up and top-down dimensions. Are transnational connections a blessing or curse for international migrants themselves? The answer often depends on specific configurations of race and ethnicity, class, and legal status, as well as the economic competition and geopolitics between origin and destination countries. Welcoming messages for capitalist and highly-skilled legal migrants do not extend to lower-skill and less educated undocumented migrants.

Transnational connections by migrants coming from a country that shares similar ideologies and interests with destination countries are perceived as positive and they can promote trade relations and friendship; whereas migrants from ‘enemy countries’ are subject to suspicion, scrutiny even discrimination, evident in both historical and contemporary incidents. Likewise, economic competition on a global stage, such as outsourcing and significant trade imbalances, impact on the settlement experiences of Asian Indians and Chinese, native-born and immigrants alike.
5. Nationalism and racism. The four Pacific Rim countries are both historical and contemporary ‘immigrant countries’, but all four also share a history of suppressing indigenous peoples and discriminating against minorities and immigrants who do not share the same racial and ethnic backgrounds as the majority European immigrants and their descendants. Such discriminatory policies and practices have become ingredients of and are institutionalized in nation-state building, national identities, law and legal practices. When this order is perceived to be threatened by others, including newcomers, tension and backlash at times become reality. This process highlights the significance of interconnections between race, class, gender, nativity, and nation.

A Silicon Valley community activist pointed out the paradox in the reality of immigrant political integration in the U.S. when he said to the author in an interview in 2000: “When immigrants are seen as non-participants in civic life, they are blamed for ‘not-assimilating’; but when they do, they are blamed as ‘taking over our city’”. This is particularly true when immigrants participate in electoral politics or flex their economic power. These issues extend beyond just socioeconomic class or race alone to include nativist sentiment and racialized ideologies. Until the receiving societies address these political realities, there will be no equal footing for immigrants in the system. In the case of highly-skilled migrants, given the global pursuit of their participation in changing economies, they may become more ‘foot-loose’ in choosing to live and work in a more welcoming and just society, rather than just seeking the best job opportunities per se.

Conclusion

Given the increasing scope and pace of contemporary cross-national movements of population, goods, information, and financial resources with accelerated globalization, communities and nation-states have been facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges. Immigrant receiving countries have remade their laws that regulate international migration flows in order to lure ‘desirables’, however defined, while excluding unwanted people. A variety of integration policies have been implemented to handle arriving migrants, based on principles of either assimilation or multiculturalism. While traditional ‘immigrant countries’ such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand continue to receive large influxes of immigrants,
some countries in the Pacific Rim that traditionally send large numbers of emigrants have become in-migrant receiving countries as well in recent years.

The diverse immigrant profiles in receiving countries have contributed to demographic and ethnic diversification and have changed the dynamics of socioeconomic and political systems. While such countries used to absorb labour immigrants and expect only later generations to become fully incorporated into their societies, contemporary immigrants — especially those armed with higher education, technical acumen and/or financial resources — have the capacity to integrate into and to transform destination countries at a much faster pace than in the past. At the same time, large influxes of labour migrants also change social-cultural needs, occupational structures, and consumer markets.

The increase in both highly-skilled and less skilled immigration has had major impacts on destination societies, while circular and return migration has changed the origin societies. Contemporary international migration systems have become highly networked and complex. Such international migration realities present unprecedented opportunities and challenges for studies of international migration in the future.

Acknowledgements

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References


Pacific Islands’ Population and Development: Facts, Fictions and Follies

GERALD HABERKORN

Abstract
Governments in the various Pacific Island states and territories, along with their development partners and a range of regional organisations, have been participating in the multi-sectoral international development agenda that is enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs have some serious omissions in so far as they relate to key relationships between population, economic growth and sustainable development. These include an absence of reference to: population growth, population structure, fertility, migration, urbanisation and the development of appropriate data bases and information systems for developing policy frameworks and implementation plans. This paper reviews contemporary Pacific Island populations in the context of demographic factors that will impact on the achievement of the MDGs in the region. Some long-standing fictions are challenged in an attempt to ensure that persistent fact-less follies do not continue to misinform public policy and thus detract from the region’s progress towards informed and sustained development in Pacific populations.

Pacific Island countries and their development partners joined an emerging international consensus by committing in 2000 to a multi-sectoral international development agenda enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This followed a decade of international conferences addressing key development challenges regarding the environment, population, social development, gender and human settlement concerns. The MDGs provide a comprehensive framework for eight broad development goals and 47 indicators, and serve a useful and politically important function in allowing regular assessments

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and comparisons of development progress against important goals and benchmarks across the broad spectrum of social and economic development. The emphasis on consolidating key environmental, population, health, social and gender concerns and development priorities, derived from several comprehensive and thematic policy frameworks and plans of action into one single document, prioritises broad common development concerns and goals. Inevitably this entails the downside of any negotiation and consensus-building exercise in that many important features invariably fall through the cracks.

There are some major omissions from the MDGs when the 13 key ICPD Program of Action priority themes are compared with the eight MDG goals (Table 1).

Table 1: ICPD Program of Action and MDG framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICPD POA</th>
<th>MDG Framework (I=number of indicators)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interrelationship between population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development</td>
<td>Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (I=5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender equality, equity and empowerment of women</td>
<td>Goal 7. Ensure Environmental sustainability (I=7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The family, its roles, composition, structure</td>
<td>Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women (see also: Goal 2: universal primary education (I=4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Population growth and structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Reproductive rights and reproductive health</td>
<td>Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (focus on contraceptive prevalence ratio) (I=7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Health, Morbidity and Mortality</td>
<td>Goal 4: Reduce child mortality (I=3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Population distribution, urbanization and internal migration</td>
<td>Goal 5: Improve maternal health (I=2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. International migration</td>
<td>Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (I=7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Technology, research, development (data collection, RHI socio-economic, population research)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. National action (policies, plans, resources mobilization)</td>
<td>Goal 8: Develop Global Partnership for development (I=16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. International cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Partnership with Non-governmental sector</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The most glaring omissions from the MDGs are:

- population growth and structure in general (ICPD-4) and two of the three drivers of population dynamics: fertility (ICPD-4,5) and migration (ICPD-7,8);
- adult mortality (ICPD-6) and with it life expectancy, a critical human development performance indicator;
- urbanization (ICPD-7); and
- the absence of any reference to data collection, research and information management, and to developing policy frameworks, implementation plans and resource mobilization schedules (ICPD-10,11), which reflects a blind faith in governments having adequate systems in place, or that these developments would somehow eventuate on their own.

Considering that most development practitioners, including staff and representatives of development agencies, would readily subscribe to the premise that social and economic development is ultimately about and for people, it ought to follow on as a matter of logic, that a realistic appreciation of population dynamics is a driving force of aid policy development, planning and program delivery. In turn there would be appreciation that a good understanding of basic demographic and population and development facts and processes, substantiated by up-to-date and reliable statistics and meaningful information, provides the foundation for development plans and policy frameworks. Having worked for several years now on Pacific population and development matters at national and regional levels has taught me that demographic facts and fiction are too close to each other for comfort, and statistical, policy and planning follies are never far behind.

A Sea of Islands: Diverse Islands and Cultures

The 22 island countries and territories that make up the Pacific Island region represent an enormous diversity in physical geography and culture, languages and social-political organization, size and resource endowment. Spread over an area of thirty million square kilometers of the Pacific Ocean, and stretching
from the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas in the north-west Pacific Ocean to Pitcairn in the south-east, are at least 7,500 islands of which only around 500 are inhabited.

Some countries such as Nauru and Niue, consist just of the one coral island, whereas other countries, like Papua New Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia comprise literally of hundreds of islands. Melanesia comprises large, mountainous and mainly volcanic island countries, endowed with natural resources, rich soils and an abundant marine life. Micronesia and Polynesia, on the contrary, are made up of much smaller island landmasses, and their natural resources are limited to small areas of land and the expansive ocean; they mostly contain small atolls with poor soils, with elevations usually between one and two meters (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu) as well as some islands of volcanic origin with more fertile lands (such as Samoa, Tonga, the Federated States of Micronesia, Cook Islands).

Although containing just 0.1 percent of the world’s population, the Pacific region contains one third of the world’s languages, testimony not just to an enormous cultural diversity, but to significant social, political and behavioral complexities. This situation is most pronounced across Melanesia, where 700 languages are spoken in Papua New Guinea alone, and more than 100 each in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. These vast differences are unknown throughout Micronesia and Polynesia, where one national language is the norm in most countries. There are distinct differences in social organization and cultural practices between the three broad sub-regions, even allowing for some variations within countries. For example, throughout Melanesia social and political status and power are usually acquired on the basis of individual merit and effort. In most of Polynesia these are achieved on the basis of patrilineal descent. In Micronesia, the situation is more complex: on high islands and more fertile atolls, there are close similarities to the Polynesian system, whereas on less endowed atolls, age plays a more prominent role with political control traditionally exercised by a council of elders.

One attitude shared throughout the region is the importance placed on access to land. With three out of four Pacific Islanders living in a rural environment land forms an integral part of culture. Though systems of ownership, inheritance and use vary greatly, land is vested in groups based on common descent, place of residence, and participation in social and economic
activities. Land means identifying with a family, a clan, a lineage. It is therefore valued for what it symbolizes, not just because it meets most subsistence requirements, and thus forms the basis for everyday survival for most Pacific Islanders.

In light of this complexity it is not surprising that disagreement or disputes over land form an integral part of major social conflicts across the region. With land a finite resource, population growth \textit{per se} has obvious consequences for the overall well-being of those attached to or dependent on it and its associated resources. And where this population growth is largely driven by growing numbers of people, who are not locals (\textit{manples}), but migrants from other islands or tribal areas, there are some key demographic ingredients for major development challenges.

**Natural Increase and International Migration**

Against this backdrop of biophysical, cultural, social and economic diversity, and mindful of population dynamics, it is useful to address some of the more critical issues relating to the contemporary Pacific. In terms of population issues that matter most for social and economic development outcomes in the region, there are three that are likely to have the biggest impact on the future well-being of Pacific peoples. I believe they have the potential to derail national, regional and international development goals and objectives and, in the process, jeopardize Pacific leaders’ vision of a secure, prosperous and peaceful Pacific region where people live free and worthwhile lives:

- sustained high levels of natural increase throughout most of the Pacific;
- the continued importance of migration to Pacific Island population dynamics, with urbanization becoming more prominent; and
- a widespread incidence of flying blind, as reflected in the absence of comprehensive and implementable population policies.

According to recent population projections produced by South Pacific Community’s secretariat (SPC), the region’s population has been estimated at 9,318,600 people as of mid 2007, reflecting an annual growth rate of around 1.9 percent per year. This growth rate translates into an
additional 177,100 people each year between now and 2011, when the region’s population is expected to pass the 10 million mark.

Population growth in the immediate future (2007-2010) is expected to grow at an annual rate of 2.0 percent in Melanesia, 1.8 percent across Micronesia, and 0.7 percent in Polynesia. This means that by July 2008 Melanesia’s population would have increased by 162,500 people compared with increases of 10,000 across Micronesia, and 4,600 in Polynesia – just slightly less than the equivalent of Samoa’s 2007 population (179,500), or similar to the combined populations of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau and Nauru. Were population growth to continue at this rate, the region’s population would be expected to double in 36 years.

Sustained high levels of natural increase are determined by two obvious developments - moderately high fertility rates and declining mortality. Fertility has the greatest impact on a country’s population composition (and growth, alongside migration), and the next section examines briefly the current situation and recent developments.

**Fertility**

Fertility remains high in the region, very much like the situation a decade ago, with seven countries averaging fertility levels of between four and five live births per woman, and with three large Melanesian countries (Papua New Guinea (4.6), Solomon Islands (4.8) and Vanuatu (4.5)) showing the highest rates, alongside Samoa (4.6), Tokelau (4.5) and the Marshall Islands (4.4). Yet unlike the situation prevailing in the mid 1990s, not a single country or territory has a TFR exceeding five, with nine PICTs showing rates of less than three live births per woman. The lowest current levels are also a mirror image of the situation in the early and mid 1990s, with the Northern Marianas (1.6), Palau (1.9), New Caledonia (2.3) and French Polynesia (2.4) having the lowest fertility.

With moderate (seven countries) to high (five countries) fertility prevailing in just over half of Pacific Island countries and territories, an emerging success story is that fertility has declined everywhere over the past decade, with only Tuvalu and Tokelau showing a modest trend reversal. Looking at these developments over a demographic generation (25–30 years) underlines the massive change that has taken place in a relatively short time, as is illustrated quite dramatically in the case of
women on Nauru and Wallis and Futuna, where fertility has dropped by half since the 1980s: TFR of 7.5 to 3.8 in the case of Nauru, and TFR of 6.5 to 2.6 in Wallis and Futuna. Similar declines have occurred in the Marshall Islands (TFR 7.2 to 4.4).

These developments have several important policy implications:

- they demonstrate that substantial declines in fertility are possible, and may become sustainable;
- they illustrate that sustained lower fertility may take some time to materialize – timelines for decline usually extend beyond the lifespan of national Governments and donor agencies' funding cycles;
- they underline the persistence of diversity in demographic characteristics of Pacific states; and
- they highlight the major challenges that remain ahead for Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, which account for 75 percent of the region’s population.

The lowest fertility levels have been achieved in countries (Fiji) and territories (three French and two U.S.) with relatively long established and well developed family health/planning facilities, as well as in the smaller Cook Islands and Niue, where residents in both countries move freely (and quite regularly) to and from New Zealand. International migration and the prevalence of multi-ethnic societies featuring distinctly different fertility behavior also play an important role, particularly in the case of the Northern Marianas (1.6), Palau (1.9), New Caledonia (2.3), French Polynesia (2.4), Fiji (2.6) and Guam (2.7), resulting in national TFR aggregates, which seem to have limited to little meaning in terms of domestic policy positions.

This is nicely illustrated in the case of the Northern Marianas where a low TFR of 1.6 is the result of a moderately high fertility of resident women (largely of Pacific Island descent), and a very low fertility for temporary residents. Up until recently, before the gradual closing down of Saipan’s garment factories, thousands of mainly Chinese female garment workers arrived each year to significantly increase the pool of women of child-bearing age without making any noticeable contribution to the number of births.
In Fiji and New Caledonia the low aggregate TFR is due to differences in fertility amongst groups in the resident population. In Fiji, a marked contrast between Fijian and Indo-Fijian fertility has prevailed over the years, with the gap gradually widening over the past 20 years (Table 2).

Table 2: Total fertility rates, Fiji 1976-2003

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Total</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fijians</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Indians</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1976-1996 estimates are derived from census data; the 2003 figures are derived from civil registration data (the latter providing consistently lower TFRs than those based on census data).

In New Caledonia fertility has also been affected by variations in fertility in different population sub-groups over the years, despite the official absence of 'ethnicity' in French censuses, household survey, and civil registration systems. This diversity can be illustrated in a simple cross-classification of provincial level populations and total fertility rates (Table 3). The Loyalty Islands and Northern Province have mainly indigenous or kanak populations, while the Southern Province includes the city of Noumea, and has a population that is dominated by people of European ethnicity.

Table 3: Total fertility rates, New Caledonia 1985–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia Total</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Loyalty Islands</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Northern Province</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Southern Province</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Registration data
Unlike the situation in the Northern Marianas and Fiji, however, recent data for New Caledonia point to a growing convergence of fertility rates. Considering similarities in Loyalty Islands and Northern Province fertility levels during the 1980s with those of their three Melanesian neighbours to the north (Vanuatu, Solomons and Papua New Guinea, Table 4), recent developments in New Caledonia could be of great relevance for fertility development and associated policy measures elsewhere in Melanesia.

Table 4: Total fertility rates, 1980–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia: Loyalty Islands</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia: Northern Province</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The diversity in fertility patterns and associated recent demographic developments across the Pacific Island region, as well as considerable sub-national variations, illustrate the danger of referring to regional or national aggregates in terms of policy development and planning. Sticking blindly to such measures will not only provide fictitious benchmarks, but lead to ill-informed or ineffective policies.

Effectively engaging at the political level about fertility and its implications for sustainable population growth and development remains a huge challenge in the Pacific, not because of cultural propriety or moral issues, but because of the inherent difficulty to advocate policy measures that take years, or decades to show results. Addressing such policy challenges is rarely actively promoted by politicians facing much shorter parliamentary life expectancies.
Mortality

Mortality has a much smaller impact on population structure, distribution and dynamics relative to fertility and migration, except in the event of war, epidemics or natural disasters. Yet mortality indicators, such as infant mortality rates (IMR) and life expectancies at birth, are important indicators of a country’s state of development. This is quite powerfully illustrated in the MDG framework, which contains three mortality indicators. But with non-communicable (or life-style) diseases on the rise throughout the region, and the prospect of increased HIV/AIDS prevalence in some countries, mortality may assume a much greater prominence in impacting on population structure, distribution and growth in the future.

Maternal and Child Health (MCH) activities and other social and economic development initiatives aimed at improving infant and child health have had measurable impacts over the past decades, as is evident from declining infant mortality rates in most countries of the region. With visible improvements everywhere, some of which are considerable, such as in the Marshall Islands and Vanuatu, there are two countries where worrying reversals in infant mortality ought to be raising concern amongst both civil society, as well as relevant government agencies and the international community. After having a very low infant mortality rate (IMR) of 11 in the early 1990s, the most recent figures for Nauru give an IMR of 42. In the Solomon Islands there has been a similar reversal with this country now having the highest infant mortality rate in the region (66), just ahead of Papua New Guinea (64), which has seen some modest reduction in IMR over the past decade.

A similar picture also emerges when considering life expectancy at birth, which in the case of Nauru shows a decline over the past 10 years, whereas Solomon Island’s values remained virtually unchanged. Currently, Nauru men have the lowest life expectancy at birth at 52.5 years in the region (as compared to 55 years, ten years ago), with Nauru women also recording a life expectancy below 60 (58.2 years), down from 64 years. And figures released from the 2005 Kiribati census also provide some worrying results, with male life expectancies of only 58.9 years and women expected to live four years longer (63.1).

The Nauru and Kiribati figures, representing the most recent evidence on adult mortality across the region, underline what Pacific public
health officials have been warning about for years: that the growing prevalence of non-communicable diseases, primarily diabetes and cardiovascular problems, has the potential to undermine earlier health gains achieved with communicable diseases. Many countries with already over-stretched health budgets are now confronting a double-burden of disease, with considerable health expenditure invested in (costly) treatment of largely preventable illnesses, and limited or declining resources available for health education and promotion.

As noted earlier, HIV-Aids has the potential to impact on Pacific Island mortality in similar ways to the introduction of communicable diseases by traders, whalers, and foreign navies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. According to the most recent information available, the situation is most precarious in PNG (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Annual reported HIV cases (1980–2005)

![Graph](source.png)

Source: HIV & STI Section (WPRO et al. 2006).

While the incidence of diagnosed HIV infection remains low in other PICTs, there is a definite upward trend in Papua New Guinea (WPRO et al. 2006). In addition, high rates of other STIs indicate that risk behaviours for HIV transmission are present in the region, representing the potential for rapid spread of HIV infection.
Figure 2 shows that most cases reported are in the age group 19–39, i.e. young, sexually active adults. However, since the available data come from routine (passive) surveillance and therefore include only diagnosed and reported cases, they do not enable accurate estimates of the total burden of disease, nor projections and forecasts that reflect trends in the spread of the infection. Furthermore, access to testing facilities is limited in many PICTs.

In 2005, six countries (Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati and Tonga) completed the first round of second-generation surveillance (SGS) surveys. These ‘targeted and tailored’ cross-sectional studies aim to measure the current situation in particular populations in terms of the prevalence of HIV and other STIs, as well as behaviours that may contribute to their transmission.

**Figure 2: Cumulative HIV cases by age and sex**

![Cumulative HIV Cases by Age and Sex](image)

Source: HIV & STI Section (WPRO et al. 2006).

The SGS findings help to inform programme development and to monitor the impact of regional and national-level activities in relation to HIV and other STIs. They also provide strategic information to enable appropriate targeting of national-level responses and interventions. The main findings of the SGS include high prevalence of STIs; limited
knowledge of modes of HIV transmission; low rates of condom use, particularly among young people; multiple sexual partners; and commercial sex activities occurring in most countries. This shows how most Pacific countries are vulnerable to HIV transmission.

Mortality, more than fertility, is probably also the process in Pacific demography, where fact and fiction appear in close proximity. With no reliable and complete death registration in most island countries - due to a combination of institutional idiosyncrasies and difficulties to enforce legislation – demographers rely on censuses and surveys to collect the required information. Once we add to the problems of accurate respondent recall as well as our dependency on model life tables, we introduce subjectivities which ought to be incompatible with the statistical rigor of the mathematical models used to measure mortality.

One of the more obvious dangers of relying exclusively on model life tables is the fact that adult mortality estimates (mainly life expectancy at birth) obviously depend on the reliability of our entry points, the infant mortality rates. Given that there have been major improvements with IMRs halving in many countries during the past 15 or so years, the result is a boosting in life expectancy at birth values, irrespective of parallel developments in adult mortality, especially where NCDs and HIV-Aids have had an impact on age-specific death rates. In other words, marked improvements in infant (and early child) health are counteracted at later stages by a greater incidence of adult mortality, with the latter not always recorded appropriately, and hence not impacting on adult mortality models. This invariably yields more positive adult mortality estimates, such as life expectancies at birth, or age-specific probabilities of surviving/dying, than is actually the case.

**Migration**

In terms of domestic policy, high rates of natural increase can only be effectively brought under control by lowering fertility, but some Pacific Island countries have managed to reduce the impact of high natural increase through substantial net emigration of residents over the years. Comparing annual rates of natural increase (births minus deaths) and rates of population growth (the result of births, deaths and migration) illustrates this quite succinctly, as shown in the cases of FSM, Samoa and Tonga. All three
display quite high rates of natural increase (2.1 percent – 2.3 percent per annum), yet they also have very low annual intercensal population growth (0.3 percent – 0.5 percent per annum) as a result of extensive net emigration.

International migration acts as a huge demographic safety valve throughout Polynesia and Micronesia, involving substantive annual net migration losses from the island countries, as shown in recent annual mobility data from the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands and Samoa (Table 5). The importance (demographic, social, economic, political) of sustained emigration, particularly in the smaller island countries of Polynesia, is neatly illustrated in recent New Zealand census data:

- thirteen times as many people of Niuean descent living in NZ than on Niue (the proportion was six-fold in 1991);
- five times as many Tokelauans, and three times as many Cook Islanders living in NZ than in their respective home islands, and
- substantial numbers of people of Samoan (131,100) and Tongan (50,500) ethnicity living in NZ.

Given the magnitude of sustained emigration from the smallest island states, Niue and Tokelau, the concept of demographic safety valve has clearly no meaning here – on the contrary, such emigration levels pose a very real threat to the political viability and sustainability of these island countries.

Table 5: Annual net migration from Cook Islands, RMI and Samoa, 2001–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Resident Population, 2001</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Annual average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands residents</td>
<td>15,017</td>
<td>-950</td>
<td>-727</td>
<td>-703</td>
<td>-943</td>
<td>-882</td>
<td>-840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>50,550</td>
<td>-2,133</td>
<td>-913</td>
<td>-781</td>
<td>-553</td>
<td>-1,023</td>
<td>-1,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa net movement</td>
<td>176,710</td>
<td>-641</td>
<td>-2,417</td>
<td>-2,435</td>
<td>-2,199</td>
<td>-2,954</td>
<td>-2,130</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
A similar picture emerges from Australia and the United States, although in the case of the latter, we are reliant on island-based case studies with census-based verification impossible due to a lack of disaggregated data. Sustained emigration to Australia is evident in the 2006 census data, which show that the number of residents claiming Pacific Island ancestry has increased by one third in just five years – from 85,179 to 112,159. In sheer numbers:

- 11,900 more people claiming Samoan ancestry live in Australia than 5 years ago (an increase of 40 percent);
- more than 3,000 more residents claiming Papua New Guinean, Cook Island Māori and Tongan ancestry live in Australia than in 2001; and
- for the first time, the number of Niueans in Australia (2,182) outnumber their counterparts on Niue (1,625), an increase of 68 percent since 2001.

Migration to metropolitan countries, particularly from Micronesian and Polynesian countries and territories, is likely to continue in the future, considering that few if any of the key social, political and economic determinants (or ‘push’ factors) have significantly changed over the years, with ‘perceptions’ of a better life overseas remaining a powerful motivator. Acknowledging this demographic and political reality, and addressing associated structural causes (and implications) in pro-active population and migration policies, is of utmost importance at national and international level. Most outer islands across the region and resource-poor atoll countries in general, such as the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati, a resource-depleted Nauru, and small micro-states such as Tokelau and Niue, simply lack a domestic economic resources base to provide for the sustained livelihood of their people.

**Rapid Urbanization**

A major structural change has taken place in Pacific rural-urban migration from the late 1970s/early 1980s onwards, with formerly temporary rural-urban mobility from a strong rural basis becoming more long-term, or permanent in nature, as Pacific peoples adopt a more pronounced urban
focus to their lives. The result is urban growth rates that have outpaced rural population growth everywhere in the Pacific over the past 25 to 30 years. At present, this pattern is almost universal, with exceptions in French Polynesia, and also in the case of FSM, Palau and Niue, where there have been urban population declines due to growing overseas emigration. At current rates, urban populations throughout Melanesia are expected to double in one generation (25 years), with the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu likely to achieve this in 16 and 17 years respectively, and American Samoa, Kiribati and the Northern Marianas in 20 years. This poses serious challenges for planning, land use, water and sanitation, housing and general infrastructure, as well as some serious rethinking of current social, health and employment policies.

Notwithstanding this overall trend of urban growth exceeding rural growth, considerable diversity prevails regarding current levels of urbanization:

- at a regional level, the vast majority of the Pacific Island population remains rural, with only one in four living in urban areas – 2.22 million out of the 9.32 million estimated total in 2007;
- while most Pacific Island urban residents are found in Melanesia (1.58 million), the highest proportions of national populations that are living in urban areas are found in Micronesia, with five of the seven PICTs having more than half their national/territorial populations in towns. In Micronesia only Kiribati (44 percent) and FSM (18 percent) have most of their people living in rural areas/living a rural existence;
- once Papua New Guinea is removed from the regional analysis, (representing 2/3 (6.3 million) of the Pacific Island population of 9.32 million, Pacific Island urbanization increases to 46 percent of the resident population total;
- when the focus is just on countries this diversity is very obvious, with 10 countries and territories showing most of their populations living in urban areas, and 11 featuring the reverse pattern (with Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna having their entire populations in rural communities).
Given such diversity and contrasting patterns, it is folly to refer to a regional urbanization average; it appears equal folly to consider 100 percent of Nauru’s population as urban, while regarding 100 percent of Wallis’s as rural. The latter has many similar characteristics (bio-physical, infrastructure, access to services, employment) with Nauru, and some observers might be inclined to say Wallis feature more “urban characteristics”, whatever these may entail.

The lower incidence of urbanization across Polynesia, with only American Samoa, Cook Islands and French Polynesia featuring sizeable urban populations, does not mean, however, that urbanization is absent from their demographic landscapes. As is illustrated quite nicely in the cases of Samoa and Tonga, it simply means that Samoan and Tongan urbanization is taking place elsewhere, largely in neighbouring New Zealand and Australia. A similar process also exists in the FSM and the Marshall Islands, with movement to urban Guam, Honolulu, the US west coast, and as far afield as the state of Arkansas, where there is a 6,000 strong Marshallese community.

One of the most obvious and immediately visible corollaries of high urban population growth is an increase in population density, usually expressed as residents/square kilometre/mile. This has led to overcrowding in settlements in most Pacific towns, adverse environmental impacts, and a large array of associated socio-cultural and health issues that we have been witnessing over the years. Urban population densities in excess of 5,000 - 10,000 people/square kilometre that are usually associated with urban poverty in Africa and Asia, are becoming quite widespread, despite the official absence of poverty in the region, where reference to hardship or relative lack of well-being appears easier to digest by politicians at least. Over-crowding and densely-packed living arrangements does not have to be synonymous with high-rise and shanty-town poverty.

To cite some specific examples from the region, the Marshall Islands had an overall population density of 306/km² in 1999 and 320/km² in 2007, representing no substantial change in the last eight years. If we examine actual densities, however, and take into consideration the specific areas where people live, as well as the village/settlement/urban boundaries, the average density rises dramatically to 1,390/km². A powerful illustration of this can be found in Kwajalein on Ebeye. With a resident population of 9,449 in 1999, estimated at 10,420 in 2007, and a land area of just 0.27 km² on an island measuring 1.5 km in length and 180 meters wide, this
translates into a population density of 38,600/km². Just for comparison – this is twice as high as the population density for Macao (17,060), and six times that of Hong Kong (6,040) and Singapore (5,880) (United Nations 2004; Table 1).

Kiribati, had a population of 92,533 at the time of the 2005 census, translating into an average density of 127/km². Taking out the Line and Phoenix groups, with a large land part of the country’s land area, and a small population of 8,850, gives an average population density of 293/km² for the Gilbert group. In the South Tarawa urban area there were 40,311 people living on 15.76 km² of land in 2005, translating into a population density of 2,558/km². If one focuses just on the islet of Betio in South Tarawa, the country’s main commercial area and port, its resident population of 12,509 was living on a land area of 1.2 km² (2.4 long and 0.5 wide), giving a density of 10,400 people per square kilometre – twice that of Hong Kong and Singapore.

Finally, to cite a Melanesian example, in Vanuatu’s main town, Port Vila, there was a population density of 1,240/km² in 1999. By 2007, when the urban population was estimated to be around 41,000, this density would have increased to 1,730/km². Looking at some of the sub-urban densities in Port Vila, we notice phenomenal annual growth rate differentials, ranging from negative growth in Vila Central, Vila East, Colardeu and Malapoa Point (to name some of the 14 areas featuring a population decline) to annual growth rates in excess of 10 percent for Freswota, Ohlen, Bauerfield and Agathis (the latter with 15 percent). At these rates, sections of the town’s population would double in population size every five to six years. These growth rates also translate into huge population density differentials, varying from a low 33/km² in Malapoa Point to a near thousand fold increase of 31,000/km² in Seaside Tongoa-Futuna.

In concluding this brief comment on urban population growth I just wish to flag some of the more obvious social, economic, environmental and cultural-political outcomes of rapid demographic change as reflected in growing levels of, largely uncontrolled and unknown urbanization, across the region:

- growing levels of unemployment, which more often than not is spatially concentrated especially in urban areas areas;
• acute housing shortages in much if not most of the urban Pacific, leading to over-crowding, in some cases with 10-15 people confined to one room, often sleeping in shifts, with children and those working sleeping at night, when the unemployed and/or out-of-school teenagers vacate the premises;
• growing substance abuse, rise and changing urban crime, which appears no longer primarily confined to violence-free petty theft;
• growing incidence of unwanted teenage pregnancies, which, as the result of unprotected sex, goes hand-in-hand with a growing incidence of STIs, including HIV/Aids;
• increasing environmental pollution with immediate consequences and costs in terms of human health and household incomes, as well as “down-stream” impacts on national economies of island countries heavily reliant on tourism as their main, or one of their main sources of both national income/revenue as well as employment.

Once an urban population base has been established its younger than average population structure contributes further to urban growth through natural increase (higher birth rates due to a greater incidence of women in the younger reproductive ages than is found in rural populations), and ongoing urban-bound migration, again of a largely younger (and often, single) population. This is a process we are currently witnessing in much of the urban Pacific, most notably PNG, Solomons Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati and the Marshall Islands.

Flying Blind – The Absence of Comprehensive Policies

Set against this context of quite visible outcomes of unplanned urbanization, it is of major concern that urbanization does not feature in the policy realm of most Pacific Island countries. The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat has recently put urbanization on the agenda of the Pacific Plan – not amongst its highest priorities for immediate implementation, but having “agreement in principal” status, which identifies urbanization as a priority, still requiring the development and approval of a full proposal. 

As part of this process, a preliminary review of urbanization policies in the Pacific region was undertaken by SPC for the Pacific Island Forum
Secretariat in 2006 (Haberkorn 2006). This report stressed that only PNG and Fiji have developed such policies, with Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands addressing some urbanization issues in their respective (draft) national population policies currently under review, and NZAID having made a recent long-term aid policy commitment to tackle urban renewal in Fiji and Kiribati. Of the remaining countries, only Tonga and Tuvalu expressed an intention to develop specific urban planning and management strategies. This followed the recent completion of an overall integrated urban development strategy in Tonga, with Tuvalu still on the outlook for technical assistance to backstop their intentions in this sector. Elsewhere, there seems to be little visible concern with urban development and management, despite higher urban than rural population growth, and urbanization rates well above 50 percent in many of these countries.

The absence of policies addressing urban development and management is all the more surprising given the growing recognition by governments of a broad range of concerns and challenges associated with urban population growth:

- increasing urbanization is exerting growing pressures on urban infrastructure and the provision of associated services, like water and sanitation, waste management and power, health and education;
- land and environmental issues, including land tenure and urban squatting, are causing widespread urban congestion and having adverse impacts on urban lagoons, coastlines and watersheds;
- poverty and hardship, unemployment and urban crime feature less prominently in government documents than in the media in many of these countries;
- there is little reference to migration as the main driver of urbanization across the region.

The review identified human and financial resource constraints as critical bottlenecks to developing and implementing urbanization policies (including the technical capacity of policy analysis). There was an explicit lack of knowledge pertaining to a country’s current urban situation, as well as a lack of policy commitment/ownership of urban realities. There is a serious need to overcome the denial of significant urbanization issues by policy-makers in most PICTs.
A similar situation prevails regarding the absence of national population policies in most countries, despite widespread acknowledgement by Pacific governments since the World Population Conference in Cairo in 1994 of the need to pay greater attention to population-resources interactions to ensure sustainable development practices and outcomes. As is the case with most global development agendas, well-meant intentions rarely move on from politically expedient rhetoric into tangible policy outcomes and implementation. Only Papua New Guinea has developed a national policy document, with a long-term focus (2000-2010), that:

- has a broad population and development emphasis;
- makes linkages to the Government’s overall social and economic policy framework;
- contains a policy implementation matrix with benchmarks and targets as well as identifying lead and collaborating agencies;
- has been ratified by Government; and
- which has recently been subject to a mid-term review.

Population policy drafts exist in a handful of other countries (Solomons Islands, Vanuatu, RMI, Kiribati, Tonga and Samoa), some in draft for as long as eight years, never ratified by their Governments, and usually containing a strong, or exclusive traditional focus on family health. Recent combined efforts by UNFPA and SPC have seen the review and reworking of the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu population (and development) policies, aligning them with their sustainable national development strategies. Similar exercises are in the pipeline for the Marshall Islands and Samoa.

**Facts, Fictions and Follies**

Given the nature of the evidence, why is it that we continue to see little action, concern, commitment across the region, by government and their development partners, in addressing more vigorously the sustained high levels of population growth in general, and urbanization in particular? And why do concerns, when they are addressed, fail to become priorities on national and regional policy agendas?
Notwithstanding the diversity of population challenges prevailing across the region, there are some commonalities across the regional demographic landscape and between countries/territories and their development partners that undermine, or block converting politically expedient rhetoric into tangible, implementable and sustainable policy outcomes and solutions. In the final section of the paper I consider first some of the more critical bottlenecks and follies that confound development efforts despite decades of well-intentioned technical assistance and HRD efforts, and second some concrete steps we might consider taking, or at least debating, to turn persistent problems into sustainable solutions.

**The Persistence of Demographic Fictions**

Three critical issues relating to the persistence of demographic fictions about the region are:

- contradictions in official statistics regarding the same demographic features in the public domain;
- widespread confusion between simple numbers and statistical indicators;
- the “do-it-yourself” approach to demography frequently employed by international development specialists/consultants, without much knowledge of demography or the region, in their quest for “the latest” figures, often generating further fictitious information about populations in the Pacific.

To illustrate this problem with reference to at the most basic of population statistics, population size, I have chosen some countries around the region whose demography I am reasonably familiar with, and some major official databanks commonly referred to when searching for demographic data and information (Table 6). While not everyone may agree with the SPC’s population projections, or with some of their underlying assumptions (which we happily share with those interested), I refer to them here simply as anchor, or ‘reference’ points.
Table 6: Current national population size estimate for a selection of Pacific Island countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pacific Islands</th>
<th>SPC Island Projections 2007</th>
<th>UN Population Division</th>
<th>UN Demographic Yearbook</th>
<th>UNESCAP Population Data Sheet</th>
<th>WHO WPRO Manila (Basic Statistics)</th>
<th>ADB World Bank Data Sheet (Indicator Database)</th>
<th>US Census Bureau</th>
<th>US State Department</th>
<th>CIA World Factbook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>52,700</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>63,200</td>
<td>61,782</td>
<td>56,417</td>
<td>61,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSM</td>
<td>110,600</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>129,000</td>
<td>107,862</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>107,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>6,332,800</td>
<td>6,331,000</td>
<td>5,887,000</td>
<td>6,331,000</td>
<td>5,930,000</td>
<td>5,748,000</td>
<td>5,796,000</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>5,793,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>503,900</td>
<td>405,660</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>496,000</td>
<td>539,000</td>
<td>496,272</td>
<td>566,842</td>
<td>552,438</td>
<td>566,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>227,100</td>
<td>226,000</td>
<td>221,000</td>
<td>226,000</td>
<td>236,000</td>
<td>221,507</td>
<td>211,971</td>
<td>221,506</td>
<td>221,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>179,500</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>179,186</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>176,615</td>
<td>179,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>101,400</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>101,100</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>116,921</td>
<td>101,169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Looking at the Marshall Islands, for example, only WHO Manila and the US State Department are anywhere near the SPC’s estimates, with the others between 15 and 20 percent higher. What is the most likely reason for the over-estimates? I suggest this is probably due to a failure to factor in the massive net-emigration from the RMI from 1990 onwards, averaging ~530/year between 1990 and the last census in 1999, and around ~1170/year since 2000.

In the case of the region’s largest and most populated country, PNG, most of the agencies under-estimate the current population by as much as half a million people, with only WHO Manila, UNESCAP and the United Nations Population Division having estimates close to the SPC’s figures. What explains our estimate? We applied a four percent correction factor to the 2000 projection base population, in line with the reported undercount at that census. Most of the other figures are close to the original published census data, which did not contain this adjustment for under-enumeration.

In the Solomon Islands, a more diverse picture emerges, with again the United Nations Population Division, UNESCAP and the Asian Development Bank having estimates that are the closest to our projections. The United Nations Statistics Division and the World Bank have lower estimates, and the remaining agencies have populations that are up to 50,000 people (10 percent) higher.

I have chosen this example not to poke fun at agencies, but merely to illustrate a prevailing malaise when it comes to reporting and using basic statistical facts in this part of the world. More important is the danger of policy follies down stream, when an inappropriate population denominator is used to calculate critical development indicators, such as crude birth and death rates, population growth rates, per capita income and the establishment of poverty lines, health incidence and prevalence rates, as well as determining development status (“Least Developed Country”) and the selection of countries for priority assistance.

A second folly concerns what appears to be a widespread confusion between numbers and indicators, or at last the perception and treatment of these as synonyms. I have come across many documented and reported references in recent years about an increase in teenage pregnancies. While this is an obvious concern from a public (sexual) health angle, as well as considering the emotional/psychological well-being of young women, as
well as the impact on their ability to continue/finish education and secure employment, fictionalizing reality has serious consequences in misinforming policy.

I will illustrate this problem with reference to a recent example from a medium-sized Pacific Island country, whose most recent health report identified a substantial increase over the past five years in the number of teenage births, from 207 in 2002 to 266 in 2006 (Table 7).

Table 7: Teenage births, 1999-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Births to Females (15-19)</th>
<th>Teenage Females (15-19)</th>
<th>15 - 19 Fertility (15-19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>2,331</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>2,633</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>2,975</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>census 1999</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>3,128</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>3,273</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>3,335</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>3,406</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>3,403</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While factually correct, the year 2002 proved to be an odd year out (possibly due to an even more pronounced under-registration than normal), as was reflected when extending the timeline back by a further five years to 1996, which revealed nearly the same number of births (N=269), as did a further five-year step back in time to 1991 (N=268). What these figures do show is absolutely no change at all in the number of teenage births over 15 years – they highlight annual fluctuations. What these figures do not show, and hence have the potential to send policy development in the wrong direction, is that teenage pregnancy is actually declining, with about the same number of births in 2006 affecting 3,318 women aged 15–19 (8.0
percent), compared to an estimated 2,740 teenage women in 1996 (9.8 percent) and 2,240 in 1991 (12.0 percent).

This confusion, incidentally, lies also behind many policymakers difficulties understanding the concept and implications of the population momentum – that even substantial reductions, such as halving fertility rates in high fertility countries, will not have a miraculous, instantaneous impact when twice as many women today, have half as many births compared to women 15-20 years ago.

Another example of numerical facts creating fictions concerns the compilation of demographic indicators based on single year event data. Such a practice not only creates stochastic havoc with chance events such as infant and maternal deaths, particularly so in small populations, but contributes to the myriad of demographic indicators floating about the same country. Many development agencies, in their quest for the most up-to-date information, tend to ignore our three or five year average TFRs or our five-year IMRs as “too old, outdated”, preferring to calculate up-to-date rates themselves if national agencies do not provide it for them – ignoring the potential double-trouble of both a wrong numerator (stochastic interference) and denominator (wrong annual population estimate).

**Fact-less Follies**

A second set of follies affecting or misinforming public policy are those that ignore facts altogether, including diversity (e.g. in social and economic conditions and circumstances between countries) invoking international standards and “best” practice, concepts such as national unity, and the need to act in line with planning programming cycles. A well-intentioned, but ultimately meaningless practice is measuring and reporting unemployment in the Pacific, with reference to people “not working/having a job in the week prior to a census/survey, but who were actively looking for work/a job, and were willing/prepared to take this up if one was available”. Most people simply do not actively look for something that is not there – if for no other reason than to avoid disappointment or “feeling shame”, as many urban ni-Vanuatu have told me over the years.

Let me illustrate the policy problem with unemployment rates for two neighbouring countries – again, not to pick on these, but because we are very familiar with the underlying data (Table 8). Micronesian neighbors,
Kiribati and the Marshall Islands, reported vastly different unemployment rates emanating from their last censuses with 6.1 versus 30.9 percent respectively. This has nothing to with a 6 year time gap, but is entirely the result of using different definitions and denominators.

In the case of the Marshall Islands, the focus is strictly on the formal sector, and excludes both subsistence farmers and fishers, as well as “village workers” from their labour force. The Kiribati census includes both of these groups in the labour force. Were only village workers excluded from their labour force, unemployment would stand at 14.6 percent - and were one to regard village workers as “unemployed”, applying a different, and more pragmatic school of thought along the lines of the “reserve army” concept, unemployment would soar to 64.5 percent. Rather than imposing unilateral definitions, we recently decided, following a request by the Kiribati Director of Planning and Statistics for a more “realistic” unemployment rate than 6.1 percent, to report both standard and adjusted definitions side by side, to give the end user the choice of making a more informed and hopefully, responsible decision (Demmke 2007). We have adopted a similar adjustment to Port Vila unemployment rates in the context of work-in-progress on reviewing Vanuatu’s population policy (Haberkorn 2007; Table 8).

Table 8: Defining unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Standard unemployment definition</th>
<th>Adjusted unemployment definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Total: 30.9% Youth: 62.6%</td>
<td>None (definition focuses only on formal sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Total: 6.1% Urban: 10.9% Rural: 2.8%</td>
<td>64.5% (if all “village workers” are classified as unemployed 14.6% (if village workers are excluded from the labor force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Vila, Vanuatu</td>
<td>Total: 6.0% Youth: 13.9%</td>
<td>15.6% (if include urban subsistence farmers, and “free” family workers) 24.3% (same adjustment)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As already mentioned when referring to fertility differentials, many, if not most demographic and socio-economic indicators vary between population sub-groups, with **ethnicity** of great significance, particularly in recognized multicultural societies. When unilaterally cancelling the 2003 New Caledonia Census during a whistle-stop tour to the territory a few weeks before the census was to take place, because of two contentious questions pertaining to ethnicity (**community of affiliation**) and tribal affiliation, the former French President, Monsieur Chirac, invoked the spirit of the French constitution, the reference to *égalité*, as well as highlighting that these questions contravened French law on information and civil liberties (Loi N. 78-17, 6 January 1978). The fact that his own *Conseil d’État* (an independent advisory body providing, what previously seemed to be, final advice and guidance on such matters) had already approved the census, including the two contentious questions which have featured in previous censuses, mattered little — as did the fact that the newly elected administration thus was denied of critical information which would have helped them address some of their electoral objectives.

I do not intend to revisit this particular folly at great length, having spoken about this more extensively at the 2004 IAOS satellite meeting in Wellington (Haberkorn 2004), but I simply wish to note that despite the constitutionally enshrined equality of peoples, major socio-economic differences persist in New Caledonia, between regions such as the three provinces, as illustrated in Table 9.

Given that 10 years ago, 97 percent of the population of the Loyalty Islands and 78 percent of the Northern Province’s population were of **Kanak** ancestry, compared with only 25.5 percent of the Southern Province, which includes Noumea, the numbers speak for themselves, especially as there has not been a very significant change in the distribution of the **Kanak** population during the decade.

Completing this brief reference to fact-less follies is a note on the state of play with regard to population policies. While some progress has been made since the 1994 Cairo Conference, in as far as several Pacific Island countries more explicitly address population and development concerns in their national development frameworks, it is only PNG to date that has a population policy which has been ratified by Government and recently been subject to an external mid-term review. The fact others still remain in draft form, some for as long as 8-10 years, could well be due to the
fact that they were developed largely on the run to meet external timelines and deadlines. More importantly, they have not been developed with reference to up-to-date population data.

Table 9: Selected development indicators, New Caledonia (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>New Caledonia</th>
<th>Southern Province</th>
<th>Northern Province</th>
<th>Loyalty Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- males</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- females</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- none/not completed</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- completed High School (BAC)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- tertiary: degree (1er cycle)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- tertiary: post-degree (2, 3e cycle)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Water (100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Running water (in house)</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No access</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population policies for PNG, Solomons and Vanuatu, for example, were all developed in 1998 and 1999, before their 1999 and 2000 censuses were conducted. This means that the policy recommendations they contain are largely based on 15 year old information: going back to the 1989 and 1990 censuses with census-based demographic information relating to the mid 1980s! The SPC is now in the process of reviewing and “updating” the population policies for the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu – this time with data from the 1999 census and much better baseline data which allows for more realistic population projections and models.
Where To From Here?

A top priority to sorting out the prevailing data malaise, with numerous different demographic indicators and estimates being “used” quite liberally, and contributing little to evidence-based decision-making, is getting the various agencies that generate statistics on the region, to make more consistent and regular use of data generated by agencies or institutions which have the comparative advantage of working continuously in the region. In this context, I see room for:

- greater strategic engagement in specific technical (mortality analysis; automated data capture; questionnaire design; web-based data dissemination) and operational areas (census planning) with agencies like Statistics New Zealand and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and collaborative work on analyses relevant for common clients and stakeholders (Pacific Island populations);
- more analytical collaboration with established population research centres and universities like Waikato and ANU, especially with regards to undertaking applied research, policy analysis, evaluation studies and providing graduate students with access to rich, and often not fully analyzed census and survey databases;
- greater on-the-ground collaboration (including joint activity programming) with UN agencies, ADB and the World Bank.

Such strategic alliances will generate tangible benefits for our key stakeholders in the Pacific, not just through creating synergies of research strengths and thus improving the quality and comprehensiveness of analytical outputs, but also arrangements with population research centres and universities could also add a greater degree of academic/scientific independence to the generation of demographic information and research capability in the region.

There is also an urgent need to move beyond collecting data and generating indicators and estimates, to engaging in more in-depth analyses. While the collection of good quality and timely data, and the creation of demographic and other socio-economic indicators and benchmarks for informed decision-making is our core business, in tandem with associated
national capacity building, the SPC’s location in the region and its development realities, together with access to extensive databases, provides a distinct comparative advantage to becoming more involved in actual policy analysis and research. This is a message I am hearing increasingly from colleagues across the region, from national stakeholders, development agencies and academics, which I feel we ought to debate and review more vigorously, and which invariably will have to involve much closer strategic partnerships with other population specialists and statistical experts along the lines referred to earlier.

Closely related to a greater emphasis on analysis, is providing the information in a way that is meaningful to the intended and to potential users. We still more often than not communicate with intended users, as if we were writing for academic journals. We have made some modest inroads over the years with our population profile series for planners and policy-makers, with our policy dialogues and census data utilization seminars, and the development of our national population GIS systems – all made possible through the very generous funding provided by AusAID, UNFPA, and DFID/AusAID respectively.

The success of our work in this field, in terms of sustainable outcomes, is not only a reflection of the quality of our input and efforts, but also of the absorptive capacity of our counterpart agencies. Regarding national statistical offices, we face the perennial challenge of under-staffing, limited budgets and high staff-turnover, with the situation in many planning agencies not much better. Early wins in terms of capacity building have a tendency of turning into quick losses, with key personnel leaving, often joining local subsidiaries of the same development agencies that funded our programs in the first place. The bottom-line is a need for ongoing commitment to capacity building, particularly in the smaller and medium-size countries, which few development agencies seem to be willing to stomach, and to recognise that ‘capacity supplementation’ for small island states is not necessarily a political step backwards.

Population policy measures and strategies/program activities addressing population growth/fertility, or the impact of unabated high population growth on sustainable social and economic development, have very little chance to succeed without widespread support through civil society and the political sphere. The Pacific Parliamentary Assembly for Population and Development (PPAPD) created in 1997, and the ongoing
UNFPA-SPC partnership in developing measures to integrate population (and gender) into national and sectoral policy development and planning, are both tangible expressions of meaningful population advocacy. Having said this, we have to step up the pace, not just at the national level (parliamentarians, as well as provincial administration and town councils), but most importantly, make more concerted efforts in assisting policymakers and politicians to actually use and implement the information.

We have to recognize that not all Pacific Island politicians have had the benefit of formal or tertiary or professional education, and hence understand statistics, the difference between numbers and rates, between rates and ratios, between estimates and projections, why we use the latter and so on. If it is possible to successfully engage traditional leaders in week long workshops on conflict resolution and dispute settlement, utilizing both indigenous and introduced techniques, and in governance issues and community development, as is the case in a current AusAID-funded and University of Queensland implemented pilot program with the National Council of Chiefs of building/enhancing capacity of traditional leadership in Vanuatu, it should be feasible to consider a more active population advocacy along similar lines, addressing population and development with countries’ modern leadership, such as parliamentarians, provincial administrators and town councillors.

Finally, we need to maintain a balanced perspective, and keep reminding ourselves, our key stakeholders and our development partners of what population and development is all about: that it is about quality and timely statistics, about data collection and analysis, as much as it is about sexual and reproductive health, population growth, migration and urbanization, economic policy and environmental legislation. Acknowledging this reality means rediscovering the spirit of Cairo, appreciating the complexity and complementarity of the various components of the Programme of Action, and recognizing different needs of different countries, at different stages of different development processes. Pacific Island countries demonstrated in the lead-up to Cairo that while embracing the ICPD PoA, they nevertheless had, and continue to have, distinct population concerns and policy priorities, commensurate with national development conditions and efforts. It is our collective responsibility to acknowledge this diversity, and assist national efforts that reflect first and foremost national, rather than international policy priorities.
References


The Structure of Māori – Asian Relations: An Ambivalent Future?

TAHU H. KUKUTAI

Abstract

Māori anxiety over the perceived threats posed by a growing Asian presence has become a common theme in popular and academic discourses on Māori-migrant relations. Media coverage of Asian victims in areas with a high Māori and Pacific concentration has added to the adversarial framing of indigene-immigrant relations. This article reorients the focus from attitudes and interactions to consider the structural bases of Māori-Asian relations through the lens of group boundaries. Three aspects of group boundaries are examined: 1) relative group size; 2) relative group status position; and 3) inter-ethnic partnering patterns. Particular attention is paid to how ethnic categories and classifications shape the representation of intergroup relations. The findings suggest future relations between Māori and Asian peoples might be best described as ambivalent.

The liberalisation of immigration policy over the past two decades has had major impacts on New Zealand’s ethnic terrain. The removal of rules favouring migrants from Europe and the United Kingdom, and the institution of criteria to promote human capital migration and family reunification, have transformed migration flows and origins. New Zealand now has one of the highest proportions of foreign-born residents in the OECD. In the 2006 census, about one fifth of the country’s usually resident population was born overseas, with peoples from the Asian continent, and China in particular, forming an increasingly visible component (Statistics New Zealand 2006). In addition to its large and growing immigrant population, New Zealand has a demographically and

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politically prominent indigenous population – a unique feature among OECD nations. In coming decades, relations between Māori and migrants – and “Asians” in particular - will be an important aspect of the nation’s ethnic relations.\(^1\)

Although the volume of scholarship on Māori-Asian relations pales by comparison with the impressive body examining relations between Māori and Pākehā, work by Ip (2003; 2009) and others (Chang 2009; Lee 2007) has begun to shed light on hitherto hidden aspects of indigene-immigrant interactions. Survey research suggests Māori view a growing migrant, and especially Asian, presence with considerable suspicion (Chang 2009; Massey News 2007). Concerns include the prospect that Asians will displace Māori as the country’s ethnic “majority minority” and that the perceived preference of migrants for multiculturalism over biculturalism will diminish Māori rights and the status of the Treaty of Waitangi. Conversely, Asian national communities, both local and foreign-born, have expressed concerns about being sidelined in debates about biculturalism and the Treaty (Young 2004; Ip 2003). Challenges have arisen about whether the Treaty is an appropriate vehicle for framing intergroup relations in a nation that is becoming ever more ethnically diverse.

Beyond academia, media coverage and political commentary have drawn attention to adversarial elements of Māori-migrant relations, including the hostile views of some prominent Māori individuals toward Asian immigration (Rowan 2008). More recently, widespread media coverage of Asian victims of a “crime wave” in impoverished areas with a high concentration of Māori and Pacific peoples have reinforced the negative framing of Māori-migrant interactions (Armstrong 2008; Trotter 2008), as have calls for vigilante style justice by self-appointed representatives of Asian communities (National Business Review 2008).

This article reorients the focus from group attitudes and interactions to consider the structural bases of Māori-Asian relations. Structural arrangements provide the macro-social context within which attitudes and interactions play out, and thus provide important insights into the construction and maintenance of group boundaries. Three aspects of group boundaries are examined: 1) relative group size; 2) relative group status position; and 3) inter-ethnic partnering patterns. Particular attention is paid to how ethnic classifications and categories shape the representation of intergroup relations. By taking account of the inherent subjectivity of
ethnic statistics, I suggest structural relations between Māori and Asians in the future may be more ambivalent than adversarial. However, much will depend on how relations unfold between Māori and the children of new Asian migrants (i.e. the second generation). The next section begins a brief discussion of the concept of group boundaries before investigating the aforementioned aspects in turn.

**Ethnic Group Boundaries**

The concept of ethnic boundaries is a quintessentially sociological one, owing much to the seminal work of Frederik Barth (1969). Ethnic boundaries may be understood as cognitive frameworks that individuals use, often unconsciously, to make distinctions between “us” and “them”. These frameworks are built from abstract rules, norms, and beliefs, but are given concrete form through legal, political and bureaucratic action. The construction and maintenance of ethnic boundaries thus involves both individual (e.g. psychological) and group-level (e.g. demographic, political) processes. Only the latter are explored in this article.

Official ethnic categories and schemas play a crucial role in processes of boundary building and creation. Though ethnic statistics are packaged and presented as objective facts about groups, social scientists are well aware of the inherent subjectivities and political processes involved (Kertzer & Arel 2002). Such processes influence boundary-making in varied ways, from the concepts used to classify groups (for example, as indigenous, racial, ethnic, tribal or ancestry groups), to which groups are given explicit recognition on official forms such as the census, and how information about them is then aggregated and disseminated. In the case of the New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, only eight of the nation’s many ethnic groups are listed on the individual form, with an additional three groups listed as examples for the “Other” write-in response. For purposes of dissemination, however, listed groups are often aggregated into pan-ethnic categories such as “Europeans”, “Asians” and “Pacific Peoples”. The ways in which groups are classified, categorised and aggregated both reflect and contribute to what Pearson (2002) calls “ethnification” – the process by which diverse ethno-cultural groups come to be attributed with a common ethnic core (Pearson 2002). The development and diffusion of official ethnic
categories and schemas by state agents thus represents a powerful form of state sponsored ethnification.

**Relative Group Size in New Zealand**

One way in which ethnic categories are put to use is to track a nation’s ethnic composition. Whether an ethnic group is the demographic majority, a majority minority, or a small minority among many reveals its place in the nation’s ethnic terrain but, more importantly perhaps, have implications for the group’s power, status and visibility. This is because, in multi-ethnic states, the “pursuit of entitlement” often translates into a “contest to achieve the ‘right’ numbers” (Kertzer & Arel 2002:30). Using categories from level one of the statistical standard of ethnicity (Statistics New Zealand 2005), Figure 1 shows the relative change in New Zealand’s ethnic composition for the best part of the last century.

**Figure 1:** New Zealand’s changing ethnic composition, level 1 ethnic group categories, 1916 – 2006

The classification is a four-tiered representation of the nation’s ethnic milieu; with level one representing the simplest form of the classification and level four the most complex. Ethnic statistics disseminated to the media and broader public are usually aggregated at level one. It comprises six categories: European, Māori, Pacific peoples, Asian, Middle Eastern Latin
American African (MELAA) and Other Ethnicity. For purposes of economy and clarity, only the first four categories are shown here.

One of the striking trends from Figure 1 is the apparent demographic decline of Europeans. Until 1976, about nine out of ten New Zealanders were classified as European—a designation historically employed to describe anyone who was considered white, from fourth generation New Zealanders of British origins, to newly arrived Norwegians and Greeks. There is a notable decline over time in the proportion of the population identifying with a European ethnic group and in 2006, the European category appears to dip sharply to 68 percent. What isn’t shown in Figure 1 is that the decrease in European ethnicities was partly offset by a dramatic increase in the number of people reporting New Zealander as their ethnic group. In 2006, their number more than quadrupled to 430,000 or 11 percent of the population, up from just 85,300 in 2001.

The discontinuity created by the unexpected magnitude of the shift in New Zealander identification was complicated by a change to the classification scheme. Prior to the 2006 census, New Zealander responses were coded as New Zealand European at levels two to four of the classification, and as European at level one. Following a revision of the classification in 2005, New Zealander responses were subsequently coded as a separate ethnic group at level four, and as an Other Ethnicity (rather than European) at levels one to three (Statistics New Zealand 2005). Without probabilistically matching records from the 2001 and 2006 censuses, we cannot know for sure how these new New Zealanders previously identified themselves. However, bivariate analysis by Kukutai and Didham (forthcoming) suggest most were New Zealand-born individuals who formerly identified as New Zealand European. If the people who identified exclusively as New Zealander in 2006 (n=374,061) were allocated to the European category as per past practice, the relative decline of Europeans between 2001 and 2006 would be considerably less, at about three percentage points.

The size of ethnic boundaries depends, not only on the categories that are used, but how the computation of group size is arrived at. This raises the question: what happens to people who identify with multiple groups? From 1991 until the 2004 Review of the Measurement of Ethnicity (RME), one approach used by Statistics New Zealand was to allocate dual and multi-ethnic identified people to one ethnic category through a post-hoc
method of prioritisation. Māori were at the top of the prioritisation schedule, followed by Pacific peoples, Asians, other non-European groups, other European ethnicities, then New Zealand European as the residual. That method has since been discontinued and replaced with two standard outputs for ethnicity data: total response data in which individuals are counted in all of their reported ethnic groups (e.g., someone who records Māori and New Zealand European is counted as both Māori and European); and single and combination data which counts people in mutually exclusive categories (e.g. Māori alone; European alone; or Māori and European. For detailed explanations see, Callister, Didham & Potter 2005a; Didham 2005; Kukutai & Callister forthcoming).

For most purposes, outputs are configured using the total response logic. In terms of tracking the relative size of group boundaries, the use of total count data has three main effects. One, the allocation of dual and multi-ethnic identified people to all of their recorded groups preserves the integrity of individuals’ responses, but the sum of groups exceeds the total population count. Two, the lack of mutual exclusivity makes the analysis and interpretation of demographic phenomena considerably more challenging. The examples of ethnic projections and intermarriage, discussed later in this article, exemplify these difficulties. Three, the extent to which such individuals contribute to overlapping group boundaries cannot be readily discerned. In short, the assessment of relative group size depends on comparing parameters that are treated as independent when the reality involves some degree (depending on the group) of interdependence. This may be of little consequence for categories with low levels of dual and multi-ethnic identification (e.g. Asian), but complicates the analysis of groups such as Māori, where almost half of the members identify with some other ethnic group, mostly New Zealand European (Didham 2005).

What have the treatment of dual and multi-ethnic identified people and the apparent decline of European demographic dominance suggested by Figure 1, got to do with Māori-migrant relations? The answer is, quite a bit. Dealings between ethnic minorities are unavoidably influenced by their relationships with the majority group. Historical interactions between Māori and Chinese, for example, have been strongly shaped by their power relations with Europeans (Ip 2003:249). Racial attitudes also develop as part of a relational process at the group-level. Attitudinal research shows that how members of the majority group perceive the relative size of
minorities affects their attitudes towards immigrants and other ethnic minorities, with greater distortion tending to be associated with more negative attitudes (Alba et al. 2005). The suggestion of eroding European demographic dominance also heightens the salience of categories such as Māori and Asian and results in them being given more prominence in ethnic debates (as distinct from Treaty-related debates) than they might otherwise be accorded. In coming years, European dominance may well decline in magnitude – projections discussed in the following section suggest this will be the case – but for now the majority group status of Europeans (and, more specifically, New Zealand Europeans) is assured.

Notwithstanding the problems that beset ethnic data, it is important to acknowledge that New Zealand’s ethnic terrain has changed in important ways. Ethnic diversification has undoubtedly increased since the 1960s, with migration waves firstly from the Pacific islands, then more recently from throughout Asia. Using birthplace data, Figure 2 shows how migration shifts have changed the composition of New Zealand’s foreign-born population.

**Figure 2: Changing composition of New Zealand’s overseas born population, 1991 – 2006**

In 1991, almost three of every five people born overseas were born in Europe and the United Kingdom, with the vast majority from England.
By 2006 this had decreased to about two in every five persons. Among the foreign born, English still dominate numerically and relatively, but far less so than in the past. An increasing share of the overseas-born population comprises people from non-traditional source countries: South Africa, countries in the Middle East, and of course Asia which includes a vast sweep of countries – from Uzbekistan and India, to Japan and Laos. In the 2006 census the proportion of Asian born migrants exceeded those born in Oceania (including Australia), for the first time. The growing presence of Asian migrants among New Zealand’s foreign-born population is one reason why they, more than other peoples, have been singled out for special attention in the media and political debates.

*Asians as the New Ethnic Majority Minority*

Clearly, immigration is a key driver of ethnic diversification in New Zealand and an important supply side factor of ethnic group growth. For Māori, however, this is not the case. Although there is a sizeable Māori population in Australia, there is no homeland outside of New Zealand that can provide a sustainable, long-term source of migrants in the same way that Mexico, for example, provides a site of replenishment for Mexican Americans, or China for New Zealand Chinese. As a theoretically closed population, Māori growth must primarily be driven by natural increase (an excess of births over deaths) and ethnic mobility (people changing their identification to Māori).³

One of the scenarios suggested by Figures 1 and 2 is that Asians will eventually replace Māori as the nation’s “majority minority”. How realistic is this scenario? One way to evaluate this is to consider the ethnic group projections produced by Statistics New Zealand. Population projections are routinely produced by official statistics agencies to guide planning and policy. Strictly speaking, a population projection is simply the outcome of a given set of assumptions about future demographic behaviour and thus, excluding computation error, cannot be wrong. Nevertheless, as Shaw (2007) points out, projections are frequently used as forecasts by decision-makers and thus it is not unreasonable to use them as a basis for comparison. Figure 3 shows the projections for 2006 alongside the actual counts from the 2006 census, as well as newly derived projections for 2026.⁴
Figure 3: Projected and observed number of people in each level 1 ethnic category, 2006 census; and projections for 2026

Note: Projected 2026 figure for European and Other combined.


The projected counts for Māori, Pacific peoples and Asians in 2006 were reasonably close to the observed counts. The unexpected increase in the reporting of New Zealander ethnicity meant the European projections were less precise. Overall, the 2006 projections were fairly robust, which is unsurprising given that they were produced in 2005, using 2001 baseline data. Longer-term ethnic projections carry a higher risk of error (between the projected and actual populations) due, in part, to the serendipitous nature of migration policy and changing identification patterns. In 2008 Statistics New Zealand released new ethnic group projections through to 2026, using baseline data from the 2006 census. Interestingly, these projections included, for the first time, a combined European and Other Ethnicity category to address New Zealander responses. According to the projections, the combined European and Other ethnicity categories is expected to increase to 3.43 million people by 2026, but its share of the population will drop to 69 percent by 2026. Māori are projected to grow to 820,000 or 17 percent of the population – just ahead of the Asians at 790,000 or 16 percent. For Māori, growth will come from natural increase, as a result of their higher Total Fertility Rate (2.78 in 2006 compared to 2.05 for the total population) and younger age structure (median age of 22.7 years in
2006 compared to the national median of 35.9 years). Asian growth will be driven primarily through migration, and supplemented by natural increase. Peoples identifying with a Pacific ethnicity are projected to reach 480,000 or ten percent of the total population – with growth primarily through natural increase.

If the projections are borne out, the future of Māori as the nation’s majority minority looks uncertain. Though it is difficult to predict how immigration policy will change, and how effectively New Zealand will be able to compete for migrant workers and investors in coming years, it is plausible to suggest that Māori will be demographically superseded by Asian origin peoples within the next 30 years. This interpretation depends, however, on the comparisons being made on the basis of pan-ethnic or “ethnified” categories. If the comparisons are made between smaller national origin groups, the future will look somewhat different as a comparison of Figures 4 and 5 show.

**How Much of the Minority Pie?**

Figure 4 employs level one total response data from the 2006 census to show the relative size of ethnic minorities. Māori are the largest minority, but the Other category (mostly comprised of those who reported a New Zealander type response) and the Asian category also have sizeable shares. The use of total response data, as per standard usage, means the overlapping boundaries between groups are obscured. The purpose of using simple pie charts, however, is to show how the relative size of groups shifts, depending on the level of aggregation employed.

With that point in mind, Figure 5 shows the same data coded at level two of the ethnic classification, which includes all of the ethnic groups listed on the census form. As the only category that cannot be further disaggregated using the ethnic classification logic, the Māori share of the pie stays the same, whereas the others are broken into smaller parts. Asian, for example, is separated into South East Asians, Indian, Chinese etc., which are aggregations of smaller identity and national origin groups. Likewise, Pacific Peoples become Samoan, Tongan, Niuean and so forth. Viewed from this perspective, the status of Māori as the nation’s majority minority looks more secure.
Figure 4: How much of the minority pie? Level 1 ethnic categories, 2006 census

Figure 5: Same pie, sliced differently, level 2 ethnic categories, 2006 census

Which graph best represents future inter-group relations depends on a whole range of factors including how old identities evolve in new settings, and how groups define themselves and are defined by others. That Chinese
and South Koreans have different identities, cultural legacies and migration histories may matter little to the average New Zealander who ascribes to them a generic Asian label and proceeds accordingly. Indeed, the routine usage of broad categories in official statistics may be perceived as legitimating the indiscriminate attribution of Asian ethnicity to a heterogeneous array of peoples. Within the New Zealand Chinese population, for example, differences arising from nativity, language use, and generational distance from the 'home' country (e.g. China, Malaysia, Hong Kong) are not easily reconciled (Ip & Pang 2005).

Nevertheless, while pan-ethnic labels may be poor descriptors of variegated identities, they can and are used for a range of strategic purposes. In the United States, for example, collective action has proved far more effective under the auspices of pan-ethnic Hispanic, African-American/Black or Asian political lobbies than as separate national groups (Espiritu 1992; Rodríguez 2000). Though pan-ethnic labels may have originated as imposed categories informed by racist ideologies and dominant group interests, in some cases such labels have also been successfully reinterpreted in ways that support group goals. In New Zealand, for example, groups are more likely to secure resources and political traction as Asians, Pacific Peoples and Africans, than as Chinese, Samoans and Somali. To some extent this is already the case, with the institution of Asian studies and Pacific studies in universities, ethnic representatives at local and central government, and pan-ethnic responses to anti-Asian violence such as the Asian Council on Reducing Crime and recently established Asian Anti-crime Group. Moreover, pan-ethnicity is not a uniquely immigrant phenomenon, as demonstrated by the emergence and survival of a supra-tribal Māori identity. Prior to the arrival of Europeans in New Zealand, indigenous identities were founded on genealogical ties, which connected the individual to an eponymous ancestor(s) via complex kinship networks spread across whānau (family), hapū (subtribe), and iwi (Broughton 1993). Today the term Māori is widely accepted descriptor of individual identity and political (e.g., indigenous) community, alongside those relating to iwi and hapū. Though ethnic categories play a key role in shaping perceptions of demographic realities and relative group positions, groups and individuals also act in agentic ways that reinforce or subvert official categorisations.

If the pan-ethnic Asian label becomes a widely accepted descriptor of a political community (if not a meaningful social identity) and intergroup
comparisons on that basis are seen as legitimate, the prospect of an Asian
majority minority has various implications for Māori. In spite of the unique
status of Māori as tangata whenua and the rights accorded, at the local level,
through the Treaty and, globally, through legal and human rights based
frameworks, external recognition is still contingent on political will. For
much of New Zealand’s history, the status of Māori as tangata whenua and
treaty partners was ignored, as indeed was the Treaty. The extent to which
Māori collective action and claims for justice were acknowledged and acted
upon were influenced by, among other things, changes in demography and
political economy, coupled with the global diffusion of indigenous rights on
the heels of Civil Rights. Recent challenges to the latter have clearly
illustrated how openings in the political opportunity structure can close as
new conditions arise.

Currently Māori are unique among indigenous peoples in North
America and Australasia in constituting the largest ethnic minority and the
high degree of visibility this gives them. Relative group size might offer a
guarantee of sorts that Māori aspirations and concerns will be taken account
of, in part because of potential for collective action and protest at the ballot
box. Size matters because even if Māori claims are advanced on the basis of
indigeneity, the weight given to those claims have been greatly aided by the
fact that Māori have historically been the nation’s largest ethnic minority.
However, demographic changes and shifts in the political economy mean
this will not always be the case.

**Problem Indigenes and Middleman Minorities**

So far this article has focused on the demography of Māori-migrant
relations and the ways in which ethnic statistics shape material
representations of demographic relations. I now focus on another important
feature of structural relations – how groups are placed in relation to each
other in the social stratification system. Sociologists generally agree that
ethnicity and race are important axes of inequality with respect to political
privilege, social prestige and the distribution of economic resources (Omi &
Winant 1994). In New Zealand, the European majority has historically
enjoyed greater access to power, prestige and wealth, though it is not an
uncommon claim that Māori, along with other ethnic minorities, enjoy race-
based privileges to the majority’s detriment. Like other indigenous peoples
in wealthy settler states, Māori are diverse with respect to culture and socio-economic attainment. At the group-level, however, Māori are over-represented among the country's poor, undereducated, sick and the incarcerated (Te Puni Kōkiri 2000). Despite state efforts to incorporate positive Māori images into the national polity, negative stereotypes of Māori people and culture persist at the workaday level and in media representations (Holmes et al. 2001). Causal explanations for Māori disadvantage reflect a range of theoretical perspectives, but regardless of the theoretical lens used, their persistent disadvantage vis-à-vis Europeans means Māori are discursively positioned as a problem to be solved, even if implicitly.

To the extent that Māori are presented, statistically and substantively, as a problem, Asians have often faced the opposite dilemma: of being seen as a solution. The term “model minority” originates from the United States, and was coined at the height of the Civil Rights movement to describe the success of Japanese and Chinese Americans in the education system and labour market. Like their American counterparts, Chinese New Zealanders have also been discursively positioned as the country's model minority, and deployed at times as “a standard of comparison” to “show up the lazy natives” (Ip 2003:241). However, being seen as the solution can also be constraining. By framing Asian peoples as model minorities, important class and cultural differences within and across constituent groups remain hidden. Focusing on high achievement also deflects attention from other forms of prejudice and stereotypes that group members may be exposed to. The discourse also tends to justify the status quo of racial relations and the myth that structural inequalities play no role in economic outcomes. As Lew (2006) argues, the model minority myth conveniently:

attributes academic success and failure to individual merit and cultural orientation, while underestimating important structural and institutional resources that all children need in order to achieve academically.

Focusing on individual orientations to the exclusion of structure fundamentally misrepresents the complexity of intergroup relations.

To what extent will future relations between Māori and Asian peoples be shaped by the juxtaposition of idealised model minorities, and disadvantaged, poor performing indigenes? Insights may be gleaned by
considering the dynamics between immigrants and disadvantaged established minorities elsewhere. The United States, like New Zealand, is a white majority settler state but has a longer history of immigration liberalisation with the dismantling of national origin quotas in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. Since the 1980s, race politics and competition for resources have generated considerable hostilities between blacks and Asians in urban landscapes like Los Angeles (Cheng & Espiritu 1989). Unfavourable comparisons between an impoverished, urban black “underclass” and economically integrated Asian groups (e.g. Japanese, Koreans) have fed pernicious racial stereotypes. Relations between blacks and Latinos have been characterised less by large status differences, than by competition over jobs and public funding and perceived demographic threats. In 2002 the U.S. Census Bureau reported that the number of ethnic Latinos superseded the number of black Americans for the first time, predictably prompting expressions of concern among the latter (Navarro 2004).

In New Zealand, Asian peoples are not only the most likely to be stereotyped as model minorities, but also form the fastest growing minority, providing the potential for heightened antagonism. On the positive side, migrants to New Zealand are entering into a racial hierarchy that, while certainly problematic, is not as rigid as in the United States. Institutions such as European controlled slavery have never existed; residential segregation for Māori is lower than for blacks (Johnston, Poulsen & Forrest 2005) and the social distance between Māori and Europeans has been far less than that separating blacks and whites. Historically, the status differences between Māori and early Asian sojourners were smaller, in some respects, from those between each group and the European settler majority. According to Ip (2003), for Māori and Chinese especially there was “affinity in adversity”, with both groups impoverished and demographically recovering around the turn of the 19th century. Both groups were also racialised minorities that were subject to de jure and de facto forms of discrimination. However, historical relations are being usurped by new dynamics. New migrants from Asian countries are more likely to be middle class urbanites with business or professional skill sets (Ip & Pang 2005). As the foreign-born predominate among New Zealand’s Asian population, their status will be particularly influential in determining how relations unfold. Reactions to recent events in South Auckland involving the deaths of three
people of Asian ethnicities suggest a polarised view of race relations may already be forming. For example, one left-wing political commentator has used the language of a “racially-motivated crime-wave” to describe the targeting of “culturally-distinct, highly-motivated and hard-working” immigrant families by disenfranchised Māori and Pasifika youth (Trotter 2008). The question is whether this will become a longer-term positioning, and much will depend on relative positions in stratification (a topic that is beyond the scope of this paper), social networks, and partnering. It is to the latter that I now turn.

Intimate Relations – A Māorasi Future?

The third and final feature of the structural relations between Māori and Asians relates to intermarriage. In the sociological literature intermarriage is used as an indicator of social distance between groups. Intermarriage signals that groups are accepted as social equals whereas its inverse – endogamy or marriage within the group – functions as a form of group closure. If decreasing endogamy reflects changes in ethnic identities and boundaries, then how likely is it that Māori and Asian group boundaries will be blurred by intermarriage in coming years?

Unfortunately, inter-ethnic marriage has been little studied in New Zealand, least of all marriage between Māori and Asians. In the late 1930s an Auckland newspaper reported at least 80 or 90 “alliances” between Māori and Chinese in the Auckland district, and in 1929 a Committee of Inquiry was established to investigate allegations of “miscegenation” between Chinese men and Māori women in market gardens. Such liaisons appeared to have been stigmatized from both communities, though the numbers were never very large (Ip 2003). More recent work on inter-ethnic marriage by Callister, Didham and Potter (2005a) offers some clues about current relations. The following tables are reproduced from their article using 2001 census data for men and women in opposite sex couples aged between 20 and 49 years. For each table the focal cells are the diagonals, which represent endogamy, and the two Māori-Asian cells. Table 1 shows the ethnic partnering choices of men for five of the Level 1 ethnic categories. The diagonal suggests a strong tendency towards same-group partnerships, especially for European men and Asian men – with 90 and 96 percent
respectively partnered with a woman with a common ethnic background. Māori men were the least likely to have a partner with the same ethnicity.

Table 1: Percentage of partners in each level 1 ethnic category for men, opposite sex couples, total counts, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European</td>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>Pacific Peoples</td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pacific peoples</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Callister, Didham & Potter 2005a: Table 5.

Table 2: Percentage of partners in each level 1 ethnic category for women, opposite sex couples, total counts, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European</td>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>Pacific Peoples</td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Māori</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Callister, Didham & Potter 2005a: Table 6

Almost half of them had a partner who identified with a European ethnic group. Only one percent of Māori men were partnered with a woman who reported an Asian ethnicity; for Asian men it was slightly higher at two percent. The partnering choices of women show a similar pattern, with the exception that Asian women are less likely to partner endogamously.

The observant reader will note that the row totals sum to more than 100 percent, due to the use of total count data discussed earlier. As a result of individuals being counted in multiple groups, some couples may simultaneously be examples of endogamous and inter-ethnic marriages. From the perspective of social distance and group closure, such results are substantively difficult to interpret. This is not yet a problem for Māori-Asian relations because the number of couples involving a Māori partner
and an Asian partner is small, as is the number of people and proportion identifying with both Māori and Asian ethnicities (see Didham 2009 for a detailed analysis of Māori-Chinese peoples and partnering). In the case of Māori and European partnerships however, the analysis is more complicated, because of the high proportion of marriages involving partners who share one ethnic affiliation, but differ on another. For example the number of marriages involving a Māori-European partner and a Māori partner in 2001 (n=28,713) exceeded the number of marriages where both partners identified exclusively as Māori (n=22,338. Callister, Didham & Potter 2005b: App. 3).

Interpreted carefully, these data may be used as evidence of the prevalence of intermarriage, but explanations for why these patterns exist are elusive. Marriage is the result of several factors including personal preferences, interference of third parties and social constraints (Kalmijn 1998). A key constraint on partnering choices is the relative availability of partners from specific groups. The predominance of Europeans compared to Māori and Asians means there are simply more Europeans available to partner with. Using simple probabilities, Callister, Didham and Potter (2005b) found Māori and Asian couples were far fewer than would be expected on the basis of random sorting. A more accurate picture of inter-ethnic relations would be derived by using odds ratios to statistically control for the marginal distributions of all groups in the “marriage market” simultaneously. Even so, one would need to separate out the overseas from the native-born because, for adult migrants, partnering choices are often made in the home country. One of the difficulties in assessing Māori-Asian intermarriage is that one needs to look the second generation for clues and, in terms of the new wave of Asian migration (i.e. post 1985), sufficient time has not yet elapsed. There is little doubt, however, that the extent to which Māori and Asian groups form closer marital alliances will be shaped by broader status differences, especially in terms of educational attainment and occupational mobility. In the presence of large status differences and geographic ethnic concentration, Māori-Asian intermarriage is unlikely to become socially significant.
Conclusion: An Ambivalent Future?

By focusing on structural relations and the theme of group boundaries, this article has sought to contribute an additional perspective to the nascent but important literature on Māori-Asian relations. In so doing, attention has been paid to the ways in which the ethnic categories and schemas that are used to statistically represent inter-ethnic relations, also contribute to processes of boundary creation and maintenance. Three features of group boundaries were examined: group size, group position and group blending. Ethnic projections suggest Māori may lose their status as New Zealand’s majority minority within 25 years, but this will depend as much on political factors – including shifting ethnic alignments and ethnic classification practices as demographic factors. Notwithstanding the diversity that exists within the Māori and Asian populations, enduring Māori disadvantage (relative to Europeans), and the economic profiles of new Asian migrants suggests the juxtaposition of problem indigenes and immigrant model minorities may yet come to pass. Finally, though the prevalence of inter-ethnic marriage between Māori and Asian New Zealanders is relatively rare now, a more accurate assessment requires the analysis of second-generation data using more sophisticated statistical models. In other immigrant receiving nations where status differences between groups are large, marriage across ethnic boundaries remain uncommon.

Drawing on the foregoing findings, I suggest that, from a structural perspective, the future of Māori-Asian relations might be best described as ambivalent rather than adversarial. Ambivalence is not used in the affective sense, though how members of groups feel about each other is a central element of intergroup relations. Rather, ambivalence arises from the ways in which group relations are structured – in this case the structural features are group size, group status and group interactions through marriage. At present, such relations are characterised by uncertainty and indecision. Finally, because relations between minorities are inextricably shaped by their relations with the dominant group, there is potential for Māori and Asian peoples, as racialised minorities with historical experiences of discrimination, to find a common structural basis for co-operation and collaboration, rather than adversarial or ambivalent relations. To some extent these relations are emergent and fluid. The next decade will be important in shaping how these relational features unfold.
Acknowledgements

This article expands on a presentation given at the "Metropolis Plus: Perspectives from New Zealand" Conference in October 2007. I thank Richard Bedford for inviting me to speak at the conference; Robert Didham for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper; Kumanan Rasanathan for sharing his insights on relative group size; and Paul Callister for permission to reproduce the intermarriage data. Any contestable judgments and errors are entirely my own. All correspondence should be directed to tahuk@waikato.ac.nz or tkukutai@stanford.edu

Notes

1 Quotations are employed for first usage of Asian to indicate that it is not treated as a natural descriptor nor objective referent, but rather reflects its usage in workaday and demographic discourses.

2 For the rest of this paper I use the term European rather than Pākehā to denote a statistical category of peoples with ties to ethnicities that originate in the United Kingdom, but also including the European continent and some nationality groups from other parts of the globe (e.g. South Africans, Australians and Americans, see Statistics New Zealand 2005).

3 Ethnic mobility – the process by which individuals change their ethnic identification – is recognised as a major force for growth in indigenous populations. In the United States and Canada, for example, the rapid growth of indigenous populations since the 1960s has been attributed to changing identification patterns, rather than natural increase (Eschbach 1992; Guimond 1999).

4 The projection data employed in Figure 3 are from Series 6, which assumes medium fertility, mortality, migration and inter-ethnic mobility.

5 A theoretical discussion of the meaning of majority and minority group status is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is accepted that the term minority is a problematic one, especially where there is significant overlap between group boundaries. The segments represent each category as a proportion of the total usually resident population who gave a valid ethnicity response that was not European. Because each category includes people who may also have identified as European, or with some other non-European group, the totals sum to more than 100 percent.

6 I note, however, that there are other ways of further disaggregating the Māori population, for example, by distinguishing those who reported a tribal affiliation from those who did not; or between those who identified exclusively as Māori versus in combination with some other group(s). In the latter case, the Māori share in Figure 4 would be slightly smaller than the pan-ethnic Asian category if limited to those people who identified only as Māori.
Though the model minority stereotype has been most closely associated with Asian origin migrants, it should be noted that Asian peoples in New Zealand have also been subject to negative stereotyping. For example, a prominent popular New Zealand magazine reported New Zealand as the "new home of Asian drug runners, illegal brothels, health cheats, student P pushers, business crooks and paua smugglers" (Coddington 2006).

References


KUKUTAI


One in Six? The Rapid Growth of the Māori Population in Australia

PAUL HAMER

Abstract
From the earliest times of colonial settlement in Australia, Māori have travelled there to seek out opportunities and experience the world beyond New Zealand. Large-scale migration from New Zealand in the second half of the twentieth century led to around 4,000 Māori living in Australia by 1966 and 27,000 by 1986. Recent census practice has improved the quality of data, but still undercounts the number of Māori in Australia by a considerable margin. Taking into account a range of factors, it is likely there were around 105,000 Māori in Australia in 2001 and 126,000 in 2006, up from the official counts of 72,956 and 92,912 respectively. With around 15,000 Māori in all other countries besides New Zealand and Australia, as many as one in six Māori now live in Australia.1

There are today a considerable number of Māori in Australia. This fact alone commands a significant amount of interest in New Zealand. It has, at times, lead to all manner of conjecture as to their actual number, their proportion of the entire Māori population, and how that proportion may change in the future. While some of this speculation has arisen during periods in which there was a genuine lack of census information, the recent Australian census results of 2001 and 2006 have not provided definitive answers. These returns in fact require close scrutiny, much as did the earlier Australian census figures from 1986 and before. The key objective of this paper, therefore, is to engage with the official statistics to decipher something of the rise in the Māori population in Australia and make some informed comments as to its current size. The paper also considers the number of Māori likely to be in all other countries

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and concludes by estimating the proportion of all Māori who now live in Australia.

Calculating the number of Māori overseas is not just an academic pursuit, for there are important policy implications that arise from the existence of a Māori diaspora (Hamer 2009). For example, Māori migration from New Zealand will often stem from pressures in New Zealand, be they social or economic. If the rate of out-migration is greater than has been recognised, so probably too were the pressures. Given the current global economic conditions, what work Māori in Australia have (alongside whom they are partnered with) will also have implications for the likelihood of their return to New Zealand, with all the impact on social services that might bring. Also, Māori who leave New Zealand often take with them the accumulated education capital of the Māori language revival movement over the last 20 years. How and whether they put that to use abroad may have implications for the ongoing health of te reo.

In setting out the difficulties in calculating the number of Māori in Australia it is important to note that, of course, such challenges will always exist when ethnicity data are being relied upon. They certainly exist in New Zealand, where inter-ethnic mobility, multiple ethnicity responses, the different responses to ethnicity- and descent-based questions, and the varying methodologies of collecting ethnicity data all combine to create a changing and at times confusing picture (Callister 2004; Kukutai 2004). As Ian Pool (1991:11-25) has commented, the differing legal, statistical and popular usages of “Māori” inevitably lead to the question “When is a Maori a ‘Maori’?” In Australia the census question is one of ancestry. The purpose of this paper is not to rank this method against other approaches to gathering ethnicity data, but rather simply to discuss the nuances that arise from the Australian approach.

**Pre-1986 Population**

The first Māori to set foot on Australian soil are likely to have been two men kidnapped by British sailors from the Bay of Islands in 1792 on the instruction of Lieutenant Philip Gidley King, who believed they would be able to teach his Norfolk Island convicts to dress flax (Hughes 1988:101). Their involuntary encounter with the Australian colonies was followed in the coming years by many willing visits by Māori eager to acquire new
technology, be exposed to European ideas, and forge relationships with Australian colonists. Historian James Belich (1996:145) guesses that, by 1840, as many as 1,000 Māori had travelled overseas, most of whom will have visited Sydney. By this time Māori had become part of the Sydney landscape, with a narrow lane in The Rocks named after its resident Māori whalers. In short, the Māori connection with Australia is practically as old as the colony of New South Wales itself. The ongoing Māori name for Sydney, Pōhākena, dates from when the settlement was still commonly known as Port Jackson.

It is difficult to say whether Māori formed distinct or particularly lasting communities in pre-Federation Australia, and their numbers will have been few. The New South Wales census of 1856 included the comment that "As the natives of New Zealand did not exceed 40-50 souls, they were thrown under the general heading of Australasia and New Zealand" (Merchant 1980). There were groups of Māori living in fishing camps along the shore of the Mornington Peninsula near Melbourne in the second half of the nineteenth century (Massola 1969:155-156), but they do not seem to have remained beyond 1900, perhaps (like the whalers of The Rocks) leaving "Māori Street" in Rye as their legacy. The Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia recorded the number of Māori entering Australia during the first three decades of the twentieth century, including a peak of 108 in 1909 (Merchant 1980), which seems clearly to relate to the troupe of Māori performers taken to Sydney that year by the famous guide Maggie Papakura (Diamond 2007:94). These were visitors, however, rather than settlers. Census figures put the number of Māori in Australia at 134 in 1911 and 83 in 1921 (Jupp 2001:592).

In a report published by the Planning Council in 1990 on the Māori population in Australia, demographer Jeremy Lowe began by setting out the limited historical data he had located. The 1966 Australian census gave the number of those of Māori race in Australia as 197 in 1933, 247 in 1947, 257 in 1954, 449 in 1961, and 862 in 1966. Since these included only those "full blood or half-caste", Lowe estimated that – on the basis of the 1966 New Zealand census result that showed the number of those not counted as Māori who nevertheless reported Māori ancestry – the figure of 862 Māori in Australia in 1966 was at least 25 percent too few (1990:4). Moreover, Lowe noted that the 1986 census result, which he analysed in depth, revealed that no fewer than 2,154 people of Māori ancestry living in
Australia had been born there before 1966, thus suggesting that the understatement of the Māori population in earlier censuses had been “substantial”. He attributed this to many Māori having recorded themselves as more than half European (1990:4-5, 23).6

Lowe concluded that there had in fact been around 4,000 Māori in Australia in 1966 (1990:24). There may be some corroboration of this in contemporary observations – in 1963, for example, the Department of Māori Affairs magazine Te Ao Hou commented on the “Māori Club” in Sydney, which it said catered for “the considerable Māori population there” (1963:9).

Of those Māori born in Australia before 1966, 443 had been born before 1931, including 189 before even 1921 (Lowe 1990:53), thus showing again the inadequacies of the earlier race-based census returns. These figures also indicate that the Māori population in Australia in the early part of the twentieth century was much more substantial than has commonly been thought. They also suggest unbroken Māori settlement in Australia since the nineteenth century, rather than simply an initial period of (early nineteenth-century) encounter followed well over 100 years later by a new wave of migration.

Despite the problems with the 1966 and earlier censuses, the three Australian censuses from 1971 to 1981 can yield no data on Māori in Australia whatsoever. In 1971 and 1976 those not “European”, Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander were asked to record their race, but Lowe was told by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) that no data on Māori was obtainable. The 1981 census simply asked respondents whether they were Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (Lowe 1990:5). The number of New Zealand-born in Australia, however, essentially doubled between 1976 and 1981 (Carmichael 1993:37), and net Māori migration (based on arrival and departure card information) resulted in significant losses to New Zealand in the years ended March 1980 and March 1981 (Lowe 1990:26).7 In the absence of any hard information, ideas of the size of the Māori population in Australia varied considerably. Philippa Merchant, who compiled information on Māori in Australia in 1980, wrote that estimates of their population that year ranged “from 2,000 to over 10,000”.

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The 1986 Census

After two decades of intensive immigration by “new Australians”, in 1986 the ABS introduced an ancestry question to the Australian census. According to the ABS (2002), the question was designed to “measure the ethnic composition of the population as a whole”. Lowe pointed out that ancestry was thus seen “as an alternative way of enquiring about ethnicity, rather than a different concept in substance” (1990:6). Indeed, the ABS had also contemplated, as an alternative to ancestry, capturing data on ethnicity using the “self-perceived identification approach” (Kunz & Costello 2003:5). The eventual census question asked “What is each person’s ancestry?” and the examples provided were “Greek, English, Indian, Armenian, Aboriginal, Chinese etc”. The accompanying guide explained that:

Ancestry means the ethnic or national group from which you are descended. It is quite acceptable to base your answer on your grandparents’ ancestry. Persons of mixed ancestry who do not identify with a single group should answer with their multiple ancestry. Persons who consider their ancestry to be Australian may answer “Australian” (Lowe 1990:6).

The official result was that 26,035 people reported being of Māori ancestry, but for a variety of reasons this figure is unreliable. The first is that, although respondents were encouraged to consider their ancestry back as far as their grandparents, and three lines were provided for their answers to be entered, only a maximum of two ancestries were counted for any one person. As Lowe observed, this predetermined approach would have been evident to “sharp-eyed computer-literate people” by the inclusion of only two coding boxes underneath the question (1993:61). It is unknown how many responses of “Māori” were thereby lost. Bearing in mind the propensity of Māori in Australia to state multiple ancestries, as well as the improbability of many Māori entering “Māori” last out of three ancestries, Lowe estimated a total of 500 (1990:7, 33).

More seriously, the Māori tally included 1,048 people who were either born in the Cook Islands or both of whose parents were born in the Cook Islands, and who were thus quite unlikely to be of New Zealand Māori ancestry. Lowe was advised by the ABS that New Zealand Māori and Cook Island Māori had been included in the same code. Taking into account the
need to exclude from the 26,035 total these 1,048 Cook Island Māori as well as the 538 Māori usually resident overseas, but to add in numbers for census undercounting, Australian-resident Māori temporarily overseas, and those with lost Māori ancestries, Lowe concluded that “the Australian-resident (New Zealand) Māori population at the end of June 1986 was around 26,000 persons – much the same as the original census figure but a different 26,000 persons” (1990:8). He later revised this estimate up to 27,000 after the Australian post-census enumeration survey revealed above-average undercounting of the New Zealand-born population (1992:97).

The ancestry question was dropped from the 1991 Australian census because of both “a high level of subjectivity and confusion about what the question meant” and “[v]ery little use” being made of the data. A refined version of the question was tested in the lead-up to the 1996 census, but it too gave unsatisfactory results and was not used (Kunz & Costello 2003:1-2). With the dropping in 1986 of the ethnic origin question on New Zealand arrival and departure cards, the size of the Māori population in Australia suddenly became very difficult to establish. In the absence of official data there were many exaggerated accounts. Paul Bergin, who in 1998 completed a doctorate in anthropology on Māori in Australia, wrote in 2001 that, if he added the highest estimates he had been given for each state and territory by Māori community leaders in 1995 and 1996, he arrived at a total of 135,000 Māori in Australia. The degree of overstatement at work is apparent from the fact that this would have represented a 500 percent increase on Lowe’s calculation of 27,000 in 1986 (2001:42).

The lack of data also led to some understatements, of course. A 2001 account in a tome dedicated to setting out the detail of Australia’s population diversity stated that “With over 300 000 New Zealanders living in Australia by 2000 it is probable that the Māori population was about 30 000” (Jupp 2001:592). This simple method of dividing the New Zealand-born by ten of course failed to contemplate the existence of Australian-born Māori, but it also underestimated the Māori population in Australia by over 200 percent, as we shall see.

The 2001 Census

After a reconsideration of how the question should be asked, as well as a successful testing programme, the ABS reintroduced the census ancestry
question in 2001. The format of the question had changed significantly from 1986. The form asked “What is this person’s ancestry?” and gave as examples “Vietnamese, Hmong, Dutch, Kurdish, Australian South Sea Islander, Maori, Lebanese”. As can be seen, several of these were groups that exist across national borders or as minority groups within nations, which doubtless reflected a desire to show that the question aimed to capture ethnic origin or ancestry rather than nationality. Respondents may have been forgiven for assuming the latter since the seven most common ancestries from 1986 – English, Irish, Italian, German, Greek, Chinese and Australian – were listed to the right of the question with tick boxes alongside them. Under them were three lines (with space for 27 characters) for entering any “other” ancestries. Respondents were told on the form to “Provide more than one ancestry if necessary”. In the accompanying guide they were advised to “consider and mark the ancestries with which you most closely identify” and to “Count your ancestry back as far as three generations. For example, consider your parents, grandparents and great grandparents” (Kunz & Costello 2003:6-7, 54).

The official result was that the Māori population rose to 72,956, a 180 percent increase over the 26,035 in 1986. Just as with the earlier figure, however, this result needs significant deconstruction. While census counts had excluded temporary visitors since 1991 (Carmichael 2001:603), the main problem was the number of lost ancestries. Once again, respondents were not advised that only a maximum of two ancestries would be counted, but in fact this time were encouraged to trace their ancestry back a further generation than they were in 1986, to their great-grandparents. Because the tick-box options were counted first, in descending order from the most popular, this created an enormous bias in the results towards them – particularly to English and Irish, which were thus always counted.

In 2003 the ABS reviewed the results of the census ancestry question. By sampling and analysing 366,667 census forms (2 percent of the total) taken from a representative range of urban and rural collection districts, ABS staff Chris Kunz and Liz Costello were able to report on the estimated number of lost ancestries for each ancestry group. The number of lost ancestries in the sample was multiplied by 49.93 to give the estimated national total. A total of 351 cases of a Māori ancestry not having been counted thus led to an estimate of 17,525 lost Māori ancestries. This was
19.4 percent of the official total. The revised estimate for those of Māori ancestry in the census was thus 90,481 (Kunz & Costello 2003: 22, 57).

This figure must itself be treated with caution, however. The ABS sample of census forms was drawn from the states and territories on a representative basis, but the spread of Māori around Australia (see Table 1) does not match the national pattern. Thus while the 2001 census revealed that 29.7 percent of Māori lived in Queensland and 14.0 percent in Western Australia, only 18.8 percent and 10.2 percent of the sample respectively came from those two states. On the other hand, 24.7 percent of the sampled forms came from Victoria and 7.6 percent from South Australia, but the proportion of the Māori population in these two states was only 14.9 percent and 2.9 percent respectively. In other words, 63.4 percent of the sampled forms came from states and territories where 80.5 percent of the Māori population lived, and 36.5 percent came from states and territories containing only 19.6 percent of the Māori population. The estimate of 90,481 is for this reason alone somewhat too low.

Table 1: Australian-resident Māori population by census and state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1986 Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2001 Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% rise</th>
<th>2006 Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% rise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>26,035</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>72,956</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>180.2</td>
<td>92,912</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>27.4</td>
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<td>9,759</td>
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<td>25,902</td>
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<td>15.1</td>
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<td>QLD</td>
<td>6,103</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>21,643</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>254.6</td>
<td>31,078</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10,874</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>169.2</td>
<td>14,268</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>285.3</td>
<td>12,552</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>141.4</td>
<td>2,604</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another problem with the 2001 census tally is the ongoing inclusion of Cook Island Māori in the total. While the adoption in 2000 of a new Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups placed Māori and Cook Island Māori within separate codes, there was — and remains — no way to prevent Cook Island Māori from being included in the Māori total where they simply enter “Māori” on the census form. The same of course occurs in the New Zealand census. Thus there were 654 people in the official 2001 Māori total of 72,956 who were born in the Cook Islands.
(Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 2003:65), as well, presumably, as some Cook Island Māori who were born in New Zealand or indeed Australia.

Kunz and Costello recommended a number of reforms for the next application of the census ancestry question. These included recommendations that:

- “a minimum of at least four separately-stated Ancestries be coded”;
- “the maximum number of Ancestries to be coded must be stated on the Census Form, and in the Census Guide”;
- “‘Australian’ be the only listed Ancestry option … in the mark box sequence”; and
- “a supplementary listing of Dual Ancestries [such as Italo-Australian] be created and then utilised in coding” (2003:47–48).

If adopted, these suggestions would certainly have assisted in the identification of the Māori population in Australia.

The 2006 Census

The only concession to these recommendations, as it transpired, was that the 2006 form, for the first time, asked respondents to “provide up to two ancestries only”, with the guide adding “For each person provide a maximum of two of the main ancestries with which they identify, if possible”. The other changes in 2006 were that the guide instructed people to consider their ancestry only back as far as their grandparents, an extra line was provided for entering written-in ancestries, and “Australian” was placed last in the tick-box options, where Scottish replaced Greek.

The 2006 census result was an official Māori tally of 92,912. To the uninitiated this 27.4 percent rise appeared to be a major increase from 2001. Since there were probably at least 90,000 people who entered “Māori” in response to the 2001 ancestry question, however, it would in fact represent something of a contraction if the census instruction was duly adhered to. Given the 9.5 percent rise in the number of New Zealand-born in Australia from 2001 to 2006, it is certainly not explained by any slowing of out-migration from New Zealand.
On reflection, there are likely to have been two factors at work. First, some respondents probably overlooked or ignored the instruction to enter a maximum of two ancestries, with a number of responses of “Māori” thus being lost. In fact, unofficially at least, it seems that the incidence of lost ancestries may have been as high again as in 2001 (pers. comm. Robert Didham, 23 January 2009). Secondly, those with high rates of multiple ancestry such as Māori were doubtless forced to squeeze at least one of their ancestries out of their census response. The impact of the new instruction is clear when one considers the number of groups for whom the official 2006 totals were lower than their 2003 estimates by Kunz and Costello. Taking “New Zealander” as an example, the 2003 estimate was 161,361, up from the official 2001 total of 122,022. But the official 2006 total for this group was only 160,681, despite the inter-censal rise in the New Zealand-born population. The reality of multiple ancestries may yet force the ABS to rethink its rejection of Kunz and Costello’s recommendations.

The other matter to remember is that respondents are of course not consistent in their ancestry or ethnicity responses. Responses are fluid, and represent only the self-identification of a population at a moment in time. To that extent the 92,912 people who provided “Māori” as one of their two ancestry responses will doubtless both include some who chose not to in 2001 and exclude some who had provided a response of “Māori” in 2001 but who altered that response five years later.

“New Zealander” Responses and Under-Enumeration

Another important matter that must be factored in when calculating the approximate size of the Māori population in Australia is the tendency of many people to have Māori ancestry and feel strongly Māori but not to enter “Māori” on the census form at all. Something of this is apparent in the responses to Te Puni Kōkiri’s 2006 survey of Māori in Australia, which was completed by 1,205 (self-selecting) people, 94.9 percent of whom were New Zealand-born. Respondents were asked the following:
The Australian Census asks a question about ethnic ancestry. You are able to give more than one answer. If you were answering that question, which of these answers would you give?

- Māori
- New Zealander
- Australian
- Other
- Don’t know

Of the 1,189 who answered this question, 149 said they would answer as “New Zealander” only, nine as “Australian” only, and 11 as “Other” only. The Māori identity of these people cannot be questioned, as the very act of filling in this survey was an expression of Māori ethnic and cultural affiliation. Some interviewees explained that their primary frame of reference when overseas was as a New Zealander rather than Māori. Others may confuse the question for a nationality one, while some may be affected by the way in which Australians tend to group Māori and Pākehā together simply as “Kiwis” (Hamer 2007:31-32). Some observers are also convinced that Australian-born Māori answer only as “Australian” in similar proportions, with one commentator in Queensland suggesting that there could even be as many as 200,000 Māori in Australia if all those with any Māori ancestry were counted (Harvey 2007: 10).

It is of course impossible to know the extent to which Māori are not identifying as “Māori” in the Australian census. However, some verification of the practice at least could be gained from an assessment of the ancestries of those giving three particularly unique Māori census responses: speakers of the Māori language in the home and members of the Rātana or Ringatū faiths. Some non-Māori will give these responses, but they will be comparatively few. At this stage, to the author’s knowledge, this analysis has not been attempted.

There is of course some overlap between the “Māori” and “New Zealander” groups in the census, but it is surprisingly small: lost ancestries aside, it was in 2001 only 1,354 people (which compares to an overlap between “Māori” and “English” of 12,214 and “Māori” and “Australian” of 7,330 (pers. comm. Siew-Ean Khoo, 27 May 2008)). The overlap is bound to be much larger than this, however. Since “Māori” or “New Zealander” will often have been the part of a multiple-ancestry response lost, and “English” never was lost, one can assume that a much larger number of people than 1,354 named both ancestries. Methods of counting ancestry responses,
whether by computers or manual coders, will also have played a part. An entry of “New Zealand Māori” will often have been coded to “Māori” only, where the intention may in fact have been to enter two ancestries (Hamer 2007:24; Kunz & Costello 2003:13-14). Of the 2006 Te Puni Kōkiri survey respondents, 344 or 28.9 percent said they would answer the census with the “Māori-New Zealander” combination (Hamer 2007:31).

A further factor to consider when assessing the size of the Māori population in Australia is under-enumeration. In part as a result of their youthful age structure, the New Zealand-born have traditionally been undercounted in Australia at a rate around twice the national average (Hamer 2007:69). The under-enumeration of Māori is likely to be even higher. There are several reasons for this assumption. First, Māori in Australia are highly mobile: of those Māori in Australia in 2001 who had been there in 1996, only 26 percent had not moved to a new address (Bedford et al. 2004:138-139). Secondly, many Māori in Australia regard themselves as temporary residents. In the Te Puni Kōkiri survey, around 60 percent of the New Zealand-born (who remain the overwhelming adult majority) intended to return to New Zealand to live (Hamer 2007:151-152; Forrest et al. 2009). Thirdly, there is what one could describe as an unwillingness to partake in the Australian polity. For example, the take-up rate of Australian citizenship for overseas-born Māori in Australia in 2001 was very low at just 22.8 percent (Khoo & Lucas 2004:92-94). That this also translates into a comparatively low rate of participation in the census can be guessed at both from the comment of one of Bergin’s informants that “Our people don’t bother with those sorts of things” (2001:40) as well as from the Te Puni Kōkiri survey results. Of the 242 respondents who answered the survey in the two months immediately after the 2006 Australian census was taken, 58 gave no answer to the question on whether they had completed the census. Of the 184 who did respond, 14.7 percent said they had not answered it (Hamer 2007:69).

Calculating the Number of Māori in Australia

Starting with the 2001 census, where we are assisted by the 2003 Kunz and Costello estimates, one can begin to make some informed calculations about the size of the Māori population in Australia. To the official return of 72,956 Māori can be added the 2003 estimate of 17,525 lost ancestries, but
because of the concentration of the Māori population in certain areas it might be considered that this estimate is too low, perhaps by 2,000. To the running total could be added perhaps at least 4,000 people undercounted through absence overseas, avoiding the census or not answering the ancestry question, although from the total could also be subtracted at least 1,000 for wrongly included Cook Island Māori. Finally, an extra 10 percent could arguably (and perhaps conservatively) be added to cover those who identify strongly as Māori in most contexts but do not state it on the census form. This gives an approximate total of 105,000.¹⁴

If there were indeed a similar number of lost ancestries in 2006 to 2001, and Māori were similarly affected, then one could arguably treat the 2006 Māori ancestry result as reflecting a straight 27.4 percent increase in the size of the overall Māori population in Australia, meaning that the estimate of 105,000 in 2001 could be raised to 133,770. Given the 9.5 percent inter-censal rise in the New Zealand-born population, however, this may well be overstating matters.¹⁵

Nevertheless, one notable 2006 census result is the rise in the number of people who reported that they spoke te reo Māori in the home. This went up from 5,504 in 2001 to 6,617 in 2006, a rise of 20.2 percent (see table 2). This sits in sharp contrast to the New Zealand census, which instead asks about the languages respondents are able to hold a conversation in about a lot of everyday things. From 2001 to 2006 in New Zealand the number who answered “Māori” declined by 2.2 percent. Furthermore, while the number of those in the Māori ethnic group who spoke te reo increased by 2 percent, the proportion of Māori in New Zealand who spoke te reo declined from 25.2 percent to 23.7 percent.

What this suggests is that the rise in the Māori population in Australia must have been substantial to allow for such an increase in te reo speakers. Alternatively, Māori speakers might have been a significant proportion of New Zealand migrants, the Māori language may be being revived to some extent in Australia independently, or more te reo speakers were sharing homes and thus able to answer “yes” to the census question, but all of these seem inadequate explanations for such a rise.
Table 2: Te reo speakers and Māori ancestry in the Australian census, 1986-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Te reo</th>
<th>Ancestry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,979</td>
<td>26,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3,615</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4,156</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5,504</td>
<td>72,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6,617</td>
<td>92,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence for a significant influx of Māori from New Zealand is also to be found in the fact that the number of te reo speakers in the home in Australia has only doubled since 1986 while, officially at least, the number of Māori has risen 257 percent. The proportion of those of Māori ancestry (assuming most te reo speakers are in this group) who speak te reo in the home has also dropped markedly. A 20 percent rise in te reo speakers in the home from 2001 to 2006, therefore, should in theory reflect a rise in the total Māori population of at least that scale.

Another proxy measure for the growth of the Australian-resident Māori population can be found in the ongoing increases in the number of Australian-born Māori living in both Australia and New Zealand. While the New Zealand aspect of this is probably more reflective of patterns of return migration than actual population growth, the combination of the figures indicates significant growth in the Māori population in Australia. Indeed, the number of Australian-born Māori in both countries increased 44.6 percent from 2001 to 2006 (see Table 3). This consideration of ancestry, Māori language and country of birth figures is of course a limited analysis that has not factored in matters such as fertility and mortality rates amongst Australian-resident Māori. Nor has it engaged with the range of available evidence (such as duration of residence and residence five years previously) from the New Zealand and Australian censuses that can shed more light on Māori patterns of trans-Tasman migration.
Table 3: Australian-born Māori in Australian and New Zealand census totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>New Zealand census</th>
<th>Australian census</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Proportion of Australian-born Māori resident in New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
<td>% rise</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>% rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,069</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4,281</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>20,595</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,973</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>30,949</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without official confirmation, of course, the ongoing incidence of lost ancestries in the census is also a matter of some speculation. Be all that as it may, however, the identified 2006 Australian census results seem to indicate reasonably significant growth in the Māori population. If we conservatively nominated a growth rate of 20 percent (a figure that can easily be justified, it seems, by the combination of out-migration from New Zealand and natural increase in Australia due to the age profile of the population), the number of Māori in Australia in 2006 would have risen to at least 126,000. What proportion of all Māori this estimate may represent is taken up in the conclusion of the paper.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the geographic distribution of Māori in Australia, because significant changes have been taking place. As Table 1 shows above, Queensland has become the most populous state for Māori in Australia, while Victoria recorded a much higher rate of growth than Western Australia despite the supposed influx of Māori workers to the latter seeking employment in the mines. The quite dramatic movement, however, has been to south-east Queensland, and specifically to the Gold Coast. There the Māori ancestry population grew by a staggering 86 percent from 2001 to 2006, in comparison to the national average of 27.4 percent. This rate of growth was double the 42.8 percent increase in those identifying as “New Zealanders” on the Gold Coast. In Sydney, the traditional focal point for Māori living in Australia, the 12.3 percent increase was less than half the national average. Perhaps in keeping with this, the number of New Zealand-born in Sydney even decreased.
Counting Māori in Other Countries

In their 2004 article in this journal on trans-Tasman Māori migration, Richard Bedford, Robert Didham, Elsie Ho and Graeme Hugo estimated that there were likely to be “a further 15,000 [Māori] … resident in all other countries” besides Australia and New Zealand. They included within this estimate the likelihood of “several thousand Māori in the United Kingdom and Ireland, as well as some hundreds of people who might claim Maori ethnicity in the Pacific Islands” (2004:133-134). Professor Bedford’s more recent advice is that the figure of 15,000 was a “guess based on an assumption that there might be around 8,000 in the UK, 3,000 in the US, 2,000 in Canada, and 2,000 elsewhere (mainly in Asia)” (pers. comm. Richard Bedford, 15 August 2007).

In fact the estimate of there being 15,000 Māori spread throughout the rest of the world was a very fair one. Treasury research in 2004 into recent census returns for 20 selected countries found there to be 459,322 New Zealand-born people living in them (Bryant & Law 2004:3), which would represent the minimum number due to the census practice of certain countries. While nearly 80 percent of these were in Australia, that still left at least 103,557 New Zealand-born people in all other countries. Since overseas-born Māori will of course have been absent from these figures, the total of 15,000 Māori living outside New Zealand and Australia seems a reasonable proposition.

Some other methods can be employed to guess at the size of the Māori population in other countries, or at the least to gauge the rate of its growth. For example, as Bedford et al noted, 2,493 Māori in New Zealand in the 2001 census had been born in countries other than New Zealand or Australia, as had 1,023 Māori in the same year’s census in Australia (Bedford et al. 2004:134). There are some problems with these figures, such as no fewer than 654 of the Australian total being born in the Cook Islands and thus likely to be of sole Cook Island Māori ethnicity (Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 2003:65). A further 609 of the New Zealand total were born in the “Pacific Islands” and would thus have been largely in the same category. But while the Cook Island Māori proportion of the Māori ethnic and ancestry groups in New Zealand and Australia remains an issue, it is becoming less of one amongst those specifically born in third countries. The number of Cook Islands-born
Māori in Australia in 2006 was down to 540 (out of a group 27 percent bigger) (Department of Immigration and Citizenship n.d.:2) and the numbers of Pacific Islands-born Māori in the Māori ethnic group in New Zealand has declined from 1,059 in 1996 to 540 in 2006. Much of this change will reflect improved coding practices.

Otherwise, the country of birth of Māori in New Zealand born outside Australia and New Zealand certainly suggests the existence of sizeable populations (with fluctuations again likely to be as explicable by changing patterns of return migration as by the actual size of overseas communities). The figures are set out in the Table 4 below.

Table 4: Māori ethnic census group usually resident population born in countries other than New Zealand and Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Census year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom and Ireland</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some countries have in fact published census ethnicity or ancestry data that indicate the number of Māori usually resident in them. For example, in Canada in 2006 there were 1,555 people of Māori ethnic origin, including 120 who gave “Māori” as a single response and 1,430 who gave it as part of a multiple response.22 This represented a 32.9 percent rise from the 1,170 recorded in 2001, a higher rate of increase than the 21.7 percent for “New Zealanders”.23 On both occasions more than half the Māori tally lived in British Columbia, with other notable populations in Alberta and Ontario. Likewise, the United States census in 2000 asked respondents an open-ended question: “What is your ancestry or ethnic origin?” “Māori” was provided as a first response by 1,055 people and by 939 as a second, thus giving a total of 1,994 people. This contrasts with 16,628 “New Zealanders” and 22,872 New Zealand-born. It is likely that the largest number of Māori
were in California, where 29.4 percent of the New Zealand-born in the United States lived. The next highest number were in New York, with just 5.6 percent, followed by Texas, Washington (state), Florida and Utah.

There are other censuses where one can make an assumption about the approximate number of Māori based on the ethnic classification of New Zealand-born people or New Zealand nationals. In England and Wales in 2001 there were 158,488 people born in “Oceania”, which largely comprised those born in Australia and New Zealand. Anyone entering “New Zealander” (or “Australian”) in the census ethnicity question was coded as “other white” (as opposed to “white British” or “white Irish”), which problematically assumed that only Pākehā would self-identify as such. In any event, 94.7 percent of the Oceania-born were recorded as “white British”, “white Irish”, or “other white”.

Entries of “Māori”, along with those of “Aborigine” or Pacific ethnicities (as well indeed as Japanese, Afghanis, indigenous Americans and those nominating various south-east Asian nationalities), were coded as “other ethnic group”, of whom there were 2,571 individuals born in Oceania. Given the probability of some Māori having been coded as “other white” or being amongst the 37,163 United Kingdom-born people in the “other ethnic group” category, as well indeed as the likelihood of a reasonable number of Māori resident in England and Wales not answering the census, it seems that there may well have been at the very least several thousand Māori in England and Wales in 2001. What proportion they were of the 2,571 Oceania-born in the “other ethnic group” category can only be guessed, but in any event one would imagine they would be at least 5 to 10 percent of the 54,425 New Zealand-born recorded by the census.

The calculations are a little easier in the published statistics from the 2006 Irish census, in which there were 1,756 New Zealand nationals usually resident in Ireland counted on census night. Of these, 94 were recorded as “white Irish”, 1,259 as “any other white background” (presumably again including responses of “New Zealander”), 32 as either black or Asian, and 346 as “other including mixed background”. It seems logical to conclude that a significant proportion of this latter group were Māori.

One or two other sources of information indicate something of the number of Māori overseas. The 2006 Kea “Every One Counts” internet survey of New Zealand expatriates was filled in by 18,000 people, including
1,418 Māori spread across 57 countries. The self-selecting nature of the survey, however, makes the number of responses per country an unreliable gauge of the relative numbers of Māori in them. For example, there were 621 Māori respondents in Australia, but 391 in England and 132 in the United States, even though these latter two countries combined are likely to have less than a tenth the number of Māori that reside in Australia. This disproportionate response rate will reflect a range of factors, such as migrants to Australia feeling they have made a permanent move rather than a temporary one, and thus disconnecting on some levels from their homeland. The proximity of Australia to New Zealand will certainly also have made people feel less motivated to complete a survey of expatriates.

Much the same applies to the electoral enrolment data held by the Electoral Enrolment Centre. Thus there were 3,871 enrolled Māori descent electors with an overseas address on election day in 2005, and 2,933 or 75.8 percent were in Australia. While more accurate than the Kea survey, this again cannot be taken as a reliable reflection of the location of Māori overseas, for much the same reasons that apply to the survey sample. Both the survey and the enrolment figures are of interest, however, in showing the range of countries that the Māori diaspora has reached, from Sweden to Syria and Colombia to Kenya. They also seem to suggest that, outside Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, the largest numbers of Māori may be in Japan and Ireland. Other administrative data will doubtless tell a similar story, be it – for example – registered addresses of either iwi members or beneficiaries of the Māori Trustee.

**Conclusion**

The 2006 New Zealand census return for the Māori ethnic group was 565,829 people. After post-enumeration survey adjustments for those not captured by the census or the ethnicity question itself, as well as births and deaths since census night, the resident Māori ethnic group population was estimated at 30 June 2006 to be 624,000. If we combine this figure with the estimate of 126,000 Māori in Australia in 2006, as well as the further estimate of 15,000 Māori resident in all other countries, we arrive at a grand total of 765,000 Māori. This would mean that around 16.5 percent of all Māori were resident in Australia in 2006, a rise from the 14.8 percent reached from a similar calculation for 2001 (using the same 15,000 figure for
Māori in all other countries that year). On the basis of 413,500 Māori in Zealand and 26,000 in Australia in 1986, Lowe suggested that Māori in Australia that year were 5.9 percent of all Māori in the two countries (1990:8).

Put another way, in 1986 there were around one in 17 Māori in Australia out of the total number in Australia and New Zealand. By 2001 there were roughly one in seven of all Māori in Australia, and by 2006 there were around one in six. As Lowe pointed out in 1990, while just under 6 percent did not seem like a large proportion, it would only take a modest level of migration of Māori from New Zealand to Australia into the future for it to grow rapidly, given the youthful age profile of the Australian-resident Māori population and its associated high fertility and low mortality rates (1990:8). Few may have reflected at the time just how rapid this growth would be.

The figures appear to confirm that Māori society has, in part, an increasingly Australian future. They suggest that the characteristics of the Māori ethnic group will need to be considered on a trans-Tasman basis more than ever before, with all the challenges for compatible data capture that will entail. At the same time the number and habits of Māori in other countries should also be monitored, in order to extend our understanding of the Māori diaspora and learn what social, economic and cultural impact it has on those Māori who reside in New Zealand.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the helpful comments of Paul Callister and two anonymous reviewers on a draft of this paper.

Notes

1 The census data referred to in this paper were taken from information published and made freely available by Statistics New Zealand, the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the United States Census Bureau, Statistics Canada, the Office for National Statistics in England, and the Central Statistics Office in Ireland. The figures for Māori Kea survey respondents and overseas electors were provided directly by Kea in 2007 and the Electoral Enrolment Centre in 2008. The paper was not supported by the purchase of any census data. It draws heavily on chapters 3-6 of the author’s 2007 report for Te Puni Kōkiri, *Māori in Australia: Ngā Māori i Te Ao Moemoea*, and its structure follows for the most part a paper entitled “Tracking the Australian-Resident Māori..."

2 Of course such “push” factors could also equally be described as the “pull” factors that make life overseas attractive, such as better weather and relatively higher wages.

3 In forthcoming research the author will examine the impact on te reo of trans-Tasman migration.

4 Some historians (Binney 1987:15; Chappell 1997:36) refer to this abduction as taking place in 1793.

5 They doubtless continued to be a common presence as crew on trans-Tasman trading vessels, however.

6 Lowe did not consider the possibility of some Māori not having been counted by the census at all.

7 In fact the arrival and departure card data were not particularly reliable and, if anything, are quite likely to have understated the extent of Māori out-migration.

8 The state-by-state numbers and percentages for 1986 are based on a total of 24,449 rather than 26,035, after temporary visitors from overseas and those born in the Cook Islands or with both parents born in the Cook Islands are removed (Lowe 1990:8, 29).

9 The guide also introduced a new definition of ancestry, informing Australians that “Ancestry is not necessarily related to the place a person was born but is more the cultural group that they most closely identify with” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006:7). In similar fashion the 2006 New Zealand census guide stated that one characteristic of an “ethnic group” might be “a shared culture” (Statistics New Zealand 2006).

10 The effect of the tick boxes can be seen from “Scottish” increasing from 534,882 responses and an estimated 338,547 lost ancestries in 2001 to a 2006 total of 1,501,201.

11 Of course many Australian-born Māori will have the census filled in for them by their New Zealand-born parents, and it is a moot point as to what kind of responses this will elicit.

12 Māori are in any case more undercounted than non-Māori in the New Zealand census (Statistics New Zealand 2007:1).

13 The figures included only those who arrived in Australia prior to 1997, and had thus had time to become citizens.
14. In the author’s report for Te Puni Kōkiri (2007:32) the figure of 101,000 was suggested, which was based on a simpler equation of the official count plus the 2003 estimate of lost ancestries and an extra 12 percent for those Māori not identifying as such in the census.

15. That the 2001 ancestry tallies for “New Zealander” and “Māori” were more affected by lost ancestries than in 2006 is suggested by the returns for a city like Adelaide. There the New Zealand-born population growth was negligible from 2001 to 2006, but the “New Zealander” and “Māori” totals rose 29% and 25.6 percent respectively. Indeed, if one took the view that the 2006 ancestry tallies suffered relatively insignificantly from lost ancestries compared to 2001, then the 12.3 percent rise in the number of Māori in Sydney (see below) would in fact represent a population decline.

16. This figure includes an unknown number of temporary visitors from overseas (Lowe 1990:16).

17. This figure excludes temporary visitors from overseas. The number including such visitors was 4,070.

18. While some of these people may have been counted in both the New Zealand and Australian censuses (held in March and August respectively) due to moving between countries, they are probably equalled out by those counted in neither country for the same reason.

19. Given the incidence of “fly in, fly out” working lifestyles, increased numbers of Māori “living” on the Gold Coast and working in West Australian mines are not necessarily different phenomena. Whereas one would imagine that most workers who commute in this way would live in Perth or somewhere nearby in the temperate, south-west corner of Western Australia, there are certainly cases of Māori flying “in and out” across the continent.

20. This refers to the Gold Coast-Tweed statistical district.

21. Only those who have lived in the United Kingdom for a period of six months are obliged to fill in the census, for example (Balarajan and d’Ardenne 2008), thus meaning many expatriate New Zealanders living there do not.

22. Numbers do not add up evenly due to rounding.

23. In Canada in 2006 there were also 10,465 “New Zealanders”, a higher number than the New Zealand-born (9,415), which sits in contrast with Australia where the number answering “New Zealander” to the ancestry question has been well under half the number actually born in New Zealand.

24. Out of the total 54,425 were New Zealand-born, 98,772 were Australian-born, and 5,291 were “other Oceania”-born.

25. A 2007 approach by the author to the Office for National Statistics was met with the response that it was not possible to retrieve the number of people answering “Māori” to the census ethnicity question.
26. The remaining 25 people did not state an answer.

27. There were also 2,335 New Zealand-born people present, although a published ethnic breakdown for them has not been located.

References


HAMER

Attachment to Place in New Zealand*

CATHERINE J. SCHRODER†

Abstract
Attachment to place is believed to play a fundamental role in understanding residential mobility, however, there is still very little understanding of what attachment actually means, its dimensions, who is attached, and in what ways. This paper addresses each of these questions by analysing the results of a National Attachment Survey administered to 1001 people in New Zealand in 2005.1 The international literature on place attachment points to its multidimensionality. Collectively these are expressed in terms of attitudes (e.g. sentiment and satisfaction) and behaviour (formal and informal social networks). Based on the survey responses, principle components factor analysis is applied to retrieve five dimensions which are subsequently labelled sentiment, friends, relatives, participation in, and satisfaction with the community. Each of the five dimensions of attachment, are regressed on a suite of demographic variables revealing how different subpopulations are associated with different forms of attachment. Different characteristics of places were also found to invoke different dimensions of attachment, even after controlling for the characteristics of respondents. Both sets of results, for individuals and places, have important research and policy implications.

To be human is to live in a world that is filled with significant places: to be human is to have and to know your place.
Edward Relph (1976:1)

Attachment to place plays an ambiguous role in population geography. While stability dominates over much of the life course, it is population movement which pre-occupies our attention due to its association with often rapid changes in the structure of local populations. Although place attachment plays a fundamental role in understanding how and why people move, we do not know who is attached,

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how they are attached, or the role that place itself plays. This paper addresses each of these questions and generates a set of arguments that can now be applied to understanding mobility in a contemporary New Zealand context.

There are three motivating factors behind the extensive body of research that already exists on attachment to place. Firstly, attachment to the place is associated with subjective wellbeing. Secondly, it is linked closely to community development. Thirdly, attachment to place tends to be inversely related to migration as well as residential mobility. All three have potential public policy significance, most notably through the relationship between transience and attachment and the role of community services.

The objective of this paper, and the thesis on which it is based (Schroder 2005), has been to investigate both the measurement and determinants of place attachment in the New Zealand context. This discussion takes place in five sections. It begins by reviewing the literature and introducing the National Attachment Survey. In the main body of the paper the dimensions of place attachment are derived and then the association that individual characteristics and those of place have with these dimensions are examined. The conclusion summarises the argument and the evidence.

**Literature Review**

The multi-disciplinary preoccupation with place attachment is voluminous but also extremely fragmented. There is little consensus around the definition, measurement, or determinants of attachment. There is, similarly, no consistently used approach to the study of place attachment either theoretically or empirically.

The multi-paradigmatic and methodologically diverse nature of the research on place attachment has been noted by a number of commentators including Hummon (1992), Theodori (2000), and Hidalgo and Hernandez (2001). As they observe, there is a proliferation of concepts and terms such as sense of place, community satisfaction, community sentiment, community ties, sentimental attachment, and place identity. Many of these terms overlap and often terms are used interchangeably so that it is difficult to tell whether the same concept is being referred to (Hidalgo & Hernández 2001).
Not surprisingly, several researchers have argued that this terminological and conceptual confusion has blocked advances within the field (e.g. Giuliani & Feldman 1993; Lalli 1992).

Despite the multiple definitions, place attachment is generally understood to refer to the affective bond or link between people and specific places. For example, Shumaker and Taylor (1983:233) define attachment as “a positive affective bond or association between individuals and their residential environment” whilst Low and Altman (1992) refer to place attachment as an individual’s cognitive or emotional connection to a particular setting or milieu.

The devil however is in the detail and much of the debate centres around which dimensions and how many dimensions comprise attachment. There are many different ways individuals can be attached to an area and these ways are not always strongly related to each other. Not surprisingly, therefore, many studies have attempted to define their own dimensions of attachment (e.g. Cross 2003; Gerson et al. 1977; Riger & Lavrakas 1981; Ringel & Finkelstein 1991).

Rather than trying to agree on a single meaning, it has become more common to use multiple indicators of attachment. Measures of individuals feelings towards place, or the affective dimension, have dominated the analysis of place attachment, however, measures of social interaction, social involvement, and satisfaction with the community are now in widespread use.

Nevertheless, there is still no consensus as to how to measure attachment and no one set of indicators has been accepted as standard. Having said that, it is common to find measures of attachment broken down into two categories: attitudinal and behavioural (Sampson 1988; Stinner et al. 1990; Woolever 1992). Attitudinal attachment measures reflect an individual’s sentiments towards the area and their evaluation and satisfaction with the area whereas behavioural attachment measures reflect an individual’s involvement and interaction with the area. Behavioural measures have in turn been divided into formal involvement (involvement with the community, such as membership of local organisations) and social interaction with friends, relatives, and neighbours (Bolan 1997; Landale and Guest 1985; Woldoff 2002).
**Attitudinal Measures of Attachment**

Three main measures of sentimental attachment have been identified. First introduced by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974), they have since been adopted by numerous other researchers (e.g. Austin & Baba 1990; Gerson *et al.* 1977; Goudy 1982; Goudy 1990; Theodori & Luloff 2000). The first of these measures identifies whether or not the respondent feels ‘at home’ in their community. The second asks the respondents, ‘to what extent they are interested in knowing what is happening in their community’. The third, and most widely used, asks how sorry or pleased the respondent would be if they had to move away from their community.

Other measures of sentimental attachment include how attached the individual feels towards the local neighbourhood (Ringel & Finkelstein 1991), whether they feel like part of the community (Austin & Baba 1990), whether there is a sense of community spirit (Robinson & Wilkinson 1997), a sense of belonging (Woolever 1992), and pride in the area (Mesch & Manor 1998). A number of studies have asked respondents to rate their satisfaction with a large variety of neighbourhood characteristics. Examples of these neighbourhood characteristics include employment opportunities (Filkins *et al.* 2000; McAuley & Nutty 1982), healthcare (Parkes & Kearns 2002; Whorton & Moore 1984), and local education (Theodori 2001; Wasserman 1982).

**Behavioural Measures of Attachment**

Behavioural measures of attachment can be divided into two categories: formal involvement and informal interaction. Examples of formal involvement include participation in local organisations (Beggs *et al.* 1996), undertaking volunteer work (Cuba & Hummon 1993), and knowledge of local government (Kang & Kwak 2003).

Informal involvement with the community refers to an individual’s social interaction with other individuals (such as family, friends, and neighbours) residing in the local area. Previous studies have often relied on local friendship ties as indicators of attachment and the majority of studies include some measure of local social networks. Community attachment, in a number of studies, is often measured solely by using social interaction variables (Brown 1993; Goudy 1990).
Local social involvement has proved to be the most consistent and significant source of sentimental ties to the community or neighbourhood (Goudy 1982; Goudy 1990; Landale & Guest 1985; St. John et al. 1986). Gerson et al. (1977) found that voluntary ties, such as those with neighbouring and local friends, are the most effective in promoting feelings of attachment. The number of friends an individual has in the local area has been shown to be the most important type of social bond influencing community sentiments (Kasarda & Janowitz 1974). There are also strong associations between the interpersonal (social interactions) and sentiment dimensions and social relationships themselves are related to and are an important part of the development of place attachment (Mesch & Manor 1998).

In summary, although the literature on place attachment is fragmented, it remains focused around the general definition of attachment as an affective bond or link between people and specific places. The attitudinal measures relate to the attitudes, feelings, and sentiments individuals have towards their community as well as their satisfaction with the community. Behavioural measures, on the other hand, refer to the individual’s social interaction and formal involvement with the community. No consensus exists, however, as to how these measures relate to particular kinds of people or places.

**Determinants of Place Attachment**

Place attachment is modelled in this paper as a function of two primary drivers: the characteristics and behaviour of the individuals themselves (their age, sex, family characteristics etc.) and the characteristics of places they live in (conventionally size and type of settlement).

It is the characteristics of the individual which have dominated the research on attachment. These include length of residence, socio-demographic characteristics, economic characteristics, life course characteristics, and home ownership. Many studies have found length of residence to be one of the most important determinants of community attachment, including Austin and Baba (1990), Beggs et al. (1996), Brown (1993), Goudy (1982), Goudy (1990), Kasarda and Janowitz (1974), Lalli (1992), Sampson (1988), St John et al. (1986), and Theodori (2001). There are interpretative problems with this variable, however, including its high
collinearity with age of respondent. More importantly stability can also be a reflection of positive attachment and modelling it simply as a cause is problematic. For this reason length of residence is not included as one of the ‘determinants’ of attachment in this paper.

Socio-demographic characteristics have been included in the majority of studies on attachment to place (Gerson et al. 1977; Riger & Lavrakas 1981). Those used to predict attachment include age, sex, ethnicity, religious status, and education.

Previous research has found that those individuals with higher economic status engage in higher levels of social participation but that they also carry higher expectations for the community. Other socio-economic determinants include income (Taylor et al. 1985), employment (Filkins et al. 2000), and housing tenure (Speare 1974).

The presence of children in the household leads to stronger attachments with the community and is an incentive for increased parental involvement in community events and associations (for example Bolan 1997; Theodori & Luloff 2000).

A number of place related factors have also been correlated with place attachment. These include size of the settlement (Buttel et al. 1979), housing (Parkes et al. 2002), economic conditions (Beggs et al. 1996), cultural factors (Gerson et al. 1977), environmental factors (Fried 1982), neighbourhood conditions (Woldoff 2002), and community infrastructure conditions (Rothenbuhler et al. 1996).

With the above research in mind the following Attachment Survey was developed in order to better understand the nature of place attachment in the New Zealand context.

The Attachment Survey

This paper draws on a survey which was developed by the Centre of Research, Evaluation, and Social Assessment (CRESA) research team as part of their FRST funded project entitled Building Attachment in Families and Communities Affected by Transience and Residential Mobility. The Survey was designed to obtain a broad national baseline of individual’s attachment to their residential location.

Telephone interviews were carried out under contract by National Research Bureau Ltd (NRB) in early 2005. A total of 1001 individuals above
the age of 15 were selected at random using the national phone directories. Stratification was done in proportion to the population within each regional council area in order to approximate the distribution of respondent's location throughout urban and rural New Zealand (see Figure 1).

The Attachment Survey instrument included a range of 35 questions and took approximately 15 minutes to complete. One set of questions was designed to associate respondents with their community while the other set addressed their behaviour within the community.

Figure 1: The geographical spread of the respondents to the attachment survey
A number of questions in the Attachment Survey collected the characteristics of individual respondents including age, gender, ethnicity, employment, home ownership, household composition, and income. The sample data set has an equal distribution of men and women and approximately 85 percent of respondents identify themselves as New Zealand European (compared with 75 percent nationally), however there is an under representation of New Zealand Māori. Approximately 30 percent of the respondents had dependent children living within their households, and nearly two thirds of the respondents were employed in full or part time work. A fifth (21 percent) of respondents earned less than $15,000 (although half of these were aged over 60) whilst 13 percent of respondents earned over $70,000. Finally, 80 percent of respondents owned their own home with or without a mortgage, slightly more than the census count of 2001.

As is quite common in telephone surveys, this data set has an over representation of older individuals and an under representation of young people (Table 1), the latter having a range of reasons for not participating including temporary absence from the household.

Table 1: Age group breakdown for the 2001 Census distribution and the attachment survey sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>2001 Census pop</th>
<th>2001 Census %</th>
<th>Survey Pop</th>
<th>Survey %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>265,281</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years</td>
<td>486,687</td>
<td>16.84</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>576,738</td>
<td>19.96</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>537,405</td>
<td>18.60</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years</td>
<td>418,431</td>
<td>14.48</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 years &amp; over</td>
<td>604,995</td>
<td>20.94</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,889,537</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately a third of the sample (326 respondents) were over the age of 60 compared to only 21 percent nationally. Nine percent of the national population is between the ages of 15 and 19 while there is only 0.6 percent of the survey sample is within the same age group. Thus, while not biasing the estimates of individuals or place effects on attachment measures, overall level of attachment levels calculated from this survey will be biased upwards as a result of the greater proportion of older households.
Representing Attachment

As noted above, the literature identifies two distinct groups of attachment measures: *attitudinal* measures which relate to the sentiments individuals have towards their community as well as their satisfaction with the community, and *behavioural* measures which refer to the individual’s social interaction and formal involvement with the community. The questions measuring attitudinal attachment are reproduced in Table 2. Responses to question one, ‘feeling at home’, were coded as either yes (1) or no (0). Question two, ‘sorrow on leaving’, was measured on a five point Likert scale ranging from ‘very pleased to leave’ to ‘very sorry to leave’. The remaining 11 questions were measured on a five point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’.

**Table 2: Attitudinal attachment questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Do you feel settled or “at home” in this area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Suppose for some reason that you had to move away from the area, how would you feel?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>I am interested in what goes on in this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>I would recommend this as a place to live</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>I feel safe here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>I have the opportunity to have a real say on local issues that are important to me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>People here would help me out with a community project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>There is a strong community spirit here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>I would be prepared to help out with a community project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Local leaders are doing a good job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>I am satisfied with job and business opportunities for me here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>I am satisfied with health services here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Education services are satisfactory here</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questions measuring behavioural attachment are shown in Table 3. The responses to the majority of these questions were coded either yes (1) or no (0). The four questions relating to the amount of interaction with friends and relatives (questions 18, 19, 21, and 22) were measured using the four categories: ‘4 times or more’, ‘1 to 3 times’, ‘did not visit or see friends/relatives’, and ‘no friends/relatives in the area’.
From the initial frequency distribution of the 25 attachment variables it was clear that New Zealanders as a whole felt very positively about their communities. Spread throughout the country, and over all age groups, the level of positive sentiment towards those living in the same area appears very strong.

Table 3: Behavioural attachment questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Do you belong to a community organisation, club or group in this area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>In the past year, did you give money to a community organisation, located or working in the area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Are you involved in any local voluntary work in the area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Do you have any friends who live in the area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>In the last month, how many times did you meet up with, or visit with such friends?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>In the last month, how many times did you talk on the phone, or cellphone, text message or email these friends?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Do you have relatives who live in the area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>In the last month, how many times did you meet up with, or visit these relatives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>In the last month, how many times did you talk on the phone, or cellphone, text message or email these relatives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Have you spoken with a neighbour in the last week?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>In the last month, have you been to church in the area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>In the last month, have you been to a Marae in the area?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority (96 percent) felt settled or at home in their community and most were indeed interested in what was happening in their community (92 percent). Nearly three quarters (73 percent) of respondents said they would be sorry to leave the community while most were satisfied with job and business opportunities, fewer were satisfied with health and education services.

In terms of formal involvement, approximately half of all respondents belonged to a local organisation and 30 percent of respondents were actively involved in voluntary work in their local community. In terms of informal interaction, the majority (over 80 percent) had friends in the community and 40 percent of respondents had relatives living locally. Interaction with neighbours appears high at nearly 85 percent. Thus while levels of formal engagement through membership and participation was
limited, informal interaction appears relatively high and in line with much of the international evidence.

**Reducing the Dimensionality of Attachment**

Three main methods have been used within the literature to generate summary measures of attachment. In a number of studies the responses to each question on place attachment were used as individual measures of attachment (e.g. Austin & Baba 1990; Brown 1993; Goudy 1990; Mesch & Manor 1998; Theodori 2001). In a second approach, individual variables were combined to form a single scale of attachment (e.g. Buttel *et al.* 1979; Crenshaw & St. John 1989; Liu & Zhang 1999).

A third approach has been to apply factor analysis to responses to the attachment question in order to identify a smaller set of dimensions (for example Armstrong & Taylor 1985; Brehm *et al.* 2004; Landale & Guest 1985; Wasserman 1982). Additionally, research on the decision to migrate from the 1960s had a strong behavioural dimension to it and a range of techniques (including factor and principal components analysis) were used to try and isolate dimensions of place and attachment to place which helped explain why some people moved while others stayed in place (e.g. Wolpert 1965). With the interest of this paper being the multidimensional nature of attachment and their determinants, it is this last approach which is used here.

The first step in identifying the dimensionality of the attachment measures involved generating the inter-correlation matrix with high correlations showing up particularly among the social interaction variables. The correlations between the three variables measuring friendships networks are approximately 0.8, whilst the correlations between the three variables measuring family networks are very close to one, approximately 0.97. As a result two variables relating to friends and relatives living in the area were removed from the analysis. This reduced the number of variables used in the analysis from 25 to 23.

Principal component factor analysis was applied in order to reduce the 25 indicators to a smaller set that still captured the essential variation present in the original measures. The principal components method extracts, from a correlation matrix, a smaller set of factors which capture
the main axes of variation in the full set of 23 attachment measures. Table 4 shows the total variance explained by the factor analysis solution.

Table 4: Total variance of the 23 variables explained by the factor analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.804</td>
<td>1.477</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.327</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.716</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.497</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.237</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.148</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.132</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of Cattell’s Scree Plot (Figure 2) (Cattell 1966), it was decided that five factors should be retained covering approximately 46 percent of the common variance.

Factor loadings indicate the strength of the correlation between each of the five factors and the 23 variables. Due to the lack of interpretability and ambiguous nature of the initial factor loadings derived, a varimax rotation was applied to the data. A varimax rotation simplifies the interpretation of the factors by reducing the number of variables that have high loadings on each factor.
Figure 2: Cattell’s screen plot for the factor analysis of the 23 attachment variables

The results are shown in Table 5. Interpretation of each of the dimensions focuses on the loadings themselves. The variables that are of importance to each factor are those that have a high correlation value (and are shaded in Table 5).
Table 5: Rotated varimax factor loadings for the five factors of the 23 attachment variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SettledHome</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterestOn</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FeeMoveAway</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PlaceLive</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FeelSafe</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SayLocalIssues</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HelpEmerg</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CommSpirit</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CommProject</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LocalLeaders</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SatJobBusOpp</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SatHealthServ</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>0.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EducationSat</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BelongClub</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ContribMoney</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoluntaryWk</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VisitFriends</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TalkFriends</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VisitRelative</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TalkRelative</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TalkNeighbor</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChurchMonth</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaraeMonth</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the highest loadings on each factor they were labelled as follows:

1. Sentiments - Feelings about the community
2. Friends - Intensity of interaction with friends in the area
3. Relatives - Intensity of interaction with relatives in the area
4. Participation - Involvement in the community including the Church
5. Satisfaction - Satisfaction with local services and local community issues

These five dimensions each constituted a separate *dependent* variable for regression on possible individual and place determinants. In preparation for this regression each dimension was tested for normality. Two graphs were developed and analysed. The univariate graphs showed that the sentiments,
participation, and satisfaction dimensions were approximately normally distributed and linear regression was subsequently applied.

The friends and relatives dimensions, however, were both bi-modal. Hence, they were more appropriately represented as binary variables in a logistic regression. The first was, “do you have friends who live in the area?” and the second was, “do you have relatives who live in the area?”

**Accounting for Dimensions of Attachment**

A wide range of possible factors influence an individual’s level of attachment to place and includes the attributes of the respondents themselves as well as their community. In this New Zealand survey, respondents indicated whether they lived in a city, town, or rural area and, if they lived in a city, they were asked the name of their suburb. These areas were then assigned to one of seven classifications from the urban and rural profile of New Zealand (Table 6).³

**Table 6: Urban and rural classification of respondents’ residential locations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Rural Classification</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main urban area</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent urban community</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite urban community</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area with high urban influence</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area with moderate urban influence</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area with low urban influence</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly rural/remote area</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table is out of 1000 as the Chatham Islands are not included in the urban rural profile of New Zealand.

Urban areas were defined either as main urban areas, satellite urban communities, or independent urban communities according to the Statistics New Zealand classification. Main urban areas represent the areas that are most urbanised in New Zealand and have a minimum population of 30,000 people. Satellite urban communities represent areas that have strong and significant links to the main urban centres.
Finally, independent urban communities represent towns that do not have any significant link or dependence on a main urban centre. Rural areas, in turn, are divided into four categories: rural areas with high urban influence, rural areas with moderate urban influence, rural areas with low urban influence, and highly rural/remote areas.

Approximately 83 percent of respondents were located within urban areas, whilst 68 percent lived in one of the main urban areas. In total, approximately 58 percent of the respondents were located within the Auckland, Wellington, and Canterbury Regional Councils boundaries, and three quarters of respondents were located in the North Island.

In addition to settlement type this research also wanted to capture the relative socioeconomic context of the area units in which respondents lived. Indexed from a series of socioeconomic variables the deprivation index provides one approach to conceptualising and measuring the broader construct of socioeconomic position (Crampton et al. 2004). Constructed to house ten percent of area units within each decile, the index runs from the highest level of deprivation 1 through to the lowest 10. Within the survey sample there turned out to be a much larger proportion of 8 and 9 level communities than would be expected on the basis of a random drawing of area units. Similarly, there is an under count of levels 1, 4, 5, and 10. Communities at the two extremes, therefore, are underrepresented (Table 7).

Table 7: Deprivation index classification for respondent’s communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deprivation Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Standard linear and logistic regressions were used to analyse the relative influence these characteristics had on each of the five place attachment measures. These variables together with the characteristics of area units are listed in Table 8. With one exception, population size, these are dichotomous predictors.

Table 8: Breakdown of the independent variables used within the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-Demographic Characteristics</th>
<th>Variable Categories</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Num Obs</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td>15-19 Years</td>
<td>age_15_19</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-29 Years</td>
<td>age_20_29</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-39 Years</td>
<td>age_30_39</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40-49 Years</td>
<td>age_40_49</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50-59 Years</td>
<td>age_50_59</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 Years and Over</td>
<td>age_60_over</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Dependent Children</td>
<td>family</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income groups</td>
<td>$15,000 or less</td>
<td>income_less15</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$15,001 to $25,000</td>
<td>income_15_25</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$25,001 to $40,000</td>
<td>income_25_40</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$40,001 to $70,000</td>
<td>income_40_70</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$70,001 or more</td>
<td>income_70more</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>ownhouse</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>New Zealand European</td>
<td>NZEuropean</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand Māori</td>
<td>NZMāori</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand European and New Zealand Māori</td>
<td>NZEuroMāori</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other European Ethnicity</td>
<td>OtherEuro</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ethnicity</td>
<td>OtherEthnicity</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Employed in full or part-time work</td>
<td>Emp_FullParttime</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not employed in paid work, but searching for paid work</td>
<td>Emp_Searching</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not available for paid work</td>
<td>Emp_NotAvail</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Retired household</td>
<td>retiredHH</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The reference group for the categorical explanatory variables is a New Zealand European male who lives in a main urban area of medium deprivation, is aged between 40 and 49 and has an income of $40,000 to $70,000 per annum.

Five separate analyses were undertaken in which each of the five dimensions of place attachment identified through the factor analysis above (sentiments, friends, relatives, participants and satisfaction) were regressed on the same set of individuals and place based arguments. As the following results clearly show, attachment is intrinsically multidimensional with different kinds of attachment having different determinants.
Sentiments Dimension

The sentiment dimension refers to the affective bond or emotional connection with specific places. It combines how respondents feel about moving away, how strongly one might recommend the area as a place to live, feelings of safety, availability of emergency help, and the strength of community spirit. What is learnt from regressing this factor on the independent variables listed in Table 8 is that the respondent’s age plays a substantial positive role in accounting for emotional attachment, a finding that supports the results of Goudy (1990) among others. When it comes to sentimental attachment, however, New Zealand Europeans are much more likely to report positive feelings towards their community than other ethnic groups (Table 9). Although on the margins in terms of the chosen level of significance, it is also worth noting the strong negative, weak sentimental place attachment also exhibited by those of Other Ethnicity (against the New Zealand European base). Of the other individual attributes income has little clear effect, neither does gender nor the variables measuring engagement in the labour force.

People’s sentimental attachment is also affected by the type of place they live in: the smaller the place the more positive the sentiment. And, the further the residents live from the influence of main urban centres the more emotionally attached they appear to be. For example, those living in independent urban communities (134 respondents) exhibited half a standard score improvement on the sentiments dimension over those individuals living in the main urban areas. Although not shown in these results, when the variables representing residence in one of the three main centres were added, those living in Wellington exhibit significantly higher level of place attachment.

A third feature of place is its socio-economic position, measured here by it deprivation index. Areas of very high deprivation scores were associated with significantly lower levels of sentiment. The more socio-economically deprived a place is, the lower the level of sentimental attachment exhibited by its residents and note that this is after controlling for the respondents own socio-economic characteristics as well as the size and type of settlement.

An additional major influence on sentimental attachment is tenure. Previous research has noted that home ownership has a positive effect on
community attachment (Gerson et al. 1977; Speare 1974) and including home ownership in the model confirms the broad consensus in the literature that investment through tenure does enhance feelings of sentimental attachment.5

In summary, sentimental attachment to places is held most strongly by older respondents and among European New Zealanders but gender, family, income, and employment play little independent role. When it comes to the characteristics of the places themselves, all three dimensions matter: the size of settlement, the degree of urban influence and the level of deprivation. Smaller settlements or higher socio-economic status further from metropolitan centres appear to engender higher levels of sentimental attachment – after controlling for the other variables in the model.
Table 9: Regression of independent variables against the sentiments dimension of place attachment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef. (t-value)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Coef. (t-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of obs = 908</td>
<td>R-squared = 0.126</td>
<td>Adj R-squared = 0.097</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f1_sent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_15_19</td>
<td>-0.643 (-1.31)</td>
<td>age_20_29</td>
<td>-0.264 (-1.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_30_39</td>
<td>-0.131 (-1.27)</td>
<td>age_50_59</td>
<td>-0.223 (-2.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_60_over</td>
<td>-0.320 (-2.51)</td>
<td>family</td>
<td>-0.081 (-1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_less15</td>
<td>-0.100 (-0.89)</td>
<td>income_15_25</td>
<td>-0.216 (-1.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_25_40</td>
<td>-0.058 (-0.61)</td>
<td>income_70more</td>
<td>-0.019 (-0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ownhouse</td>
<td>0.200* (2.32)</td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.032 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZMāori</td>
<td>0.012 (0.07)</td>
<td>NZEuroMāori</td>
<td>-0.523** (-3.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherEuro</td>
<td>0.030 (0.20)</td>
<td>OtherEthnicity</td>
<td>-0.250 (-1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp_Seaching</td>
<td>-0.140 (-0.86)</td>
<td>Emp_NotAvail</td>
<td>-0.035 (-0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retiredHH</td>
<td>-0.019 (-0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. PLACE EFFECTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_Satellite</td>
<td>0.109 (0.44)</td>
<td>ur_IndepUrban</td>
<td>0.471** (4.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralHigh</td>
<td>0.072 (0.30)</td>
<td>ur_RuralMod</td>
<td>0.301* (1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralLow</td>
<td>0.444** (3.36)</td>
<td>ur_HighRural</td>
<td>0.444* (2.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_vlow</td>
<td>0.067 (0.51)</td>
<td>dep_low</td>
<td>0.200 (1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_high</td>
<td>-0.131 (-1.17)</td>
<td>dep_vhigh</td>
<td>-0.207* (-1.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.127 (0.82)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Friends Dimension

Social involvement with friends has been identified in the literature as one of the most powerful indicators of place attachment (Gerson et al. 1977). As noted earlier the friends dimension was bi-modal and therefore logistic regression was applied to the binary responses of a representative question loading on this factor.

For this dimension age plays no statistically significant role (although the importance of friendship rises positively with age), and again, neither does employment nor income. What does matter is family. Having dependent children in the family increases the likelihood that friendships bind the respondent to the community. The result is strong and significant statistically, as is apparent in Table 10. The odds of being attached by friends increases by 1.7 times if children are present in the household, a finding that reaffirms similar findings elsewhere (Gerson et al. 1977; McAuley & Nutty 1985). When it comes to friendship as the basis of attachment, home ownership again appears to have an independent, positive influence, doubling the likelihood of having friends. Substantively this makes sense; home ownership denotes commitment to an area and is a signal of future presence which makes investment in making friends more worthwhile.

In terms of ethnicity, when it comes to friendship, Māori appeared substantially more attached than the New Zealand Europeans in the sample. As with the sentiments dimension, it is found that the odds of having friends in the area rises with age (although the results are not significant). Income and the remaining variables such as employment continue to have little discernable effect.
Table 10: Logistic regression of the independent variables against the friends’ dimension of place attachment

| Number of obs | 904 |
| Degree of freedom | 28 |
| Chi-squared | 58.64 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.083 |

**INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FriendsArea</th>
<th>OddsRatio (z-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>age_20_29</td>
<td>1.083 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_30_39</td>
<td>1.023 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_50_59</td>
<td>1.764 (1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_60_over</td>
<td>2.200 (1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>1.723* (2.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_less15</td>
<td>0.823 (-0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_15_25</td>
<td>1.332 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_25_40</td>
<td>0.913 (-0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_70more</td>
<td>1.409 (0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ownhouse</td>
<td>1.976** (2.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.780 (-1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZMāori</td>
<td>7.381* (1.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZEuroMāori</td>
<td>0.562 (-1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherEuro</td>
<td>1.127 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherEthnicity</td>
<td>0.642 (-1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp_Seaching</td>
<td>1.728 (0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp_NotAvail</td>
<td>1.118 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retiredHH</td>
<td>0.810 (-0.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PLACE EFFECTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FriendsArea</th>
<th>OddsRatio (z-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ur_Satellite</td>
<td>1.275 (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_IndepUrban</td>
<td>4.501** (3.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralHigh</td>
<td>0.541 (-0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralMod</td>
<td>1.201 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralLow</td>
<td>1.349 (0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_HighRural</td>
<td>1.170 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_vlow</td>
<td>0.468 (-1.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_low</td>
<td>0.349* (-2.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_high</td>
<td>0.357* (-2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_vhigh</td>
<td>0.530 (-1.49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Again, place matters - in terms of type of settlement, those living in independent urban centres were four and a half times more likely to have friends in the area than those living in the main urban areas, controlling for all other variables in the model. Interestingly, the likelihood of respondents living in either rural areas with high urban influence or highly remote rural areas having friends declines in comparison to the main urban areas (Table 10). Finally, the influence of the area's deprivation level is curious. Deprivation most negatively affects friendship at the extremes, in areas of relatively high and low deprivation – relative to the median. It is, however, in these areas either side of the median where difference in stability is significant.

In summary, when it comes to place attachment friendship matters, particularly to Māori and increasingly so with age and among those who own their own home. Place also matters although in ways which require further investigation.

**Relatives Dimension**

The relatives dimension was bi-modal and therefore logistic regression was applied to the binary variable that measured whether the respondents had relatives living within the community or not. When age was entered into this model respondents aged 60 and over were again found to be significantly more attached to the area (Table 11).
Table 11: Logistic regression of the independent variables against the relative dimension of place attachment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RelativeArea</th>
<th>OddsRatio (z-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of obs  = 908</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of freedom = 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared = 90.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared = 0.074</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>age_15_19</td>
<td>2.274 (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_20_29</td>
<td>1.683 (1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_30_39</td>
<td>1.109 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_50_59</td>
<td>1.340 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_60_over</td>
<td>2.278** (2.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>1.416* (1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_less15</td>
<td>1.061 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_15_25</td>
<td>1.253 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_25_40</td>
<td>1.094 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_70more</td>
<td>0.836 (-0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ownhouse</td>
<td>1.347 (1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>1.523** (2.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZMāori</td>
<td>2.632** (2.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZEuroMāori</td>
<td>1.486 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherEuro</td>
<td>0.781 (-0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherEthnicity</td>
<td>0.538 (-1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp_Seaching</td>
<td>0.954 (-0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp_NotAvail</td>
<td>0.944 (-0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retiredHH</td>
<td>0.994 (-0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. PLACE EFFECTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ur_IndepUrban</td>
<td>2.661** (4.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_Satellite</td>
<td>1.271 (0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralHigh</td>
<td>0.361 (-1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralLow</td>
<td>1.604 (1.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralMod</td>
<td>1.589 (1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_HighRural</td>
<td>1.055 (0.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>dep_vlow</td>
<td>0.665 (-1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_low</td>
<td>0.893 (-0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_high</td>
<td>0.674 (-1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_vhigh</td>
<td>0.631* (-1.98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
The expectation was that women would be more highly attached to the community through social involvement (Beggs et al. 1996) and the results confirm this expectation with women being 1.5 times more attached via relatives.

Following the literature on the importance of children in generating attachment to the local areas (Gerson et al. 1977) it is found that having a child present in the family is associated with the likelihood of having other relatives in the area. The odds of being attached via relatives increases 1.4 times if children are present in the household.

The expectation that New Zealand Māori would be more attached to the area via relatives than any other ethnicities was also confirmed with New Zealand Māori showing a strong statistically significant effect on relative attachment; identifying as New Zealand Māori raises the likely importance of family 2.6 times over the European base. Once again, neither income nor labour market engagement or other characteristics of the individual had any statistically significant effect on attachment via this dimension.

In terms of settlement type however, independent urban communities and rural areas with moderate urban influence did have a significant influence. Living in Independent Urban Centres seems to increase the odds of being attached to the community via family 2.6 times relative to the base of Main Urban Areas.

The level of place deprivation again had a negative effect on attachment, however, this time via relatives. The odds of respondents in high deprivation areas, being attached to the community via relatives is significantly less than those respondents in areas with less deprivation. This is an interesting result given the generalisation often voiced about the relative importance of proximate family in areas of lower socio-economic status. It is a finding worth much closer inspection for its potential policy relevance.

**Participation Dimension**

The relationship between formal participation and attachment has been addressed in several studies (e.g. Cuba & Hummon 1993). The participation dimension is roughly normally distributed and linear regression was used to estimate the model of influence.
Two age groups were positive and statistically significant: those aged between 20 and 29 and those aged 60 and over (Table 12). Those under the age of 40 showed lower levels of participation than the base 40-49 year olds, whilst those 50 and over exhibited a higher propensity to participate. These results support the findings of Pretty et al. (2003) and Sampson (1988) who found that older individuals were more likely to participate in community activities.

It has often been suggested that the presence of children within the household is an incentive for increased parental involvement with the community (Gerson et al. 1977; McAuley & Nutty 1985). The a priori expectation was that the presence of children within the household would have a significant effect on the respondent’s level of attachment via participation and this was confirmed. Once again, neither income nor employment had any statistical influence on this form of place attachment.

In terms of place effects, independent urban centres, rural areas with high urban influence, and rural areas with low urban influence each experienced higher levels of attachment via participation relative to the main urban areas. This time the deprivation rating of the respondent’s area unit had no statistically significant influence on attachment. Implicitly people in low and high deprivation areas are equally likely to engage in community activities.
Table 12: Regression of the independent variables against the participation dimension of place attachment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef. (t-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of obs</strong></td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-squared</strong></td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj R-squared</strong></td>
<td>0.070</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>f4_part</th>
<th>Coef. (t-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>age_15_19</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>age_20_29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>age_30_39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>age_50_59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>age_60_over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income_les</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income_25_40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income_70more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ownhouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NZMāori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NZEuroMāori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OtherEuro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OtherEthnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emp_Seaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emp_NotAvail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>retiredHH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>PLACE EFFECTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ur_IndepUrban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ur_Satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ur_RuralHigh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ur_RuralLow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ur_RuralMod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ur_HighRural</td>
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<td>dep_vlow</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dep_low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dep_high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dep_vhigh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>_cons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
\textit{Satisfaction Dimension}

The fifth and final measure of attachment registered the respondent’s level of satisfaction with the area. This has been identified as one of the key dimensions of place attachment in a majority of the literature (Goudy 1982; Mesch & Manor 1998; Woldoff 2002). Only one age group related significantly to attachment via this dimension, those aged 60 and over (Table 13). In fact there is a notable U shape between satisfaction and age. Those individuals in the young ages (aged 15 to 19 and 20 to 29) and those in the older categories (aged 60 and over) had greater levels of attachment through satisfaction than those in the middle. None of the individual effects played a statistically significant role although many of the signs are similar to those observed above.

Nor did this dimension produce any significant relationship between the place and satisfaction. Interestingly, however, when separate metropolitan identifiers were added to the model, residents in Auckland, the largest urban centre, emerged as significantly less satisfied with the area than individuals living in either Wellington or Christchurch. A result which independently supports the findings of the 2004 Quality of Life Survey (Morrison 2007).
Table 13: Regression of the independent variables against the satisfaction dimension of place attachment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>(t-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of obs</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-squared</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj R-squared</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>f5_sat</strong></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>(t-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>a. <strong>INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_15_19</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_20_29</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_30_39</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>(-0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_50_59</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>(-0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_60_over</td>
<td>0.315*</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_less15</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_15_25</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>(-1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_25_40</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income_70more</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>(-0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ownhouse</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZMāori</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZEuroMāori</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>(-1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherEuro</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>(-1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OtherEthnicity</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Emp_Seaching</td>
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<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emp_NotAvail</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>(-0.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retiredHH</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>(-0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. <strong>PLACE EFFECTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_IndepUrban</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_Satellite</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralHigh</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>(-1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralLow</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_RuralMod</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ur_HighRural</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>(-1.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_vlow</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_low</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>(-0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_high</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dep_vhigh</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>(-1.43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Conclusion

Whilst stability plays a significant role in understanding how and why people move, there is little understanding of individuals' attachment to place. This paper is confined to identifying the main dimensions of attachment and what drives attachment: who is attached, how they are attached, and the role that the characteristics of the place itself plays. Based on a nationwide survey of 1001 residents in New Zealand in 2005 this research has shown not only that many of the dimensions of attachment identified overseas do apply in New Zealand but also that individuals and places can have separate identifiable influences.

As the international literature has shown, attachment to place is multidimensional and difficult to summarise in a simple model. The analysis of the National Attachment Survey resulted in five dimensions of attachment which have been used to characterise the New Zealand experience. Attachment by the sentiment dimension proved to be the most important followed by the friends and relatives dimensions. The fourth dimension was participation whilst the satisfaction factor was found to be relevant only in highly selective instances.

Not only is the notion of attachment itself multidimensional but the arguments that lie behind each dimension also differ. For example, the presence of children within the household increases the odds of having friends and relatives in the area and also increases the level of attachment through participation, however it has no independent effect on sentimental feeling or satisfaction of the community. Home ownership has a significant effect on sentimental attachment and attachment through friends, whilst being of New Zealand Māori ethnicity raises the likelihood of being attached; however this is only through the presence of friends and relatives.

If there is one single factor common to all dimensions of attachment it is being in an older age group. Older individuals are more attached and in more ways than younger individuals, with elderly individuals (those aged 60 and over) more likely to be sentimentally attached, have relatives nearby, participate in the community, and feel relatively more satisfied with the area they live in.

Of particular interest in this study is the relative importance of the characteristics of places themselves on people’s feelings of attachment. The use of the two characteristics of place was innovative. The conventional size
of ‘community’ was complemented with a settlement type variable which took into account both the size and the urban/rural-ness of the area including the distance to the nearest large urban centre. The settlement type variable, therefore, took the influence of urbanisation into account and provided a better representation of the diversity of ‘community’ within New Zealand. This also then showed that both size and proximity to metropolitan centres played a role in residents’ feelings of attachment (especially by sentiment), after controlling for their own personal attributes. The way the notion of attachment changes with the scale of the community should be investigated further. It is likely that what is meant by attachment in a small rural community will be different from that which applies in a large metropolitan setting. This has been hinted at from the findings of this research which showed that community attachment on all dimensions is lowest in the main urban areas.

The second innovation was including a variable measuring the socio-economic character of the area, in the form of the deprivation index. The interest in this centred on how individuals living in areas with relatively high and relatively low levels of deprivation judged their attachment – after controlling for attributes which rendered individuals different from one another on other grounds. The area’s deprivation index only featured in the first three factors obtained from the principal components: sentiments, friends and relatives. In each case, however, living in areas of relatively high deprivation reduced feelings of attachment.

The finding that living in a lower socio-economic area can reduce the otherwise positive impact which friendship and kinship play in fostering attachment is of importance, given the widespread belief about the importance of attachment in sustaining such communities. Given the policy interest in service delivery options in poorer communities when mobility rates are high (and by inference attachment levels are low) the relative weakness of friends and family based attachment may deserve greater attention than it appears to have received in New Zealand to date.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Kay Saville-Smith, Director of CRESA for providing access to the data from the National Attachment Survey for the masters’ thesis upon which this paper was based. CRESA’s continued support throughout is appreciated. I would also like to thank Professor Philip Morrison, Victoria University for his
supervision and guidance throughout this research and for his valuable comments on previous versions of this paper. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. Finally, I also wish to thank the New Zealand Population Association for awarding me the Statistics New Zealand Jacoby Prize on the basis of an earlier essay version of this paper and presented at their biennial PANZ Conference in Wellington, 3-4 July 2007.

Notes

1 This work was undertaken as a component of the FRST funded research programme Building Attachment in Communities Affected by Transience and Mobility led by Kay Saville-Smith (CRESA) and involving cross-organisational research teams as follows – Phil Morrison (Victoria University of Wellington), Philippa Howden-Chapman (Wellington School of Medicine), Cathy Wylie and Jane Gilbert (NZCER), Libby Plumridge, Gina Priestly (Auckland University) Bev James, Margaret Southwick (Pacific Health, Education and Research, Whitireia), Charlotte Williams, Mel Pipe (National Institute of Child Health and Development, USA) and Eric Olssen.

2 An additional 91 individuals contacted by NRB opted out of taking part in the survey.


4 For a related discussion of the role of place in the subjective wellbeing of respondents from the Quality of Life surveys, see Morrison (2007).

5 Research on contemporary Māori mobility and aspects of place attachment includes work by Kearns and Smith (1994) and Scott and Kearns (2000).

References


Labour Force Shortages in Rural New Zealand: Temporary Migration and the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Work Policy

KIRSTEN LOVELOCK*  
TERESA LEOPOLD†

Abstract

Contemporary economic and social change in the agricultural sector in New Zealand in conjunction with a time of full employment has ensured that labour shortages are an increasing reality for many primary producers. Increasingly too, changes in land use within this sector, especially where viticulture and horticulture have replaced sheep and beef production in some areas, have increased the demand for temporary seasonal workers. This paper explores how New Zealand immigration policy is responding to these changes in the agricultural, horticultural and viticultural sectors, paying particular attention to the use of temporary migration as a means to address labour shortages in these sectors through the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy. The paper draws on interviews with public sector stakeholders conducted in late 2007 and early 2008 where the objective was to explore the reasons for establishing the RSE policy, the process of policy development and anticipated outcomes. This paper outlines the intentions behind this scheme, observes current research in the area and highlights the need for further research on the use of temporary migration to meet labour needs in New Zealand.

New Zealand has experienced significant economic change in the last three decades which in turn has led to changes in labour requirements and demands. During this period the New Zealand government has focused on sectors requiring a high level of skill, for example, the health sector, information technology and business services, and how migration might assist in addressing labour shortages in these

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sectors. Skilled labour and migration have also attracted considerable attention from both the media and researchers alike. Labour market shifts and emergent needs have prompted various policy shifts that culminated in the development of an immigration strategy from 1987 onwards that attempts to attract skilled and business migrants to New Zealand as permanent residents (Bedford & Ho 2006; Benson-Rea & Rawlinson 2003). Not surprisingly, much of the debate in migration research until recently in New Zealand, has focused on the various implications of this major policy shift, consequent migrant flows and integration outcomes for new settlers (Iredale 2000, Lovelock & Trlin 2007; Nash et al. 2006; Watts & Trlin 2000). Thus, there is an established body of research which has focused on skilled migrants and permanent migration policy in New Zealand over the last two decades and there is ongoing research in this area (Bedford et al. 2002; Bedford et al. 2005; Trlin & Spoonley 2005).

Yet, despite some evidence of a shift toward a knowledge-based economy and the subsequent labour demands that this generates, New Zealand’s export economy remains primarily dependent on agricultural production and arguably will continue to be so into the next century. This predominant means of production carries with it significant labour demands and requires both skilled and semi-skilled workers. With respect to the latter, the local labour market has struggled to provide the seasonal, casual and in some cases permanent semi-skilled labour required by the agricultural sector.1 Bedford and Ho (2006) observe that temporary migrants and policy to address temporary migration have become increasingly important over the last decade in New Zealand. Here however, the focus has tended to be on acknowledging that temporary migration can serve as a tool to facilitate permanent migration of skilled workers in what has become an increasingly competitive global market (Cobb & Clarke 1997; Iredale 2000).

However, temporary migration is also a means of addressing semi-skilled labour shortages, where permanent settlement is neither the intention nor the outcome. The important role that temporary migration plays in assisting producers in horticulture, viticulture and agriculture reach their production objectives should not be underestimated. Temporary migration is emerging as an important component in migration policy and practice in New Zealand, however not all temporary migrants are the same, nor will they share the same trajectory of experience. Temporary migration
practices have important economic, social and cultural implications for both New Zealand society and for those countries supplying the labour, and consequently demands long term research attention.

The Agricultural and Horticultural Sectors

Agricultural production in New Zealand contributes over 60 percent of export earnings (Statistics New Zealand 2008). The agricultural workforce comprises nine percent of the total New Zealand labour force and the labour takes place on approximately 66,000 farms, dispersed throughout the North and South islands (Statistics New Zealand 2008). The agricultural workforce of approximately 103,000 workers is culturally diverse, aging, geographically dispersed, and has a diverse set of skills (Statistics New Zealand 2008). Over the last thirty years the agricultural sector has experienced increasing intensification: specifically there has been a decrease in the number of farms, an increase in stock levels and increased mechanisation across the sector. There have also been significant changes in land use in some regions, with some producers moving out of grazing and grain cropping and into viticulture and horticultural production (Le Heron & Pawson 1996; Lovelock 2008; McLeod & Moller 2006; MAF (1)).

These changes in land use and shifts in the profitability of some production practices have ensured changes in labour requirements within the sector. Specifically, sheep and beef producers increasingly rely on part time, casual and seasonal labour and there has been a trend of moving away from employing permanent full time workers (Lovelock 2008; M&W (1)). This shift in employment practice for these producers is due in large part to issues surrounding falling returns for their products, in particular wool and the subsequent inability to afford labour (Lovelock 2008). Further, those engaged in viticultural and horticultural production have a greater need and reliance on temporary seasonal labour (HORT (1); Le Heron & Pawson 1996; Lovelock 2008; M&W (1)). There have also been shifts and changes in ownership practices in the sector (Le Heron & Pawson 1996; M&W (1)). The emergence of corporate farms, which usually involve large land holdings, has ensured that some properties employ a significant number of both permanent and temporary workers (Lovelock 2008; Le Heron & Pawson 1996; MAF (1); M&W (1)). In some regions these corporate farms are predominantly engaged in dairying and finding an adequate and reliable
workforce to work on these properties has been difficult for employers (Lovelock 2008; MAF (1); M&W (1)).

Managing constantly shifting labour requirements has been an issue particularly in those regions where land use change has occurred relatively rapidly and where employers have also been experiencing the effects of long-term rural depopulation and loss of services (Lovelock & Leopold 2009). Attracting temporary, fixed term contract workers for work on a seasonal basis and/or attracting permanent workers into areas where public amenities such as schools, childcare facilities, health care and retail outlets (supplying basic goods), have been lost has been a significant challenge for many employers in rural New Zealand over the last two decades (Lovelock 2008).

The labour shortage in the rural sector is not new. Arguably, it has been a problem intermittently for this sector since the time of colonial settlement (Martin 1990). More recently, industry forums and their representatives started drawing attention to labour shortages and the pressing need to address these shortages in horticulture, viticulture and agriculture (HORT (1)). Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s many industry related publications addressed the economic consequences of not being able to attract workers in time for harvest. Some also raised concerns about the ‘work ethic’ amongst the local pool of labour, complaining that many of the young who remained in local areas did not want to work or were unreliable. Importantly, in this period, many in the horticultural and viticultural industries attempted to redress the labour shortages themselves (HORT (1)). It has been estimated that attempts to secure labour during these shortages led to as many as 80 percent of growers engaging in the employment of illegal seasonal labour from abroad (HORT(1)). While this practice raised issues with respect to border control it also raised issues with respect to the working conditions provided for these illegal workers.

**Demand for Semi-skilled Labour**

How the state responds to the ‘skill’ shortages in the rural sector, has been and looks as though it will continue to be, quite different to responses to skill shortages in sectors requiring high levels of skill. Most notably, it has involved the introduction of various schemes aimed at attracting temporary migrants; those that will stay only for the working season and then return
to their permanent place of residence. More recently these schemes aim to secure ‘return’ temporary migrants to work in the same industry – even on the same property.

Thus, while we see increasing flows of highly skilled migrant labour occurring across national borders, and, increasing international competition between various settler nations to attract these skilled workers, we also see new and reoccurring flows of low or semi-skilled labour across national borders. However, the flow of low or semi-skilled workers is also commonly a flow of temporary workers, where permanent settlement is not an intended outcome. Typically too, the market for temporary low or semi-skilled workers has become very competitive with various nations targeting labour sources from within their geographic regions and agricultural nations increasingly seeking seasonal temporary labour from their less developed neighbours (Massey et al. 1998; Hugo 2004; Martin 2008).

The development of formal temporary migration schemes is an attempt to regulate this migrant flow. In New Zealand as elsewhere, such schemes attempt to address the problem of primary producers acting outside of the law, to provide border protection and to offer some protection for temporary migrant workers whilst they are in New Zealand. Not surprisingly policy development in this area has drawn on established migratory flows and relationships within the region. Increasingly too, attempts have been made to address the social and cultural implications for sending communities – or more broadly still to address ‘development’ issues in the region (Katseli 2008; Levick & Bedford 1988; McPherson 1981; Ramasamy et al. 2008).

One of the key differences between semi-skilled migrants and skilled migrants is the intention of the state to ‘temporarily settle’ the low or semi-skilled and ultimately encourage the ‘permanent settlement’ of the skilled. Firstly, it is important to note that not all temporary workers seek permanent settlement, even if it is possible, and arguably this is as true for semi-skilled workers as it is for skilled. However, it is equally important to note that while this observation suggests a commonality between semi-skilled and skilled migrant workers, it is important not to exaggerate commonality between these workers. Critically, the difference between these migrant workers is that there is no intention on the part of the state to encourage the settlement of low or semi-skilled workers; there is intention
to settle the skilled – even if temporary migration is the necessary tool used to facilitate this outcome.

How an individual responds to state intentions is variable, but for the semi-skilled arguably an individual’s response is more constrained; not only by state policy, but also the economic circumstances of those they leave behind and the economic realities of what they as workers can command in remuneration from their host society and how much it costs them to remit home. For the unskilled or semi-skilled worker, intentions and ‘choices’ are constrained and typically shaped by very different economic, social and cultural realities than those that shape the experience of skilled workers. Thus, while globally it appears we have entered an era of increased mobility, where not all migrants seek permanency, it remains to be demonstrated convincingly that there has been a ‘blurring of the boundaries’ between different types of movements, as Bedford and Ho (2006:52) argue. It may be the case that skilled potential migrants will work temporarily, or study (up-skill), in a destination before deciding to seek permanent residence and it is the case that there is no obstacle to these workers achieving this under current immigration policy. However for the low or semi-skilled this option is at best constrained for some and not an option from the outset for those working under the Recognised Seasonal Employer Work Policy. The blurring of boundaries perhaps should be qualified as it appears to be peculiar to skilled migrants who come to ‘wait and see’ whether they will stay; while there is little blurring for the semi-skilled who come ‘knowing they are going home’. We need to be cautious about suggesting or implying commonality between the skilled and semi-skilled temporary migrant because it can obscure vast differences and inequalities that exist between skilled temporary migrants and low or semi-skilled temporary migrants, as well as their source societies and the host society.

**Temporary Migration**

Researchers in New Zealand have tended to treat temporary and permanent migration quite separately, and consequently, as Bedford and Ho (2006) observe, little consideration has been given to the relation between the two. This clearly has implications for our understanding of the nature of contemporary skilled migration. It also precludes a critical consideration of how we respond to migrants who have been categorised in this way. More
generally too, while little research has addressed the relation between both classes of migration, even less attention has been paid by researchers to temporary migration per se. This is perhaps because researchers have tended to focus on the state’s traditional emphasis and practice of settling people permanently in New Zealand.

The relative absence of a research focus on temporary migrant labour is notable, particularly given temporary seasonal migrant labour has been meeting our labour needs in agriculture since the introduction of intensive pastoralisation in New Zealand (Martin 1990). Over time the labour sources have changed and our labour needs have shifted slightly, but the process and practice of employing temporary migrant workers dates back to colonial settlement and continues to play an important role in sustaining and meeting contemporary labour needs in agriculture and increasingly horticulture and viticulture in New Zealand.

There is a small body of research in New Zealand which focuses on temporary migrant workers. This research provides valuable insight into the various schemes which have addressed labour shortages in urban and rural New Zealand through facilitating and regulating the flow of temporary migrant workers. In particular the research has focused on formal and informal schemes aimed at attracting temporary labour from the Pacific from the early 1960s until the late 1980s (Gibson 1983; Levick & Bedford 1988; McPherson 1981). In this period a number of formal and informal schemes operated and targeted specific countries in the Pacific. In 1976 these various country specific schemes were replaced by the South Pacific Work Permit Scheme and at this time a separate scheme was negotiated with Fiji to meet rural labour needs in New Zealand (Levick & Bedford 1988). The South Pacific Work Permit Scheme and the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme (PIIDS) represent a move on the part of the state to formalise and curtail temporary worker movement from the Pacific in a time of rising unemployment and provide an early illustration of the relation between temporary migration and development initiatives in the region (Gibson 1983). In this instance, the South Pacific Work Permit Scheme addressed the perceived need to regulate the informal movement of guest workers from (then Western) Samoa and was in part an attempt to enforce immigration regulations and the PIIDS explicitly addressed development concerns. Specifically, aid was given to facilitate industrial development in the Pacific, in particular to provide incentives for
New Zealand manufacturers to establish manufacturing employment opportunities in the islands and to provide training opportunities for workers in the Pacific (Gibson 1983; Levick & Bedford 1988; McPherson 1981).

The termination of the temporary work scheme with Fiji in 1987 and the curtailment of the informal guest-worker movements from Samoa in this period highlight how temporary migration schemes (formal and informal) can be vulnerable to economic downturn and rising unemployment in the host society. In this instance the economic downturn also shaped shifts in perceptions about the role that temporary migrant employment could or should play in development initiatives within regions and also served as a mechanism by which the host society could sanction political unrest in one source country, Fiji. Space precludes a full discussion of the aforementioned schemes and the processes that shaped their development and their subsequent demise. However it should be noted that these schemes are the historic precursors to the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy in New Zealand which currently facilitates and regulates temporary migrant worker flows from the Pacific. Many of the issues and concerns raised by researchers in the 1980s about these earlier schemes have been and will continue to be subjects of debate with respect to the RSE policy. This is, in part because the RSE policy is addressing the same issues that previous schemes set out to address, but also because the RSE policy differs from its precursors in that it explicitly attempts to be beneficial to all parties (Ramasamy et al. 2008).

Recently, researchers have focused on the RSE scheme, documenting the origins of the policy and the implementation of the scheme, as well as providing an initial evaluation of the scheme (Ramasamy et al. 2008). Other researchers have explored the implications of this temporary migrant scheme for Pacific workers, their households and communities (McKenzie et al. 2008; Gibson et al. 2006, 2008; Ramasamy et al. 2008). This research will be discussed more fully later in the paper.

These studies are part of a comparatively small body of research based literature on temporary migration in New Zealand, and this stands in stark contrast to the vast international literature that considers temporary worker migration for a wide range of sectors and in a large number of locales. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to review this body of international literature in any detail or to consider other schemes operating
in comparable settler and agricultural nations, it is important to note a number of reoccurring issues and concerns that emerge from this research record.

The International Context of Temporary Labour Migration

For nations that recruit temporary migrant labour there are issues that arise over protecting borders, addressing and managing illegal migration, and regulating the nature of the migration so that it remains temporary (Basok 2000). There are also issues surrounding citizenship and rights for temporary workers and access to welfare protection (Engelen 2003). To date the research record has demonstrated in a number of locales that temporary migrants are vulnerable to deprivation and exploitation, including poor housing, poor health provisions, social exclusion, poor health outcomes, and inequitable pay rates (less than that paid to local workers); the latter can potentially precipitate the erosion of work conditions for other workers (Basok 2000; Holmes 2006; Martin 2005; 2006).

Research has demonstrated that temporary migrant workers are often engaged in industries that are hazardous, e.g. agricultural injury and disease is a public health concern in industrialised nations and many of these nations rely heavily on the labour of temporary migrant workers in the agricultural sector (Bean & Issacs 1996; Ciesielki et al. 1991; Cooper et al. 2006; Culp & Umbarger 2004). There are also health outcomes for families when workers return, for example with AIDS (Ford et al. 2001; Goicoechea-Balbona & Grief 1992), or with significant injuries, with mental health issues, or with substance abuse habits developed abroad and continued at home (Hiott et al. 2008; Kim-Goodwin et al. 2004; Garcia & Gondolf 2004; Rust 1990; Sakala 1987).

With respect to policy in temporary migrant destination countries there tends to be an over reliance on self reporting mechanisms where typically workers are not likely to report difficulties for fear of losing the opportunity to work abroad and remit home, thus compounding vulnerability (Connor et al. 2007; Culp et al. 2004; Engelen 2003).

Qualitative research in the United States focusing on Latino workers reveals that they often experience considerable racism which manifests itself with respect to access to health care, obtaining reasonable work place conditions and in relation to their experiences in the local
communities within which they reside (temporarily) (Holmes 2006). Other health and cultural outcomes include migrants experiencing the ready availability of commodities which are affordable and may be consumed in excess, with alcohol being a prime example (Garcia & Gandolf 2004; Watson 1997; Worby & Oganista 2007). The temporary migration can also lead to changes in the sexual lives of temporary migrants whilst away working. This can have implications for their relationships back home and their health and the health of others when they return home (Gonzalez Lopez 2005). Managing remittances and adjusting to changes when they return home is also an issue for many temporary migrants (Grzywacz et al. 2006).

Additionally, the research record raises theoretical questions about how temporary work schemes contribute to and sustain segmented labour markets within the host communities and globally (Castels & Miller 1998). Ethnographic research has raised the question of whether or not temporary migrant labour can reinforce and reproduce local (host society) inequalities and associated prejudices (Holmes 2006). Further, the local labour shortage raises questions about why locals are no longer prepared to labour in these sectors and the ethics and economic implications of employing those from underdeveloped or developing nations to take up work that locals are no longer prepared to do.

Most industrialised countries have multiple programmes to admit temporary workers and while it has been established that there can be gains for the temporary migrant, the country of origin and the host country, it is also the case that temporary migrant programmes have been historically problematic, particularly for migrant workers who are low or semi-skilled and who are migrating from less developed countries to developed countries. Most host nations are aware of the issues and concerns outlined above and have increasingly moved toward developing policy that addresses roles and responsibilities more explicitly (Martin 2008; Katseli 2008). Increasingly too, some policy initiatives attempt to provide what is referred to as 'a triple win', which includes the migrant, the source country (or region) and host society all benefiting from the policy (Ramasamy et al. 2008). These triple win policies, including the RSE policy in New Zealand, explicitly address development and the role temporary migration can play in development initiatives (Martin 2008; Katseli 2008; Ramasamy et al. 2008). However, while contemporary policy makers grapple with addressing the
aforementioned issues and concerns, some also observe that no temporary migration policy will eradicate the underlying inequality that underpins the migration of low and semi-skilled workers and the ability of host societies to attract them and retain them on a temporary basis (Martin 2008). Others observe there are significant areas of potential conflict that need to be negotiated if desirable outcomes for all parties are to be achieved (Ramasamy et al. 2008).

In part the temporary migrant policy in New Zealand – specifically the Recognised Seasonal Employer policy has sought to anticipate inequity and discriminatory practice by making social security provisions available for some ‘classes’ of temporary workers, by regulating and monitoring working, housing and health conditions for these workers and by attempting to ameliorate negative impacts locally and in the migrant home communities. However, the RSE policy is still very new and whether some of the issues that emerge from the international literature will become issues with respect to this policy will not be evident for some time. Emergent questions will not be answered comprehensively until the RSE policy has not only been running for longer but also until researchers produce evidence based appraisals.7

Temporary Migrant Policy and Schemes in New Zealand

There are currently five visa and work policies for temporary seasonal work in the agriculture, horticulture and viticulture industries provided by Immigration New Zealand.8 These policies are:

- Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Work Policy
- Transitioning to Recognised Seasonal Employer Policy (TRSE)
- Variations of Conditions (VOC)
- Working Holiday Scheme (WHS)
- Working Holiday Extension (WHE)

This paper focuses on the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Work Policy.

In 2005/2006 the Department of Labour piloted seasonal work permits in the horticulture and viticulture industry, initially involving the
placement of 4,000 workers. In April 2007 a new seasonal labour policy was introduced, the RSE – Recognised Seasonal Employer Work Policy. While the largest proportion of temporary workers (19 percent) in New Zealand are from the United Kingdom, followed by China (12 percent), the great majority of seasonal temporary workers that are targeted under the RSE policy and those destined to work in horticulture and viticulture are from the Pacific. The RSE policy is open to all Pacific Forum states, initially involving the participation of five countries, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga and more recently including the Solomon Islands. There is currently a cap of 8,000 work permits that can be issued a year and the average permit is granted for a period of six months, with the exceptions being no longer than nine months.9

New Zealand employers must meet a number of conditions to be a Recognised Seasonal Employer and must meet a number of responsibilities toward the temporary migrant workers. The steps involved are: 1) the employer must apply to be a Recognised Seasonal Employer and be able to meet several criteria, including the ability to pay the minimum wage for thirty hours a week, provide accommodation, provide pastoral care, and pay half of the worker’s return airfare (Department of Labour 2008; Ramasamy et al. 2008) employers’ must obtain an Agreement to Recruit (ATR), which allows them to employ overseas workers to plant, maintain, harvest and pack crops, and, 3) the prospective worker who has an offer of employment linked to an employer with RSE status and who has an Agreement to Recruit (ATR) can apply for a visa offshore. Workers must apply for a Seasonal Work Visa (SWV), which involves obtaining certain clearances including confirmation of a current and valid passport, undergoing a police check, tuberculosis screening, provision of a medical certificate and a return air ticket. Workers must also attend a pre-departure workshop. There is an optional return for the worker in the following season if various conditions have been met. These conditions include evident compliance with immigration requirements, a continued labour shortage in New Zealand, and a new Agreement To Recruit (ATR) held by the employer (Department of Labour 2008; Ramasamy et al. 2008).

Whilst the number of temporary migrant workers employed under the RSE scheme is not large in relation to all migration movements, it is an interesting development and one that has parallels internationally, particularly in North America and Western Europe. Australia is also
currently developing a temporary migrant scheme that will address their labour shortages in agriculture and where they intend to seek labour from Pacific nations (DOL (2)). A number of legislative and policy and guidelines have been developed in New Zealand in response to this initiative; ensuring that these workers are protected by New Zealand employment and workplace legislation, in particular those concerning health and safety conditions at work.

The research record internationally suggests that temporary migrant workers are often vulnerable to exploitation and poor working conditions, especially when the system relies on self reporting of breaches of their employment rights. Certainly, it appears that the New Zealand policy makers have attempted to address these potentialities, but policy cannot insure against all vulnerabilities. Importantly, self reporting remains a feature of these protective policies and under-reporting is potentially an issue when breaches of employment rights arise. The research record in New Zealand is in its infancy, but anecdotal evidence suggests that some workers have had experiences that parallel the experiences of temporary migrant workers internationally (DOL (1)). Yet, it is also the case that some employers and communities have managed the process very effectively (DOL (1)). It would however be naïve to assume that New Zealand will manage this scheme without incident (Lovelock & Leopold forthcoming) and that all of the developmental initiatives will be fully realised.

The preferential status of workers from the Pacific is conditional on the failure of local recruitment, or when an employer does not have an established relationship for recruiting workers from other countries. Labour recruitment links with the Pacific have historical precedence and in part this has predetermined the Pacific focus (Levick & Bedford 1988; McPherson 1981; Spoonley 2006). Like its predecessors this policy also addresses development issues and concerns, but does so with the benefit of having these schemes to reflect upon. The RSE policy is also arguably more ambitious than its predecessors; attempting to realise what is referred to as the triple win for migrants, their countries of origin and their destination (New Zealand) through promoting co-development; this policy sits along other international policy initiatives with an explicit ‘pro-poor migration’ agenda (Martin 2008; Ramasamy et al. 2008; World Bank 2006a).
Remittances and Development in the Pacific

While remitting income back home is the dominant practice of temporary migrant workers globally, and it is acknowledged that these remittances contribute significantly to the economic wellbeing of kin in the countries of origin, typically development initiatives are not developed beyond these individualised transactions (World Bank 2006). The RSE work policy differs in this respect. Underscoring this relationship with the Pacific is an explicit intention to assist with development within the Pacific and to build on established aid relationships with Pacific nations (DOL (1); World Bank 2006; World Bank 2006a). Whilst the remittances back to Pacific countries will have an impact, managing this impact has been considered since inception (DOL (1); Gibson et al. 2006). Additionally, for some the exchange is not just one way as some of the employers in New Zealand have entered into joint venture enterprises in the Pacific and thus potentially will be providing employment opportunities in these countries as well as opportunities to work temporarily in New Zealand.11

Explicitly using migration as a means to alleviate poverty is a relatively new approach and one that has emerged as increasingly agricultural nations have required temporary migrant labour to meet their production needs. Increasingly too, semi-skilled workers are globally in demand, and consequently many industrialised agricultural nations requiring this labour are re-evaluating existing policy and developing policy that addresses development needs in the regions they seek labour from.12 Referred to variously as - pro-poor initiatives – or development sensitive immigration policies, these policies usually involve the development of bilateral agreements which attempt to address the needs of both the source and host societies – or where there is at least a conscious intention to develop a policy that is based on a greater degree of co-operation and reciprocity. However there is usually a caveat here and that is, that migration should not be considered the sole panacea for poverty in developing nations.

Thus, with respect to the RSE policy, the development of policy involved considering the needs of various Pacific nations and exploring how temporary migration might assist with respect to these needs whilst simultaneously addressing labour shortages in New Zealand (DOL (1), DOL (2)). Specifically, high rates of unemployment amongst the young is an issue
for a number of communities in the Pacific and the RSE initially intended to target this pool of labour and address the issue of rising youth unemployment for these countries. However, in the first year that the scheme has been operating the average age of workers recruited was in the mid 30s. Evidently these recruits were not those that were originally discussed as being the ones in need and those that would be targeted. One explanation that has been offered is that the source communities were concerned the first recruits make a good impression on the host communities and not undermine the further development of the scheme, and older migrants were perceived as being more dependable (Gibson et al. 2008). If this is the case it remains to be seen if younger recruits will be targeted in the future. Some temporary workers were disappointed on arrival and reportedly did not have very realistic understandings of what working in New Zealand would involve (McKenzie et al. 2007). These misunderstandings are being addressed through pre-departure induction programmes run by the Department of Labour.

Pastoral care for temporary migrants whilst in New Zealand has involved addressing issues of accommodation, language translation, transportation and general induction into life in New Zealand, including the provision of recreational opportunities and religious observance where appropriate. The Department of Labour is also in the process of developing pre-departure programmes and onsite induction. Employers are also engaged in developing relationships with the communities their workers come from with the return of these workers anticipated for the next season. All stakeholders seem to concur that this potential labour pool will be increasingly sought after, in particular by Australia, and that long term the employment experience and the strength of relationships with the workers’ communities will be key in sustaining access to this labour supply for agriculture, horticulture and viticulture in New Zealand.

Research on employer and temporary worker experiences in New Zealand is to be undertaken by the Labour Department, but to-date most feedback on the experiences of these workers and these communities has been largely anecdotal. Further evaluation will also be conducted by the Department of Labour exploring how the scheme has been operationalised, what support has been provided to the participating Pacific countries and their workers, short term outcomes and how risks have been managed (DOL (2); Ramasamy et al. 2008).
Follow up research on the RSE scheme in Tonga and Vanuatu has recently been undertaken and explores the benefits and challenges for participating Pacific countries and New Zealand, while final analyses were not available at the time of writing, results to date suggest that it will be difficult to generalise. That is, the impacts will vary between participating nations in as much as there are differences culturally, institutionally, infrastructurally and developmentally, between participating countries (McKenzie et al. 2008). For example, what is possible in Tonga will not necessarily be possible in Papua New Guinea or Vanuatu. Those islands that have greater English language competency, stronger infrastructure, and are less dispersed geographically, will be more likely to attract joint ventures from New Zealand enterprises (Gibson et al. 2008). This potentially means that the more disadvantaged might remain disadvantaged.  

It is also clear that there are considerable costs associated with participating in the scheme, including visas, airfares, health checks and clearance, internal transport and the cost of remitting payments back home (Gibson et al. 2006, 2008). Both Tonga and Vanuatu’s finance sectors are attempting to address these costs with upfront loans for workers (Gibson et al. 2008). It is evident that there are considerably more men accessing this scheme, than women. It has been concluded that it is too early to observe the impacts on households, however, initial indications are that the recruitment process has proceeded smoothly (albeit with some variability) and the RSE policy has opened up migration opportunities to poor rural households (Gibson et al. 2008).

Conclusions

While early indications suggest new opportunities have been presented for the rural poor in the Pacific through the RSE scheme, it is also clear that ongoing research is necessary given that the scheme is still very new and given that many of the social, economic and cultural implications of this scheme will only become evident over a longer time frame. The international research record clearly demonstrates that temporary migrant workers are often very vulnerable and it would be naïve to assume that all vulnerabilities have been circumvented in the New Zealand case. For example, New Zealand as a settler society has considerable experience in
settling the ‘permanent’ yet this process continues to be problematic. There is much less experience in ‘temporary settlement’ and we must ask what we have learned from past experiences. Will these temporary migrants experience racism in rural New Zealand? What other forms of social exclusion might operate – both here and back home? What will the long term implications be for these temporary migrants, local communities and their home communities?

There are many questions that need to be asked about the New Zealand context and ongoing questions that need to be explored in participating Island communities. It is clear that we need to remain cognisant of existing and long standing economic, social and cultural differences in the region if the risk of perpetuating, reinforcing and exacerbating existing regional inequality is to be avoided. All of the stakeholders agreed that schemes like the RSE are not a ‘fix all’ for poverty in the region, however, all also were optimistic that such schemes offer the opportunity for partnerships and a means by which various communities can offer employment to the rural poor.

There remains scope for research that explores what the implications are over a wider time frame both in the Pacific communities participating and in host communities in New Zealand. While the scale of temporary migrant workers employed in agriculture, viticulture and horticulture in New Zealand is smaller than that occurring in some other countries, it is nonetheless an important development and one that warrants ongoing research. It is equally critical that research which explores schemes and policies in New Zealand be situated with respect to international research in this area and that researchers ensure that good intentions do not serve to obscure outcomes and/or serve as a substitute for critical evaluation of this and other temporary migrant schemes in New Zealand.

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Notes

1 Interviews: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Meat and Wool New Zealand, Horticulture New Zealand and the Department of Labour.

2 Clearly this has wider implications with respect to the population composition of some rural areas, where increasingly the young do not stay to work, young families move to find more secure employment etc. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this in any detail, but ultimately it will have implications for seasonal workers also.

3 Space prevents a fuller discussion here, but clearly this has implications not just for those seeking to recruit workers, but also ultimately might have implications for the workers (Lovelock 2008).

4 Australia is currently developing temporary migrant policy to address labour shortages in their agricultural and horticultural sector and it is anticipated that they will also seek this labour from the same Pacific nations that New Zealand is currently targeting (DOL (1)).

5 Definitions of “skill” vary over time as too do certain skill demands. Yet even if these definitions are malleable, and they often are when host societies have immediate labour needs, it is seldom the case that a shift occurs that completely erodes the notion that skilled equals educated, professional and potentially permanent, and unskilled, equals low levels of education, labourers and invariably temporary (Martin 2008; Levick & Bedford 1988; McPherson 1981).

6 “Blurring” suggests that it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between “permanent”, “temporary”, “settler”, and visitor, circular, and or return. Arguably this might be the case for some, but not necessarily the case for all. “Blurring” even if unintentional, implies equity – an equal degree of choice over mobility and stability.

7 Some of which are currently being undertaken by the Department of Labour and some by the Pacific Island – Migration Study. Waikato University.

8 As of the 26 November 2007. These can be accessed online via http://www.immigration.govt.nz.nz/migrant/stream/work/hortvit/.

9 Department of Labour website http://www.dol.govt.nz

10 Lovelock and Leopold current project on temporary migration and employment in agriculture, horticulture and viticulture, will be completed in 2009.

11 Interview 3, DOL, Wellington 2008.

12 For example, Canada (Bram 2006) and Australia (World Bank 2006; Mclellan & Mares 2005; 2006).

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Once Returned, Twice Forgotten?
Asian Students Returning Home
After Studying in New Zealand.

ANDREW BUTCHER
TERRY MCGRATH
PAUL STOCK

Abstract
An important and often under-recognised group of returned migrants for New Zealand are Asian students who have studied in New Zealand. These students either return to their countries of origin in Asia or migrate elsewhere. We need to consider these Asian students within New Zealand’s broader engagement with Asia, rather than within the relatively narrower confines of educational marketing or psychological experiences that they are more often discussed. Based on research undertaken for the Asia New Zealand Foundation, this paper summarises the data and research on Asian students in New Zealand before commenting on the importance of these returning students on New Zealand-Asia relationships long-term.

The New Zealand government has invested a significant amount of funding into the recruitment of international students, the professional development of those that work with international students and research into the experiences of international students in New Zealand. However, relatively little research has been undertaken on the experiences and implications of international students returning to their countries of origin. This paper considers Asian students within international relations more broadly. Attention is focussed on how Asian

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students, who have studied in New Zealand and have returned to Asia, could be nurtured, maintained and developed as friends and allies to New Zealand longer term.

Despite decades of Asian immigration and Asian students, New Zealanders’ “Asian literacy” is poor. New Zealanders need to find ways to draw on the skills of Asian students to sharpen their knowledge of Asia. At the same time, we need to find ways to provide greater opportunities for our new Asian Kiwis to become “New Zealand literate” so they can make an effective contribution to the country as well as enjoy life in New Zealand to the fullest. Moreover, “New Zealand literate” Asian students can effectively promote New Zealand overseas.

There are already important linkages via returned students into the Asian region. Alumni networks build on existing connections and advance educational links. There are also person-to-person networks, computer-mediated communities, religious networks and other more informal networks between returned Asian students. All of these networks maintain important connections amongst New Zealand’s alumni in the Asian region. Strategically, there are important issues to consider around ongoing engagement between these returned Asian students and the further development of industry, politics and education in New Zealand. At a people-to-people level, the types of communities that returned Asian students establish and the success they have in entering the labour market are salient issues. There are also significant implications for New Zealand to consider: do these returned Asian students use their New Zealand study experiences to maintain and build linkages with New Zealand and are businesses, government agencies and the education system utilising these students as effectively as they could?

While more international students are choosing to and being encouraged to remain in New Zealand, the great majority still return to their countries of origin. Given that most international students to New Zealand continue to come from countries in Asia and return back to these countries, this paper addresses the question: “What is the impact of returning Asian students on NZ-Asia relationships?”
A Brief History of Asian Students in New Zealand

Students from Asia first came to New Zealand under the Colombo Plan in the 1950s, ostensibly as a form of educational aid somewhat aligned with New Zealand’s foreign policy. As a publication at the 50th anniversary of the Colombo Plan identified, “today, in New Zealand at least the Colombo Plan is remembered mainly as a plan for bringing Asian students to New Zealand rather than as a wide-ranging effort to support the development of Asian countries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001).

Alongside the Colombo Plan students, and eventually outnumbering them, was a cohort of private fee paying students. These private students were generally from the same countries as the Colombo Plan students; they paid their own way in a subsidised environment. The largest single group were Malaysian-Chinese largely unable to find places in local universities because of Malaysia’s bumiputra policy (a policy that positively discriminates toward Malay students being offered places at universities). During this era, many New Zealanders involved in tertiary education came into contact with these Asian students. Many of the Asian students who studied in New Zealand during this period appreciated the social and educational opportunities they were given. Their experiences in New Zealand were genuinely life changing and set them on a path to influence in their home countries.

The Colombo Plan era ultimately drew to a close in the 1980s. Changes in foreign policy priorities, aid objectives and educational philosophy in that decade brought about changes toward open market policies and selling New Zealand education to international students at full cost for tuition and services (for a fuller discussion of New Zealand’s changing policy toward international students, see Tarling 2004). Under open market policies, the bulk of new international students came from Asia and by the end of the 1990’s, increasing numbers were coming from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The importance of learning English, globalisation trends and desires for cost efficient, high quality Western style education appeared to be the motivating factors for those coming from China and elsewhere. Even though there was a dominance of students from China, there was also a greater diversity among international students, extending beyond Asia to other parts of the world, including the United States, the Arab world and
Europe. With the end of the Colombo Plan and education-as-aid, the full-fee paying Asian students that came to New Zealand became important for new reasons, in particular as an earner of export revenue.

**Growing Pains: The Asian Student as a New Zealand Export Earner**

“The Government has reversed its longstanding opposition to high fees for overseas students in a bid to earn export income from New Zealand’s education services”, proclaimed the *New Zealand Herald* on 27 December 1988, in relation to the soon to be enacted legislation that would allow New Zealand educational institutions to sell places to overseas students for profit. This change was to significantly impact upon Asian students.

Initially, numbers of international students to New Zealand reduced as the cost of education in the country became less attractive to families from South East Asia struggling to afford study and for whom the subsidised study of previous years had been attractive. However, along with the lifting of the subsidy came a lifting of the limits on numbers of places and the countries from which students could be drawn from. Initially, there was an upper limit imposed on the numbers of students from China. The overall effect was that international student numbers dipped in the early 1990s, especially from Asia, but began increasing through the mid 1990s, rising rapidly in the early 2000s before falling again gradually from a peak in 2004 (Figures 1 & 2).

In the open market, international students increasingly represented both income for public education institutions and the opportunities for consolidation of profit for many private education providers. During the decade of 1994–2004, both growth in roll numbers and the size of the education sector adapted to cater for the increasing inflow of students. Most export education marketing focussed on Asia, where there was perceived significant opportunity. China, in particular, along with Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), became very important markets and a flood of students came in to learn English and to gain a tertiary education in New Zealand. Primary and secondary schools entered the market and total numbers of international students peaked at a little over 120,000 in 2003–4, compared to barely 5000 ten years earlier.
Figure 1: Enrolments of international students in New Zealand by provider groups

![Enrolments of international students in New Zealand by provider groups](image)

Figure 2: Enrolments of international students in New Zealand by country

![Enrolments of international students in New Zealand by country](image)
The proportion of Asian students rose to around 87 percent of the international student body during this period and while numbers of students from other regions also increased, they did so at a more modest rate.

**Asian Students and the New Zealand Host Communities**

The increase in Asian students to New Zealand clearly had economic benefits. However, what quickly became apparent was that host communities were not necessarily prepared for the subsequent demographic changes in their neighbourhoods. In New Zealand, as the number of Asian students rose rapidly, the host communities became more aware of them. Host communities frequently provided goods and services such as accommodation, food, transport, recreation, entertainment along with the provision of education and its attendant services such as libraries, bookshops, teachers, and computers. The economic benefits of providing goods and services to international students became quite clear quite quickly. Estimates of the overall economic benefit to New Zealand by education sector are shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3: Economic benefits of export education in New Zealand**

| Source: Education New Zealand Statistics |
In 2003, the economic benefit was estimated to be $2.09 billion and in 2004, $2.15 with over 40 percent of that coming from China. A further 40 percent came from the export of education services to other parts of Asia. New Zealand’s export education industry had very significant links into Asia and had become an industry in its own right in New Zealand by the early 2000s.

The rapidly increasing numbers of Asian students through to 2004 coincided with increased Asian immigration, which was due, in part, to favourable changes in immigration policies toward non-Western countries after 1986. These policy changes also included allowing international students to work whilst studying and favouring them for longer-term migration on the completion of their studies. This combination effectively put a lot more Asian faces into the New Zealand host community, whether the host community was prepared for this shift toward a more diverse population or not.

Incidents of racial discrimination reported by Asian students tended to have greater impact on them than the positive attitudes and friendships they encountered (McGrath & Butcher 2004). Portrayals in the media of Asian students also added to host community views (Spoonley & Trlin 2004). Media reports tended to identify Asian students as being responsible for health problems, crime and as visa abusers (Rotherham 2003). High public exposure of negative incidents tended to magnify the influence on host community perceptions.

Interactions between Asian student communities and New Zealand’s host communities extended beyond New Zealand’s dominant Pākehā/European majority culture. Asian students – and, historically, Asian migrants generally – interacted in significant ways with New Zealand’s Māori population, although “[a]mong the recent chorus of shrill anti-Asian voices are some eminent Māori protagonists” (Ip 2009:2). There are also parallels between New Zealand’s Asian and Pacific migrant (and also local-born) populations: they both involve a level of return migration and migration onwards to other countries and both populations, because of their growing numbers and demographic strength, are becoming significant to New Zealand’s future (Didham & Bedford 2004). So while there was somewhat limited interaction between Asian students and Māori and Pacific populations in the early years of educating Asians in New Zealand (a result, amongst other things, of geography and socioeconomic status),
demographic realities will ensure that there will be increased interactions between these population groups going forward.

Until the late 1990s, New Zealand’s export education industry was largely unregulated. From 1999, however, a mandatory *Code of Practice for the Pastoral Care of International Students*, and relying on quality assurance, such as NZQA audits, were the main tools used as the means of assuring both care of students and quality systems in delivering education (Butcher 2004). However, little or no attempt was made to consider the effects on and of large numbers of Asian students entering education in New Zealand (Butcher 2003).

In four substantive reports by the then Tertiary Education Advisory Commission (subsequently the Tertiary Education Commission) addressing future directions in New Zealand tertiary education, international students received one fleeting reference, yet at the time they accounted for almost eight percent of the student body and their numbers were rising. Successive reports on the internationalisation of education have generally been largely ignored in relation to the opportunity afforded for building international relationships (see, for example, Back *et al.* 1998 and McInnis *et al.* 2006). ‘Internationalisation’ has largely been viewed within narrow terms and not with reference to broader issues of international relations long-term.

**Asian Students’ Views of New Zealand Culture**

The decade of growth for international education in New Zealand brought with it changes in the New Zealand environment for Asian students coming to study here. Frequently, Asian students encountered large numbers of other Asian students and, for many, much of their adjustment and socialisation occurred amongst co-nationals and other international students. Many Asian students reported limited opportunities to engage with New Zealand domestic students and with the host communities. Research shows that international students and Asian students in particular felt that the education they received here was of a generally good standard and that accommodation and living were generally good but a little more costly than the students would like (McGrath & Butcher 2004; Ward & Masgoret 2004; Ho *et al.* 2007).

Asian students readily report that New Zealanders are superficially friendly but somewhat reticent to engage in quality relationships (Ward &
There are exceptions and these frequently relate to quality home-stay experiences and deep lasting friendships with some domestic students but the majority of Asian students return home having not achieved a level of engagement with the host community or New Zealand student peers that they would have liked. Some Asian students have received negative messages such as racist remarks, financial exploitation or poor treatment by service providers.

Research on returning students showed the most frequently encountered problems returned Asian students identified in New Zealand were transport and communication. New Zealand’s poor transport infrastructure and the struggles to communicate well in English, along with experiencing cultural distance and being unable to make New Zealand friends, were also the leading problems encountered by international students who participated in a national survey in New Zealand in 2004 (Ward & Masgoret 2004). Asian students were less likely to maintain friendships with New Zealanders once they returned home if they had not developed those friendships in the first instance. The task of developing those friendships falls to Asian students as much, if not more, to New Zealand students; and to the institutions where Asian students study.

Research also illustrates that many Asian students ended their time in New Zealand with a desire to stay on but the lack of employment opportunities and the pull of home and family mitigated that desire (Department of Labour 2006). Approximately four-fifths of Asian students who study in New Zealand return to Asia. However, there are an increasing number of international students remaining in New Zealand after completing their studies. New Zealand’s Department of Labour reports that 17 percent of students granted their permit between 1997/98 and 2005/06 had gained permanent residence by June 2006, although this figure is lessened by the inclusion of the most recent cohorts (where migrants have had less time in New Zealand). If sufficient time is allowed, approximately 20 percent of international students gain permanent residence in New Zealand. This trend may be seen in part as due to the desire to stay on and to immigration policies that favour New Zealand trained graduates. As Asian graduates who return to Asia are a great resource, so are those graduates who remain in New Zealand: together, Asian students who return or stay are invaluable in building relationships between the countries of Asia and New Zealand.
During their time in New Zealand many Asian students formed friendships with their peers. Frequently, these friendships and networks were maintained after graduation and developed into successful business and community service relationships. Research shows that amongst recent Asian students studying in New Zealand, their friendships are more likely to be made amongst co-nationals and other internationals rather than with local domestic students and other New Zealanders (Ward & Masgoret 2004). At re-entry, many of these Asian students regretted that they did not engage more with New Zealanders and domestic students, although they also admitted that this was a demanding task.

By contrast, during the Colombo Plan era Asian students reported many friendships with local domestic students and host communities. This has implications for Asia New Zealand relationships, especially if it is accepted that the presence of Asian students living and studying in New Zealand offers a significant opportunity to lay foundations for future developing relationships. Of particular importance to us here are where those long-term relationships are with students who have returned to Asia.

**Home Again: Asian Students’ Perspectives on Re-entry**

The re-entry of graduates into their countries of origin is motivated largely by the twin factors of the pull from home and the lack of employment opportunities in New Zealand. Amongst return graduates, a common theme has been their under-preparedness for their re-integration into their home societies (Butcher 2003). Making good adjustments in the areas of lifestyle expectations, worldview change and the Asian work environment are all important for successful re-entry (McGrath 1998).

Re-entry research has demonstrated that in terms of the working environment, graduates tend towards two types of professions. The first type is work in family-owned businesses; often, there had been a purpose in overseas education for that. Frequently, overseas education related to plans for the family to expand their business in some way or other. Sometimes it might simply be to gain quality understanding and methods in running a business, such as accounting and business practices. Other times it was to ensure current technology could be incorporated into the business without the need to go outside the family for partnerships. Where the graduate returned to a family related business or enterprise the family had set in place
for them, inevitably they went through greater adjustments in returning to family desired levels of filial piety (Butcher 2003).

In contrast, the other tendency noted in earlier research has been where graduates were freer in their choices of job selection and the family had no intention of involving them in a family business. This second set of professional choice was a tendency amongst the graduates to move away from locally owned companies and local employers to overseas owned or multinational companies or employers. Seemingly contrary to the point noted above regarding the transportability of their New Zealand education, returnees’ commented that their overseas education was better fitted for international companies or multinationals and that they were more comfortable working in that type of environment as the work practices were more in keeping with what they were educated for in New Zealand. However, it is worth noting that these comments were made in discussing the contrast of working for either the family business or for a multi-national company; the issues around the transportability and relevance of New Zealand education nonetheless remain.

**Asian Countries’ Incentives for Returning Students**

Some Asian countries are also providing incentives for their graduate students to return, in particular China, who are adopting policies explicitly to draw back their students from abroad (Ip 2004). Iredale and Gao (2001), in a comparative case study of the roles of returnees to Taiwan, China and Bangladesh, identified benefits to an origin country in recruiting its overseas graduates to return and also showed the transforming and influential roles these same graduates have. Amongst the vehicles for ongoing influence these graduates form were the transnational communities that become agencies for social transformation and conduits for flow-on effects in business and other relationships. In a study of graduates returning to Indonesia, Cannon (2000) found a higher stock was placed on such things as changes in intellectual abilities, attitudes and cultural perspectives than on narrower career advantages such as salary and promotion, which frequently suffer in the immediate term as a consequence of time out for international education.

Many returnees retain contact with New Zealanders and with their own cohort of Asian graduates. These networks are retained in two ways,
formally and informally. Formally, Asian students may be part of alumni associations or international business or trade councils. However, these formal bodies are largely dominated by less recent graduates (Butcher 2003). Recent graduates, by contrast, use more informal links, including computer-mediated communities, such as chat-rooms or blogs (for example, Skykiwi, Ronga, Skype). These computer-mediated communities are increasingly seen as an important and ubiquitous feature in the migration experiences of skilled migrants, in the formation of their identities and in their settlement or re-settlement experiences.

Reflections on Enhancing New Zealand Asia Relationships

Amongst many Colombo Plan students there is tremendous good-will towards New Zealand because of the positive experience many of those students had while here and the ongoing contacts they have with New Zealanders and other alumni. Will the same be able to be said of present Asian students in New Zealand? Or has globalisation wrought its effect upon the world in such a fundamental way that we need to completely re-think how effective person-to-person relationships are? Should we instead undertake a broader, more significant engagement socially, politically and economically with the Asian region, whence most of these Asian students shall return? We would suggest that we need to be careful about how much we rely on nostalgia and the good-will of students past.

We need to support building, facilitating and maintaining person-to-person relationships between Asian students and others in New Zealand, whether that is done formally through educational institutions or informally through groups such as churches and sports-clubs. More often than not Asian students in New Zealand have found their social support through these informal groups rather than through any institutional support and yet these informal groups are often ad hoc and sometimes have hidden agendas (McGrath & Butcher 2004).

Not only do we need to strengthen these informal groups that play such a crucial role in providing social networks for Asian students, but we also need to address issues in the school or university, of mono-cultural curriculum and pedagogy; and in the society at large, of social exclusion and discrimination. We need to include “Asian students” as part of a broader conversation about what it means for New Zealand to engage with Asia.
Asian students need to be considered within the framework of international relations more broadly and not just within the education framework. Additionally, greater emphasis needs to be placed on grasping economic and social opportunities to ensure that the present generation of Asian students become significant on return in positively influencing their countries' relationships with New Zealand, so that these countries, along with their New Zealand graduates, become our friends and allies both now and in the future.

References


The Distribution of Personal Incomes 1951 to 2006; Māori and Non-Māori Compared

JOHN GOULD

Abstract
This research note draws on census data to chart the course of the distribution of personal incomes in New Zealand from 1951 to 2006. Gini coefficients (Ginis) are given for both total and Māori populations and for men and women separately. The overall trend has the shape of a shallow saucer, with maximum inequality in 1951 and 2006 flanking an interval of somewhat lower Ginis about 1986. There is a sharp contrast between time trends for males and females, the former showing increasing inequality throughout, while female inequality fell substantially from 1951 until 1991. Changes in Māori levels and trends of inequality were not very different from those of New Zealand as a whole.

Present day understanding of the level and trend of income inequality in New Zealand in recent decades cannot be said to be characterised by consensus, since studies already published are difficult to summarise or compare. This is because they have been derived from various data sources covering differing chronological periods, have employed different measures of inequality and have targeted different types of income recipients including households, individuals and the gainfully employed. Justification for adding to this existing array rests on the fact that this Note, unlike other studies, presents measures of inequality over an unusually long period, 1951 to 2006, and for both the total New Zealand population and important sub-populations of it, namely Māori and (for both of these) males and females separately. Data are taken from every second Population Census from 1951 to 2001, and additionally from the Censuses of 1986, a year which will be shown to be in some ways a turning point, and of 2006.

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Personal Incomes in the Census

It is well known that measuring incomes and their distribution from Census data presents difficulties, among them the fact that the results can only be at best approximations, since respondents are required only to report their income as falling in one of a small number of bands ranging (inexplicably) from 24 in 1981 to a mere nine in 1991. But offsetting the difficulties are two important advantages: Census returns are available for a uniquely long period, and they avoid the pitfalls of sampling bias by canvassing the whole population. It would be comforting if we could add that the Census also operates on concepts and definitions which do not change over time; but this, unhappily, is not the case. In particular, before 1981 responses to the income question were required to be based on income from sources excluding Social Security Benefits (=SSBX) whereas after 1981 the basis was income from all sources (=AS). Happily, the 1981 census offers income data on both SSBX and AS bases, making comparison possible and permitting some impression of the trend of incomes during periods spanning the year 1981 (surprisingly, some earlier studies based on Census data failed to notice this crucial change of definition in 1981).

A second major change relevant to the Māori outcomes reported here was the changing conceptual basis of identification as ‗Māori‘ in the Census. Until and including the 1981 Census this rested on biology (blood fractions) but from (perhaps) 1986 or (more unambiguously) 1991, this changed to self reported ethnicity. This Note acknowledges these two approaches by using, for 1991 and 2001, data for both the Māori Descent (biological) and Māori Ethnic Group (self reported ethnicity). A familiar method has been used to derive incomes from Census data. The numbers of respondents locating their income in each of the given ranges specified in the Census question have been multiplied by the mid-point of that range and the products summed. The use of the mid-point is known to underestimate incomes below the modal income and overestimate those above it. This however is no great problem where, as here, the interest is in comparing incomes and their distribution for various sub-populations and for different years, for in this case, the distortion mentioned will at least work in the same direction, if not to the same extent, for each or all of the elements being compared. It is however true that the level of inequality will be
overestimated, to an unknown extent, since underestimating low incomes and overestimating high ones must necessarily have that consequence.

In calculating mean per capita income for each population studied Nil responses have been omitted from both numerator (necessarily) and denominator. For the open-ended range at the top end of the distribution a roughly estimated figure has been imputed for the earlier period; for the most recent period, when very high incomes have become quantitatively more important, a mean figure from tax returns has kindly been supplied by Inland Revenue in private communications.

The measure used to report the degrees of inequality of distribution is the Gini co-efficient (hereafter ‘Gini’). Other measures of inequality, perhaps more sophisticated, are available, but the further away from the raw data one gets, the greater the chance that the econometric formula employed will impart a bias of its own to the result. For this reason, as well as because it is probably the most widely used indicator and thus opens up the widest possibilities of comparison with other studies, I have preferred the Gini to its alternatives. For my own information I have however also plotted Lorenz Curves, since identical Ginis do not necessarily imply identical distributions; where they do not, the curves cross somewhere in the middle. In the interests of space I do not reproduce the Lorenz diagrams here, but at points in the text where what they show seems relevant to the argument, I summarise their significance verbally.

The Income Background

We turn now to address the findings promised in the title. It is useful first, by way of background to present some of the comparisons generated in the course of calculating the measures of inequality. These are offered in Table 1. Columns 1 and 2 show Māori per capita income as a percentage of non-Māori income, respectively for the total populations and for those aged 15 years and over. The figures clearly disprove, in a long term perspective, the contention of a widening income gap between Māori and the rest. Starting from slightly under half of non-Māori incomes in 1951 Māori per capita income (all ages) rose to about 62 percent in 1986, fell back to 55.7 (Māori Ethnic Group) in 2001, and finally recovered to 58.6 percent in 2006.
Table 1: Relative incomes 1951 – 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Māori income as percentage of non-Māori income</th>
<th>Mean female income as percentage of mean male income</th>
<th>Female income as percentage of income of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ages*</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 and over</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981(SSBX)</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981(AS)</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991(MEG)</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991(MD)</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001(MEG)</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001(MD)</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006(MEG)</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MD = Māori Descent  MEG= Māori Ethnic Group SSBX= Social Security Benefits Excluded  AS=All Sources

* Note: ‘All ages’ income is calculated on the basis of the income of those aged 15+ averaged over the total population (while income data is not now collected for those aged under 15 years, in earlier censuses, these data were collected, with high proportions in the ‘nil’ category)

Thus considering all ages, Māori income improved relative to non-Māori, especially up to 1986, after which it had a relative decline. Similar patterns are apparent for those aged 15 and over, though the percentages are higher because the ‘all ages’ data is strongly affected by the relatively young population. In considering the population over 15, despite the relative increases in the 1960s and 1970s, if 1961 is taken as a benchmark, then the relative situation of Māori in 2006 is only slightly improved.

The transition from the SSBX to the AS basis in 1981 made little difference to the measured Māori/non-Māori ratio, since it brought about fairly equal percentage increases in the reported incomes of both populations. On the other hand, in both 1991 and 2001, Māori Descent income, and therefore its ratio to non-Māori Income, was substantially higher than that of the Māori Ethnic Group (=MEG). As I have pointed out elsewhere, the case for positive discrimination in Māori favour is in fact at its strongest when the Māori Descent (=MD) basis is used for enumeration.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION

but the MEG for calculating the degree of socio-economic disparity (Gould 2000:17-18).

The remaining columns in Table 1 illustrate the other great income disparity in post-war New Zealand, that between men and women. This was much wider, in the early post war years, than the Māori/non-Māori gap, but the gender disparity has been reduced more quickly than the ethnic one. This is chiefly because of the rapid increase in the proportion of women in the labour force, from under 25 percent of the 15 and over female population in 1951 to over 58 percent in 2001 (as compared with about 72 percent for men). The change from SSBX to AS in 1981 also caused a much larger increase in measured female income than in that of males.

From only 20.2 percent of male income in 1951, female mean income for New Zealand reached 53.5 percent in 1986, and unlike Māori income relative to the national total continued to rise thereafter, to about 62 percent in the early 21st century. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show female mean incomes, for New Zealand and for Māori respectively, as percentages of male mean income, while Columns 5 and 6 show the shares of total personal income accruing to females, again respectively for New Zealand and for Māori.

The Distribution of Income, 1951 to 2006

Against this background the findings in respect of income distribution are now presented in Table 2. Column 1 shows the trend of distribution for the total population. (Māori distribution will be discussed later). For 1981 Gini are given for both the SSBX and the AS bases, the trend on a consistent basis being given for the first three decades by comparing the values for 1951 and 1981 (SSBX), and for the later period by comparing 1981 (AS) and 2006. The difference brought about by the adoption of the AS basis is of course shown by comparing the two figures for 1981.
Table 2: New Zealand income distribution (Gini co-efficients) 1952 – 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>0.5842</td>
<td>0.3547</td>
<td>0.7759</td>
<td>0.6185</td>
<td>0.4194</td>
<td>0.8240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.5783</td>
<td>0.3542</td>
<td>0.7518</td>
<td>0.5846</td>
<td>0.3438</td>
<td>0.7998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.5773</td>
<td>0.3935</td>
<td>0.6984</td>
<td>0.5696</td>
<td>0.4315</td>
<td>0.7575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981(SSBX)</td>
<td>0.5616</td>
<td>0.4374</td>
<td>0.6473</td>
<td>0.5820</td>
<td>0.4293</td>
<td>0.7263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981(AS)</td>
<td>0.4833</td>
<td>0.3969</td>
<td>0.5057</td>
<td>0.4996</td>
<td>0.3907</td>
<td>0.5645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.4257</td>
<td>0.3696</td>
<td>0.4280</td>
<td>0.3908</td>
<td>0.3212</td>
<td>0.4175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.4405</td>
<td>0.4084</td>
<td>0.4292</td>
<td>0.4214</td>
<td>0.4245</td>
<td>0.3935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.4992</td>
<td>0.4871</td>
<td>0.4813</td>
<td>0.4719</td>
<td>0.4702</td>
<td>0.4560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.5048</td>
<td>0.4825</td>
<td>0.4878</td>
<td>0.4668</td>
<td>0.4775</td>
<td>0.4027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MEG = Māori Ethnic Group  SSBX = Social Security Benefits Excluded  AS = All Sources

Note: A declining Gini implies decreasing inequality i.e. 0 represents “perfect equality” and 1 “perfect inequality.

For the population as a whole there was a modest shift towards greater equality in the three decades 1951 – 1981, though the Lorenz curves cross. The proportion of people in paid employment substantially increased, especially for women, reducing the proportion reporting ‘Nil’ incomes and so, as it were, pulling the lowest stretch of the Lorenz curve towards the left.

The comparison of the two 1981 values gives, as was to be expected, an unambiguous result: the AS measure is substantially more egalitarian throughout the range. Again, though, the chief engine of the shift is that fewer report ‘Nil’ incomes, thanks to the inclusion of benefits for those not in the paid labour force. At the top end, not unexpectedly, the distribution is little changed by the inclusion of benefit income, and the 1981 (AS) curve crosses that for 1951.

The 1981 (AS) Gini is the starting point for comparisons up to 2006. Between 1981 and 1986, there was a sharp movement in the egalitarian direction. Though the reason for this is not obvious it is probably not a coincidence that, as Haines showed in a 1989 study, the total labour force increased more rapidly between 1981 and 1986 than in previous inter-censal intervals. Moreover, again unlike in the preceding periods, this increase was due more to a higher participation rate than a rise in the working age population. It was the female rate which brought this about,
however, the male rate actually fell slightly (Haines 1989:Infograms 1.1, 1.2:4–5). This difference doubtless helps to explain why between 1981 and 1986 female incomes moved much more rapidly than male towards greater equality of distribution.

Between 1986 and 2006 the trend turned decisively towards greater inequality; the Ginis suggest that it was at its steepest in the 1990s. From 2001 to 2006 the pace slackened; for the total population the trend towards inequality continued, but less steeply, while for Māori there was actually a modest reversal towards equality.

Overall, then, the conclusion seems to be that taking the two periods separately, each on its consistent basis, a modest movement towards greater equality from 1951 to 1986 was mirrored by a similar movement in the opposite direction between 1986 and 2006. In both sub-periods, however, the relevant curves cross, reflecting the progressively increasing importance of very high incomes. Three features stand out as unambiguous. The equalising effect on measurement of the change from SSBX to AS in 1981 is clear. There was a sharp movement towards greater equality between 1981 and 1986, though particularly for women; the movement for men, though in the same direction, was considerably less. And there was a steep trend towards inequality from 1986 (for men) or 1991 (for women) to 2001.

It is unsafe to rely on the 1981 ratio of SSBX to AS as a link between the two periods; the ratio would certainly not be the same for every subsequent year. But disregarding this caveat for the sake of interest, and applying the 1981 ratio to the 2006 Gini, it seems that the distribution of income for the population as a while may have ended up in 2006 little changed from what it had been in 1951.

**Male and Female Distributions**

A different and, from the analytical point of view more revealing, picture is painted when we consider male and female incomes separately. Table 2 Columns 2 and 3 permits the comparison. Female incomes were distributed very unequally in 1951, over 60 percent reporting ‘Nil’ incomes. This, of course, was largely owing to the low proportion of the 15 and over females in paid employment. By 1981, still on the SSBX basis, the proportion of female ‘Nil’ income responses had been virtually halved, thanks in part to
the increased proportion in paid work. Though still inegalitarian, the female distribution was therefore substantially less so than in 1951.

By contrast the male distribution had become appreciably more inegalitarian. Starting from the much greater inequality of female incomes in 1951, increasing male inequality and the opposite tendency in the female population combined to greatly reduce the gender difference in distribution between 1951 and 1981, even on the SSBX basis.

The inclusion of benefits in the Census definition of income reduced the measure of inequality for all populations, but because of their lower labour force participation the effect was greater for females than for males. The gender gap in distributions was therefore considerably smaller for 1981 (AS) than for 1981 (SSBX). The following inter-censal period, to 1986, resulted in a further narrowing of the gap. The measure of inequality declined much more for women than for men, who experienced an interruption to their otherwise unbroken trend towards greater income inequality which was modest as well as short-lived.

Although in 1951 the scope for greater female labour force participation had been very large, it was inevitably finite, and by 1986 further movement towards lower female inequality from this source was becoming harder to achieve. The decline of the female Gini between 1986 and 1991 was therefore very small, and during the 1990s it reversed to rise sharply.

Thus while from 1951 to 1986 the male trend towards greater inequality had been offset and indeed overwhelmed by a steeper female trend in the opposite direction, from 1986 to 1991 this female offset became less powerful, and from 1991 female increasing inequality reinforced the continuing strong male trend in that direction. Overall, the male shift towards greater inequality was very considerable; the increase in the Gini from .3547 in 1951 to .4825 in 2006 considerably understates it, because of the Gini-reducing effect of the change from SSBX to AS in 1981.

The sharp contrast between male and female patterns to 1991 suggests a novel way of looking at the determinants of overall income distribution. Instead of trying to identify a date from which the trends of national distribution changed from declining to increasing inequality and then searching for changing causal factors which might account for this reversal, the national experience might better be viewed as an outcome partly determined by the differing experiences of the two genders, the
distributional trends of which, and their determinants, need not have been, and were not in fact, the same.

It seems probable that the male trend was largely determined by factors which were worldwide and chiefly economic, such as changes in business structure and the structure of the workforce, an increasing level of skill differentiation, the greater opportunities for capital gains, and the increasing portability of a range of skills, especially in the more highly-paid professions, in management, and even in professional sport, putting upward pressure on earnings in such occupations in all except the highest income countries. As the same time labour-saving technological change and growing imports from low-wage economies combined to hold down employment and earnings in less highly skilled occupations in the service and manufacturing sectors.

By contrast, the determinants of declining female inequality were to all appearances much more varied, and arguably to a considerable extent non-economic. Admittedly the chief proximate explanation was the increase in the female paid labour force, but to account for this one has in turn to invoke the whole gamut of factors involved in the gender revolution in advanced post-war societies: ethical, legal, demographic, educational, political as well as more narrowly economic. Advocating such a gender-specific approach to explaining the trend of New Zealand’s national income distribution does not rest on an expectation that the national Gini would be a simple advantage of the two single gender Ginis. Such an assumption is invalid. Arithmetically speaking, the outcome for income distribution of the merging of two sub-populations into a whole depends on three factors: the relative sizes of the sub-populations, the shapes of their distributions, and their relative mean incomes. All three are important. Thus, for example, if two sub-populations say male and female have exactly the same size and have Lorenz curves of exactly the same shape (and thus identical Ginis), but differ in mean income, adding the two together will result in a total population which has a curve and a Gini different from those of either of the sub-populations. The merging will have added disproportionately to the lower income segment of the higher income group and to the higher income segment of the lower income group.

It therefore cannot be guaranteed even that the Gini for the total population will lie within the range defined by the Ginis of its two sub-populations, let alone that it will equal the mean of the two. But intra-
gender distributions are still important, and one would expect that a sudden change or a trend in the distribution of a sub-population, other things remaining equal, would result in a similar change or trend in the distribution of the whole.

These expectations are borne out in the results presented in Table 2. Of the 18 sets of Total/Male/Female Ginis in the Table, 13 have Ginis for the total which fall within the range defined by the Ginis of the constituents. The five exceptions are all for one of the last three years: 1991, 2001 or 2006. This is not surprising. By 1991, male and female distributions had become very similar, so that their respective Ginis defined only a very narrow range within which the total Gini might be accommodated. But of the 18 sets involved, all except two had a Gini for the total population higher than the mean of the male and female components, presumably reflecting the contribution of the inter-gender differences as well as the intra-gender differences. The two exceptions were Māori in 1951 and in 1971; the 16 of course include the results for 1991 (New Zealand only), 2001 and 2006, where the total Gini lies above the higher of the two single gender Ginis.

**Māori Income Distribution**

So far the Māori distribution has been mentioned only in passing. This is because there is little, perhaps surprisingly, which is different about it. In the levels and trends of distribution for the total, male and female populations, Māori experience has fairly closely resembled that of New Zealand as a whole. Māori started out in 1951 with male, female and total distributions rather more inegalitarian than New Zealand in general. This perhaps counter-intuitive relativity may possibly have reflected chiefly a difference between the incomes of the majority, still living in traditional rural areas, and those of the already growing number of Māori earning high urban wages, rather than inequalities within each of these separately. Between 1951 and 1981, the overall Māori distribution, like that of New Zealand in total, moved in the egalitarian direction, if at a slightly faster rate. Māori male incomes, though also becoming more inegalitarian, did so more slowly than those in the country at large. The behaviour of the Māori male Gini in these early decades is difficult to interpret; in particular the Gini value for 1961 is well below the values for both 1951 and 1971. But at
all events Māori were still slightly more inequalitarian in 1981, and the change from SSBX to AS did not alter that relativity.

In the following five years, however, Māori moved even more rapidly than the rest in the egalitarian direction. Indeed, the Gini for the Māori male population in 1986 is the lowest of all 54 Ginis in Table 2. In respect of equality of distribution, as well as of relative per capita income, 1986 was thus a successful year for Māori income experience. Between 1986 and 2001, Māori distributions moved as much as the national total. Male inequality moved between 1986 and 2001 even more sharply than that of males in general; female incomes continued towards greater equality until 1991, though slowly, and then reversed sharply in the 1990s. Between 2001 and 2006 Māori distribution recovered even more decisively than New Zealand as a whole from the inequalitarianism of the 1990s, the Gini for the total Māori population declining slightly, and those for the genders separately much more substantially. Over the whole 55 years Māori income inequality seems to have fallen, even after allowing for the effect of the 1981 change from SSBX to AS. The rise of male inequality was somewhat slower, and more erratic, than that of the New Zealand males as a whole, and the reduction of female inequality somewhat more rapid. This last contrast, in conjunction with the facts already presented in Table 1, suggests one feature of the Māori economic experience since World War Two which deserves more notice than it has so far received: Māori women have not only done better than Māori men; their income has equalised more than for non-Māori women.

Conclusion

The results of this analysis thus offer only heavily qualified support to the widespread belief that New Zealand has experienced since World War Two a dramatic reversal from an initial position of unusual income equality towards one of internationally marked inequality. For one thing, I pointed out in a book published more than 20 years ago that international statistical comparisons did not fully support the claim of unusual equality in the early post-war decades (Gould 1982:32-36). For the population as a whole, the long-term trend of distribution has the shape of a shallow U curve, with the most inequalitarian distributions, in 1951 and 2006, flanking a relatively – though only modestly – more inequalitarian interval in the middle. Young
people and those with shorter memories – and those who disregard the role
of women in the economy – have more reason for perceiving a trend
towards increasing inequality than others.

What is far more striking than changes in the distribution of
incomes of the total population is the sharply contrasting experience of the
two genders. This, incidentally, makes the approach which seeks to explain
the national trend in terms of a ‘turning point’, and changes in the
determinants at about that time, seem not very promising. Male incomes,
with one brief interlude, have consistently followed a path towards greater
inequality since at least 1961, and this path, moreover, became markedly
steeper towards the end of the period. The male trend, however, was
counteracted for most of the period by an even more pronounced decline in
female inequality, as more and more women joined the paid labour force. By
2001 female distribution had become just about as egalitarian as a male.
This raises the question whether, rather than being a mere passive reflection
of international experience, New Zealand’s income distribution may to some
substantial extent have been determined by internal factors, including some
by no means exclusively economic. It requires further research, however, to
determine just how distinctive New Zealand’s experience in this respect has
been. As for Māori incomes, some will find surprising the degree of
similarity between Māori and national levels and trends of income
distribution. To the writer, however, this finding adds one more piece of
evidence to a belief he has long held that changes in the differences between
Māori and non-Māori in terms of economic conditions have often been over-
stated.

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